Photo Jonathan Blair

Thursday, September 25, 2014

Nation-building in the Mideast? What is needed is a Sunni home in Mesopotamia

In an enthusiastic endorsement of Barrack Obama's new offensive in Syria, Brookings' Kenneth Pollack argues that the key to the stability of the region lies in effective nation-building.

In the face of innumerable failures and, over the last twenty years, of the progressive reconfiguration of Germany, Central Europe and the Balkans around newly created--or re-created--ethnic states, Pollack still argues that multi-ethnic or multi-communal nation-building is possible in the Middle-East, from the outside and without rearranging the absurd boundaries of the region. And yet, if it were successful (a big if), the most likely outcome of the strategy he outlines--arming a "moderate" Syrian opposition and helping it take control of the country against both Assad and IS—would be the rise to power, in Syria, of a Sunni regime that would be a mirror image of Iraq's Shia one, and under which you wouldn't want to be a minority: Alawite, Kurdish or Christian, in this case, instead of Kurdish and Sunni in Iraq.

As Pollack puts it, "ISIS is the symptom of that underlying problem, not the problem itself." Fine, but what is the problem and, in particular, what is the problem that can be resolved? He basically argues that the problem is the need to make Syria and Iraq into unified and functional social and political entities in spite of the tensions and the blood over decades of state-led communal repression of communal massacres and wars. This is indeed a problem, but one that nobody since WWII has been able to resolve, especially not through the "reconstruction" of infrastructure and civil society-building by foreign experts who have been failing miserably everywhere they have tried. And for good reason: what is being sought is not nation-building but nation denial, nation breakdown, nation oppression and nation fragmentation among artificial states. In a few rich democratic countries like Canada, the UK--barely-- and Spain--for now--it has been possible. Everywhere else, it just hasn't worked.

ISIS is the symptom of the failure of the state system that Britain and France, then the United States, and now the UN, have been trying to salvage for decades. It is the expression of a nationalist claim on the part of Sunni populations in Syria and Iraq that just will not--in the case of Syria--or that could not--in the case of Iraq--continue to live under political regimes that are dominated by other communities. Take the Sunni of Iraq and Syria out of ISIS--or the Pashtun out of the Talibans--and you are left with a weak movement devoid or territorial or social anchor.

Aside from the re-establisment of communal dictatorships that would happen to represent majorities, instead of minorities, nothing good can come from the kind of nation building that Pollack advocates. The only sustainable solution to the problem is the creation of a Sunni state on a territory that currently straddles Syria and Iraq. In this region, remember, Sunni arabs have no home, unlike the Kurds (almost), Shia Arabs, and Shia Persians.

As Jeffrey Herbst has been arguying for years, this kind of solution also beckons in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, I would add, in Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia and a number of other countries.

I can hear the standard objections: re-opening the border issues would lead to chaos and anyway, we don't do that anymore. We patch things up at the UN. Well, chaos is here and has been here for a long while and, as I mentioned before, we have in fact been doing lots of boundary adjustments in recent years, though only in Europe and almost exclusively with white people. The time has come to open up the communal state club to other peoples.

[First posted on http://opencanada.org/features/the-think-tank/comments/nation-building-in-the-mideast-what-is-needed-is-a-sunni-home-in-mesopotamia/ ]

Wednesday, September 24, 2014

The very strange turn of Brazil's electoral contest

On October 5, Brazilians will head to the polls after one of the most unexpected and tightly contested electoral process their country has seen since the end of the military dictatorship in 1985.

The official campaign had barely begun when, on August 13, it was turned upside down by the tragic death of presidential candidate Eduardo Campos. Young but already experienced and a very clever, capable and ambitious politician, he was bound to become a fixture of the Brazilian political scene and, possibly, at some point, President of the country. To all observers, however, it was clear that, this time at least, he had no chance of winning: running third with about 10% of voting intentions, he could at best ensure that no candidate would gain an absolute majority, forcing a second round in which he could play the kingmaker.

His death, however, opened the way for his running mate, Marina Silva, to make the run that she had planned but could not pull off when the party she tried to set up was unable to get on time the hundreds of thousands of signatures needed to register. Silva was already very well known in Brazil, as a moralist firebrand and fierce environmentalist who had resigned from Lula's cabinet and left his Workers Party (PT) in protest against the government's decision to allow transgenic soya to be cultivated in the country. In 2010, she was presidential candidate for the Brazilian Green Party and received 20% of the votes in the first round, a spectacular performance given the limited resources she had at the time and the tiny following of her party. Born in an extremely poor family of Brazil's Northeast and working her way up the Workers' Party and Chico Mendes' environmentalist movement in the Amazon, her trajectory is every bit as bracing as Lula's rise from a similarly poor upbringing to the presidency of the country.

Her sudden rise in the polls following Campos death may have been driven in part by a wave of sympathy for the man and by the huge media exposure that followed his death. Very quickly, however, what appeared to crystallize around her was a strong sentiment of rejection towards what is broadly perceived as a stale and rotten political status quo of which incumbent Dilma Rousseff's Workers' Party, shaken by a series of corruption scandal, is very much a part. The wave on which she surfs echoes the deep discontent that fed the massive street demonstrations of the Summer of 2013, during which hundreds of thousands of people denounced the billions spent on holding history's most expensive FIFA World Cup while Brazil's public services were still clearly those of a third world country.

Silva has kept the second place in opinion polls, and the last few ones put her head-to-head with Rousseff in what is now a guaranteed second round run-off. Nothing is set in stone yet however. Indeed, support for Silva has been wavering and some polls even put her in a technical tie with Aecio Neves, the candidate for the centrist Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB). Were Neves able to overtake Marina Silva, her sudden rise to political stardom would essentially be frozen in time, for at least four years. Such a result, however, would suit Rousseff and the PT as all polls give her a second round win in a head to head confrontation with Neves. Were Marina Silva to be the runner-up, the whole game would be thrown open, with the PT's grip on power very much under threat. In a strange twist of political fate, in other words, the outcome of the final round of this election could well hinge on who finishes second in the first one...

Now, what exactly could determine Marina Silva's final vote tally? Interestingly, not her program or that of her adversaries, for she doesn't really stand for any clear policy measure and is not particularly critical of that of her adversaries. Her politics is a peculiar mix of progressive ideas, particularly around environmental issues, and social conservatism, which has a strong appeal among evangelical Christians but also among a neglected but still sizable conservative Catholic bloc. The rest is unclear. The Workers Party has awkwardly tried to paint her as an enemy of social redistribution, accusing her of opposing the Bolsa Familia conditional cash transfer program that has become a political sacred cow because of its massive popularity among the country's still huge number of poor. In a poignant TV message that has been widely distributed, she has eviscerated the argument, using her personal experience of extreme poverty to powerful effect. She has had a harder time dismissing suggestions from the PT that her environmentalist convictions would lead her to oppose the exploitation of Brazil's massive deep water hydrocarbon reserves, another sacred cow as they are widely seen as a guarantee of an energy independence that Brazilians have long sought.

Neves' PSDB and its intellectual supporters have taken another tack, focusing on her ideological rigidity, on the limited openness to compromise she has demonstrated over her political carreer, on the lack of clarity of her proposals and on the limited administrative and technical expertise of her team and core followers, an issue the PT has also heavily insisted on. More generally, her ability to harness the discontent with "the system" that brought her the support of many young people is hampered by the sometimes messianic tone of her pronouncements and especially by the dogmatic opposition to abortion, drugs and gay marriage that makes her so appealing to her socially conservative base. She wouldn't need to lose much support in the richer and more liberal South Eastern part of the country to lose her second place.

In the face of Marina Silva's unexpected challenge, Dilma Rousseff and her party seem unable to exploit the massive advantages of incumbency and to lay out a clear program for her next mandate beyond the defence of a progress made essentially under Lula and largely inexistant since. The PT campaign has now become a huge attack machine, intent on eliminating what it clearly sees as a strong and credible challenge to the party's hold on power. Aecio Neves and the PSDB, very much in line with Fernando Henrique Cardoso's two mandates and with their continuing success at the state level, in Sao Paulo, have tried to present themselves as the pragmatic, serious and professional alternative to what they denounce as the ideological and amateurish management of the PT. That attempt was derailed by Marina Silva's rise and they also now focus essentially on her person and on the many damaging uncertainties that her election would entail. Although the electoral contest reflects quite a broad discontent with the very nature of the political system, we thus have an election that is dominated by the personal qualities, stands and attitudes of a candidate that was not even in the picture five weeks ago.

To some extent, this is understandable as Silva offers little else but herself and her abstract challenge to the way politics is done in the country. How different she would--or more importantly could--do politics once elected, however, remains unclear. For she would have to govern in a very peculiar political environment where the PT enjoys solid support for a largely political project centred on consolidating the party's hold on the state in the face of significant resistance from well-entrenched economic elites, where quite a large clientelistic right sells its vote to the highest bidder, and where more programmatic but small liberal and conservative factions try to usher in what they see as a modern capitalist democracy. Both the PSDB and the PT have proven adept at playing that complicated game, winning some battles and losing others. The nature of the game, however, clearly dismayed the many Brazilians that took to the streets last year, and for them Marina Silva looks like a way out. And yet, there may be little choice but for her to muddle though just like her predecessors.

Perhaps sadly for Brazilians, the very real short and medium-term challenges of the country take the back seat to this somewhat disembodied debate about "the system." Indeed, the columns of the country's newspapers are replete with discussions of the sorry state of an economy that is slated to grow at less than 1% this year and barely more than that next year, an inflation rate that is reaching 7%, a decline in inequality that is now stuck at what remains one of the highest levels in the world, the country's ever-shrinking industrial base, its sudden invisibility on the regional and international scene, and the criminal violence that year-in year-out produces more than 50,000 homicides. And yet, none of this seems to matter much, for now at least.

The three weeks separating the two Presidential rounds (the second will take place on October 26) may ground the debate somewhat. Many of the cards will already have been dealt, however, as the shape of the Congress will have become clear. On election night, in other words, keep an eye on who finishes second and on which parties get the largest shares of seats in the Chamber and the Senate.

Wednesday, September 10, 2014

Cannabis legalization is a sideshow. Illegal market management is the real game.

The Americas are slowly moving towards the full legalization of cannabis. Uruguay is still alone among national governments to have gone all the way, but for marijuana at least, hardline prohibition is quickly being replaced by a range of flexible arrangements, from the legalization of ‘personal doses,’ to the decriminalization of possession –as in the ‘ticket’ option being considered by Peter McKay. These changes are long overdue, and the fuller the liberalization, the better, in spite of the increase in consumption which should logically follow the drop in price and the lifting of sanctions. The benefits of consumption are most likely limited, but the potential negative health and social consequences of higher cannabis consumption pale when compared to the massive damage inflicted by tobacco, alcohol and prescription opioids. Moreover, much of the harm caused by the criminalization of cannabis is tied to the huge social and economic impact of marijuana-related arrests and convictions in the United States, an issue that would simply vanish with legalization.

Eliminating that part of the problem is a good thing. But the main challenge lies elsewhere. The War on Drugs has been an unmitigated disaster, mainly because it has created the conditions for mass murder in Latin America. In five years, between 2007 and 2012 and according to the latest available data (UNODC, 2014), 773,052 people have been murdered in the region: 274,585 in Brazil, 121,683 in Mexico, 92,274 in Colombia, 84,980, in Venezuela, 36,237 in Guatemala, and so on. By no means all of those homicides were drug-related, but most analysts agree that a very large proportion of them is tied to drugs or more precisely to conflict over shares of domestic markets and export routes. To this carnage, cannabis and its traffic have contributed very little. Cocaine is the culprit and its legalization, which would destroy the black market and eliminate the violence currently tied to it, is not in the cards. Not here, nor in Latin America. Something else must be sought.

By any humane standard, harm reduction in this case has to mean the reduction of homicidal violence and the limited liberalization that is politically feasible would simply not help. Decriminalization of cocaine possession and personal use, moreover, could very well lead to increased consumption and create larger, more valuable and more competitive drug markets. What is needed are policies that make those markets less violent.

This may seem far-fetched, but in fact, it is not. The largest drug markets in the world, North America and Europe, are not violent at all by Latin American standards, even the US’. Mexico, as it became the main hub of the global cocaine market in the 1990s and early 2000s, saw its homicide rate decline by half. Mexico City, the country’s largest drug consumption market, has a homicide rate of about 8 per 100,000, very low by regional standards. Similarly, Bogota, Medellin, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Recife have seen their homicide rates drop by between 40 and 70% without any indication that drug consumption was going down.

Illegal drug markets can be managed. Gang truces in El Salvador, albeit fragile, have proven to be very effective at reducing violence. On universities and their surrounding student ghettos all over Canada, there are very active drug markets that the police and traffickers themselves are very careful not to disturb and, as a result, drug-related violence is essentially non-existent. More explicit arrangements, which Mexico’s Jorge Chabat has called ‘Pax Narcotica,’ were clearly behind the decline in that country’s violence and its end, under Calderon, widely seen as the main reason for its descent into hell.

Drug legalization is no panacea: the main cause of drug overdoses in North America are perfectly legal opioid painkillers. The same holds for illegal market management: Mexico’s Pax Narcotica, for instance, threatened to destroy Mexico’s budding democracy and for that very reason, many supported Calderon’s disruptive and ultimately deadly offensive against traffickers. And yet, for as along as the legalization of hard drugs is not on the table, any serious attempt at reducing the harm that drug and drug policies beget must include an effort to manage illegal drug markets in a way that minimizes violence.

[First published on OpenCanada.org as “A less-violent, illicit drug market?” http://opencanada.org/features/the-think-tank/comments/a-less-violent-illicit-drug-market-it-is-possible/]

Tuesday, August 19, 2014

Brazilian elections monitor (1): the stakes

This is the first instalment of what I intend to make a weekly analysis of the ongoing Brazilian election campaign. Each post will analyze recent events and polls, as well as one or two particular themes (candidate profiles, regional dynamics, congressional elections, as well as state elections in the country’s three largest states: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais). The series will end roughly a week after the final results are in, i.e. after October 5, if there is only one round, or after October 26, if none of the candidates gets an absolute majority in the first round.

In this post, I will introduce the basic stakes of these elections, along with the most recent polling results, which have been affected by the death of Eduardo Campos, who was running in third place in the presidential race when he died in a plane crash, on August 13.

So, what is at stake?

Let’s start with reasons for the world to be interested in these elections. By any measure, Brazil is huge: fifth largest country in the world and fifth most populous. Seventh largest economy (after France and the UK, but before Russia. Canada is eleventh), fifth largest industrial and agricultural producer, sixth largest car industry, and so on. Regionally, it looms even larger, with about 40% of the territory, population and GDP of South America and almost half of the region’s military spending.

For much of its history, Brazil has punched well below its weight. A gentle giant protected by the American strategic umbrella and completely devoid of territorial ambitions, its raw size along with a clever and effective diplomacy have made it an anchor of regional stability in South America but essentially a non-entity at the global level. Decades of economic instability and hyper-inflation, along with a quasi-universal consensus around the development and protection of its domestic industry, dating back to the 1930s, have also kept it at the margins of the global trade and economic game. However, its huge market and formidable agricultural and mining potential have long sucked in large flows of foreign investments. Since 1994, moreover, economic stabilization, a degree of trade and investment liberalization, aggressive public investments, innovative social policy and an increasingly activist foreign policy have greatly enhanced Brazil’s visibility, status and influence in the world. It is now a prominent member of the most powerful global clubs and a player in most important negotiation venues (G20, BRICS, WTO), as well as an influential actor in global governance institutions, particularly the United Nations (where it is a perennial candidate to a permanent seat in a reformed Security Council) and the IMF.

As it rose to prominence over the last 20 years, Brazil has mostly played ball, nudging here and there but generally playing a constructive role in the chaotic redefinition of global governance that has accompanied the US slow retreat from prominence. Under incumbent Dilma Rousseff and her Workers’ Party (PT) predecessor, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (Lula), however, the country has taken increasingly confrontational stands towards the West generally, from its support of Iran’s claims to a “civilian” nuclear program, to its refusal to condemn Russia’s policy in Ukraine--which secured it a larger market share of Russia’s agrofood market following Moscow’s counter sanctions against the EU and the US). At the same time, however, Brazil’s taking this or that position, or taking this or that side would by no means be a game changer. With the marginalization of multilateral trade negotiations--where Brazil has become a formidable architect of veto coalitions--and as its complete absence from the discussions of the Ukraine and the Middle East crises has shown, moreover, Brasilia is not yet a major global player.

Regionally, and most obviously in the face of the deepening crisis in Venezuela, Brazil has abandoned the more neutral pro-democracy stand that had characterized its foreign policy since the end of the military regime in 1985. This has led to its virtual disappearance from the informal management of regional issues, leaving the space open for Colombia’s Santos, Mexico’s Nieto and Chile’s Bachelet, on the centre and centre-right, and for Ecuador’s Correa and even Venezuela’s Maduro on the left. Overall, the clever and effective regional governance led by Brazil’s foreign ministry and by activist presidents Cardoso and Lula has been replaced by a much messier regional game nobody is really in charge.

While it would be a wild exaggeration to say that the election could determine how pro- or anti-West Brazil’s policy could become, it is quite clear that the reelection of Dilma Rousseff would reinforce current orientations while an opposition victory would make Brazil once again the soft ally of the West that it had been well into Lula's presidency. Regionally, it would probably also mean a cooler attitude towards Venezuela’s current regime. Most importantly, however, it could open the way for progress on free trade with Europe and, in the same movement, for the further weakening of Mercosur, the trading bloc that Brazil forms with Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina and Venezuela, the last two of which are adamantly opposed to trade liberalization.

Overall, because even the Venezuela crisis is unlikely to degenerate into a regional conflagration, and also because Brazil remains a relatively marginal player globally, the results of the election are unlikely to radically affect global dynamics.

The domestic game is another matter. The election of Lula in 2002 was the culmination of the country's slow transition from the military regime that had governed it between 1964 and 1985. In this most unequal country long dominated by narrow elite coalitions, the election of a working class President born in the impoverished Northeast came as breadth of fresh air and then his reelection, with the massive support of the poorest sectors of the electorate, undoubtedly boosted the democratic legitimacy of the political system. Innovative social programs, quite aggressive adjustments of the minimum wage, extensive infrastructure and education investments (almost all of it, admittedly, a continuation of efforts begun under Cardoso) have given substance to the claim that, at last, the state was to serve all Brazilians.

In spite of this very concrete progress, and beyond the important symbolic effect of Lula's decade in power, there are few signs of further progress towards freer, more open and less corrupt political governance since he was elected. The congressional coalition led by the Workers' Party ("PT," for Partido dos Trabalhadores) has included some of the worst sectors of the good old clientelistic cliques, and often provided cover for their corrupt schemes. The party leadership itself, including Lula's closest lieutenants (but not Lula himself, apparently), was involved and then condemned for their use of a large-scale vote-buying scheme. Court nominations, including at the Supreme Court, have become ever more politicized--epitomized by the progressive weakening of the vote-buyers' sanctions. The country's huge national development bank, the BNDES, as well as its mega-oil company, Petrobras, have been increasingly used as political instruments, both for populist purposes--e.g. to keep gasoline prices artificially low--and to place and help party members and allies.

From those standpoints and except perhaps for Petrobras, which had slowly become more autonomous from the political powers that be, the PT in power has not been very different from its predecessors. But that is precisely the problem: Brazil's democratic consolidation seems to have stopped in its tracks, and there are worrying signs that it may be starting to move backward. It appears, in particular, that Dilma Rousseff and the PT do not stand for a particular political, social or economic program, but that they are instead strictly driven by their will to stay in power. If Dilma is elected this Fall and, as is most likely, if she completes her mandate, the PT will have been in power for 16 consecutive years. Worryingly, party president Rui Falcão recently said bluntly that the main reason the party wanted to reelect Dilma was to pave the road for the return of Lula in 2020 (unlike their American counterparts, Brazilian presidents are only barred from more than two consecutive mandates). Four years is obviously very long in politics, but the comment nonetheless testifies to a political project that, beyond the consolidation of the party's grip on the state, is a bit thin. In the context of the growing politicization of public institutions and public policy, moreover, such an outlook is not promising for Brazilian democracy.

This political stasis happens in the context of growing economic difficulties, with some of the slowest growth rates in Latin America (only "beaten" in that race by the likes of chaotic Argentina and Venezuela). The resource boom that sustained Brazil's relatively high growth rates of the first decade of this century appears to be over, while the country's quickly shrinking industry is less competitive than ever. Inflation is creeping up, in spite of the government's efforts to artificially control it--for instance by forcing Petrobras to sell well below profitable levels, crippling the company's ability to invest and sustain the country's now very slow march towards energy self-sufficiency. The huge investments tied to the World Cup and, in two years, to the Rio Olympics, are set to have little long-term economic impact and heavily constrain the government's investment plans. These difficulties, unfortunately, push the government towards short-term populist measures likely to deepen the country's predicament.

While Brazil's political development and its economic and public policies now moves like an oil tanker--not a bad thing when the recent past includes a military regime and the wild economic swings of the Collor de Melo era--the stakes of this election may well lie in the fate of the increasing closure of the political system and the consolidation of a short-term, populist and ultimately counter-productive economic policy.

In the next instalment of this monitor, I will briefly examine how the two other candidates would likely affect the tanker's direction.

Latest polls

According to Datafolha, one of Brazil's top pollsters, Dilma Rousseff remains in first place, with 36% of voting intentions, while Marina Silva and Aecio Neves, the still unofficial replacement for Eduardo Campos, were tied at 21% and 20% (a huge progress for Silva, whose ticket, with the late Eduardo Campos as Presidential candidate, was still stuck below 10%). This implies that a second round would take place and, in that eventuality, Datafolha's numbers suggested that Marina Silva would defeat Rousseff, a stunning reversal of all the polls done since the latter was elected in 2010...

Silva appears to be surfing on the publicity and universal wave of official and public sympathy for Eduardo Campos, a bright, popular, likable and pragmatic centrist politician that, remarkably, had a plethora of personal friends of all stripes. However, she is also a force unto herself. She enjoys broad and positive public recognition and commands respect, even from her political enemies and she received 20 million votes in the 2010 election. As columnist Dora Kramer recently pointed out, moreover, in the early stages of this campaign, when Silva was trying to legalize her own party, 27% of poll respondents supported her, more than anything Eduardo Campos ever registered.

By next week, the dust should have settled to some extent when we will look in more details at the main candidates and assess their prospects.


Thursday, March 13, 2014

Venezuela: Dark present, darker future

Venezuela is in bad shape. Daily demonstrations, barricades and fights with the police are adding yet more chaos to the country’s economic mess and violent crime wave. But if you assume that things can’t get worse, just wait. Here is a grim, and unfortunately quite likely scenario.The political dynamics in the country are intractably poisoned. The two sides are deeply entrenched while hatred, not rivalry, rules. Even the start of a dialogue is made difficult by the internal divisions that plague each side, with radicals ready to denounce compromise as treason. Leopoldo Lopez, the now jailed opposition leader that led the early demonstrations in Caracas, has become the face of the street protests and he wants nothing less than President Maduro’s resignation. This leaves no room at all to manoeuvre for Henrique Capriles, the opposition candidate in last year’s elections. In the government’s aggressive campaign against the “fascist” opposition, the President, Nicolas Maduro, tries not to be outdone by National Assembly President, Diosdado Cabello, who has been keeping some distance since the very night of the Maduro’s disastrous and razor-thin electoral victory.

Economic problems complicate developments even more. High inflation (already greater than 50 percent in 2013), decaying infrastructure, regular power blackouts and shortages of a wide range of basic commodities cannot be tackled without deep economic reforms. Most of these issues emerged under Chavez, but growing oil revenues previously enabled the government to patch things up. The problems are now much worse, and  oil revenues are not keeping up as prices do not increase any more while production—given chronic under-investment and continuing brain drain at PDVSA, the national oil company—declines. This will leave the government in Caracas increasingly powerless to protect its political base among the poor, especially if anything is done to tackle inflation and address shortages.  Both already hit the poor the hardest: they are the ones with little access to dollars, the worst protection against financial inflation, and the narrowest range of options for buying basic necessities. But government action to fight these plagues will hurt them even more. Higher interest rates and lower government spending, critical to reducing inflation, will make unemployment, still remarkably low, shoot up, while dropping price controls, a crucial step to address shortages, will make inflation worse for a while at least, something the poor can ill-afford.

The current discontent, in other words, will likely seep into the chavista base. Given the polarization between the two sides, however, this won’t reinforce the opposition. Expect instead a growing, amorphous and violent mutiny, expressing itself in spontaneous looting and haphazard acts of violence, very much along the lines of the 1989 Caracazo. This will aggravate an already frightful security situation with, once again, the most vulnerable as the primary victims of the unrest.

Here, too, government action is more likely to make things worse than better: as a consequence of past and current policy, the country is rife with guns, gangs and poorly controlled chavista militias. Even government forces appear to be only notionally under control as demonstrated by the recent arrest of state security agents following the killing of demonstrators. Reestablishing any semblance of monopoly over the means of violence, in the context of growing popular discontent, necessitates a massive use of force and a degree of unity and coordination among government and military leaders that is clearly not present at this time.

Amid such deepening tensions and anarchy, the most logical exit is a military coup. Given years of chavista cleansing within the armed forces and with the opposition essentially bereft of weapons, the game would play out within the regime itself. In such a scenario, options are many but two look most likely: Maduro himself could find inspiration in Alberto Fujimori’s “auto-coup,” closing the political system to introduce harsh reforms and clean up the security mess. With that said, National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello, a former lieutenant widely felt to have much tighter links with the military, is in a better position, especially as he could blame Maduro for the crisis and, given the reservations he has expressed in the past, present himself as a true alternative. In either scenario, foreign players, especially Cuba, will likely play an important role. This is another story, however. For now, the domestic game is most prominent, and prospects most depressing.

[This commentary was first published on the CIC blog: http://opencanada.org/features/the-think-tank/comments/venezuela-dark-present-darker-future/]

Wednesday, February 19, 2014

There is no "Beyond NAFTA"

IN 1994, NAFTA was as much integration as the needs and politics of its three member countries could afford them. Twenty years later current politics are less amenable than they were to deeper integration, and needs are fewer. Treaties are tougher to undo than to do, and NAFTA won't disappear. But a sequel --better, bigger, deeper--will just not happen. We are back to bilateral agendas, and we should focus on them.

North-American integration had two pillars: the auto industry, with truly North-American production chains, and the energy dependence of the United States on its two neighbours. Only the first was really a trilateral agenda and as the industry is now reconsolidating along a US-Mexico axis, with Canada an increasingly marginal partner, a core rationale for regional integration is withering. Energy proved crucial to the Canada-US deal, but was left out of NAFTA because of nationalist qualms in Mexico. Still, the US's unquenchable thirst for energy, and the reserves and investment needs of its neighbours created a sense of regional interdependence. This second pillar is now crumbling as shale oil and gas transform the US into a self-sufficient energy behemoth.

Twenty years go, moreover, there was no China factor. Yes "Asia-Pacific" was seen as the world's forthcoming engine of growth, but nobody could sensibly bet the house on Asian markets or see them credibly as an alternative to America's. How things have changed. China's share of Canada's trade is increasing as fast as the US' share is declining. The simple fact that Obama could dither for so long on Keystone shows how weak Canada's hand has become on what used to be the central strategic vulnerability of its neighbour. Obviously, killing Keystone will precipitate Canada's turn to Asia, but approving it would not alter the fundamentals: the two countries' economies are drifting apart and soon, the old joke about Canada getting the flu each time the US coughs will need to be "chinezed."

Mexico has been moving in the same direction, as China has become the country's second largest trade partner. The movement, however, is much slower and likely to be much less radical than for Canada. The degree of economic, social and cultural integration of the border area, now reinforced by the redeployment of the auto-industry, has created a level of interdependence that has probably never existed between Canada and the US.

With trilateral stakes so low, there is no logical reason for current administrations to spend scarce political capital on deeper integration and, surprise, surprise, they don't. Meanwhile, however, bilateral agendas pile up: infrastructure, security, environment, water, migration, visas, standards, and so on. The best way to address those challenges is to frame them from the outset as bilateral issues. 

In that new landscape, the US remains Canada's most important partner, especially, if anything, as its increasingly resource-dependent economy is now hooked--both literally and figuratively--on China. Mexico, moreover, matters for Canada and it is just ridiculous that some progress on travel restrictions had to wait for a trilateral meeting to take place. As a significant trade partner, an important link in the value chains of major Canadian companies, and a society with which increasingly close links have been built over the years, it merits more attention from "the Centre" than it has received. That attention should be freed from the NAFTA shackles in which it is still stuck in much public discussion and policy development.


Continentalism and North-American integration made lots of sense a generation ago and clever political leaders seized the day. The very same ideas have now become blinders. We should drop them.

[This post was first published on Open Canada.] 

Monday, October 21, 2013

Do No Harm (or at least try): Canada, Latin America, and international drug policy

More than a million people have been murdered in Latin America and the Caribbean over the last ten years, many and possibly most of them in fights over drugs, drug turf or drug trafficking routes. Violence, and by implication, drug trafficking, preoccupies the public and has become a priority in the region’s policy debates. Now, having trod the bloody path of prohibition and law enforcement for decades, the governments of the region are exploring new avenues. Some are toying with decriminalization and even legalization. In doing so, they join several European countries and various American states.

Standing in the way of this trend toward experimentation, however, are the international arrangements that currently govern drugs policy. For more than 50 years, a global drug regime centred on prohibition has tried to reduce consumption by eliminating production, and by punishing producers, traffickers, and consumers. Success has been elusive, to say the least. Global consumption of illegal drugs is at an all-time high; unregulated consumption of injection-drugs has been, and continues to be, a major vector of HIV and hepatitis; tens of thousands of mostly young men are dying in the trenches of the drug war; and hundreds of thousands more are spending their most productive years behind bars.

 Now a movement is under way to modify the current international drug prohibition regime, for instance by reclassifying cannabis as a less dangerous substance, or by formally enshrining harm reduction – like heroin substitution or safe-injection facilities­ –within existing treaties. A report commissioned by the Organization of American States and launched in May 2013 called for a more flexible approach involving systematic experimentation and suggested that decriminalization and even legalization should be considered, given the disastrous effects of current policies. Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico have decriminalized possession for private consumption of all illegal drugs and, in November 2013, following a vote by the country’s senators, Uruguay will  become the first country to legalize the commercialization of marijuana.

While the international organizations charged with enforcing the drug conventions have predictably criticized liberalization measures, they would have to change their tune if the legal regime were made more flexible. Resistance, however, is fierce; a number of countries oppose taking any steps toward liberalization, domestically or internationally. Japan, Thailand, Russia and China, as well as Saudi Arabia lead this group, but their position is strongly supported by many other states in Asia, the Middle East and Africa, all regions where many states still threaten and carry out the death penalty to deal with drug traffickers.

In this global debate, the United States, despite the increasing liberalization of its domestic policies towards addiction and cannabis consumption, has sided with the hardliners, and so has Canada. In the face of increasingly broad public – and police – support for a softer policy that would focus less on repression than on non-criminal sanctions, treatment and education, both countries are actively engaged in protecting the current regime and maintaining its rigid emphasis on repression.

Arguably, compared to the glaring hypocrisy of the Obama administration, the Harper government is at least consistent, walking the same rigid line in international circles that it does at home, where it is fighting harm reduction initiatives – such as Vancouver’s Insite safe-injection clinic – and, against all evidence and in the face of declining levels of violence, progressively implementing its law and order agenda, with mandatory minimum sentences and increasingly strict guidelines regarding the enforcement of drug prohibition.

More importantly, however, both governments are behaving in an equally callous way. At home, they must answer for their policies and can pay a political price for it. Abroad, they ride free as the horrendous consequences of the current international regime are felt by foreigners to whom they are not accountable. It is these foreigners whose bodies are piling up in the war on drugs across Latin America, and in Iran’s and Asia’s epidemic of injection drugs. They should be the ones setting the international drug policy agenda.

Decriminalization and legalization are certainly not silver bullets and their long-term consequences are still largely unknown. But given the disastrous failure that is the current international drug regime, it is cruel and counterproductive to actively prevent Latin American countries, and others, from asserting their right to try something else.

The decent thing for the government of Canada to do – and the United States, for that matter – is to abstain from pushing their domestic position on drug policy in hemispheric and international discussions. We should let those who are paying the price call the shots or, as they say in Mexico, those who pay the Mariachis pick the tune.

Tuesday, October 8, 2013

The Brazil-Canada spying scandal: What boys with toys have wrought

With their Anglosphere friends, a bunch of irresponsible boys playing computer games with their expensive toys have done lots of damage to Canada's relations with Brazil. After years of childish confrontation around planes, beef and petty criminal affairs and thanks to a large diplomatic effort, the bilateral relationship had become "normal." Two countries with distinct outlooks and increasingly divergent paths in global arenas (Brazil up, Canada down) were finding ways to work together in a variety of fields, while investments and trade, in both directions, were increasing, sometimes significantly. 

The spying scandal matters, but not because that relationship is important for either country. Notwithstanding the hues and cries of the Globe and Mail, trade with Brazil remains marginal for Canada, representing less than 1% of this country's imports and exports (see the graph below). Don't get sidetracked by the big numbers: trade with Brazil was worth $6.5bn in 2012 (down 2.7% from 2011, by the way), but in a sea of $916bn, this is nothing. Investment is a similar story. Don't let the number of companies involved fool you: most of the value is linked to a very small number of investments. Were Vale to sell Inco--which they would do for economic not political reasons--Brazil would disappear from the top ranks of foreign investors in this country. 

In fact, it is the very thinness of the relationship that makes this scandal so damaging: with so little at stake, good will and trust become critical, and this is what has been damaged here. From that standpoint, in other words, tapping Paulo Cordeiro's phone is at least as bad as penetrating the mining ministry's computers, for he was as good a friend of Canada as you would find in Brazil's diplomatic service. If he could be treated like this, everybody is fair game.

Manners matter where stakes are low. Obviously, manners have never been the forte of the gaming crowd…


Friday, August 16, 2013

Hamster Wheel Diplomacy

Over the last eighteen months, Latin America has been one of our ministers’ favorite destinations: Ed Fast spent three days in the region in March 2012, and nine more in April; Diane Ablonczy, on Fast’s behalf, visited for five days in November; John Baird for ten in February 2013; Stephen Harper travelled South for three days in May; and John Baird is just back from another thirteen days trip to the region. Colombia was visited four times, Peru three times, Chile and Mexico twice and Panama, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil once each. Of the hemisphere’s significant countries, only Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela were left out, the latter dropped at the last minute as the scheduled visit overlapped with Hugo Chavez’ death. There is clearly nothing flimsy to this government’s commitment to the region, which it identified as a priority almost as soon as it was elected. That simple fact is no doubt welcome in a region that has seen Canada’s interest flutter wildly over the years. But at some point, both Latin Americans and Canadians will be wondering what all these trips are about. And that point may well have been reached.

The Conservatives’ agenda, like the Liberals’ before them, focused mostly on free trade. But now that agreements have been signed with virtually all the governments interested, there is little of substance left to do. Those who haven’t joined the bandwagon won’t do it soon. Indeed, it is hard to see any hint of free trade in the political debates of Brazil and its Mercosur partners, which now include anti-liberal Venezuela and soon Bolivia and Ecuador. Some would like Canada to join the Pacific Alliance, but with free trade agreements already signed with all its members and support from them for Canada’s Asian/Transpacific Partnership strategy already secure, there simply is nothing substantial to gain without a readiness to liberalize immigration, something this government is not willing to contemplate.

Obviously, there is much more than trade to Canada’s relations with the region – a plethora of programs, ranging from technology and student exchanges to peacekeeping, human rights, good governance, public safety cooperation, training, and support have been set up.  In addition, with each visit, a slew of mostly small projects and programs are dusted up, renamed, refinanced or truly introduced. None of those announced recently, however, are really significant for these countries, and none truly matter for Canada.

Both critics and cheerleaders will say that active and visible diplomatic efforts impact Canadian companies present in those countries, sometimes positively, sometimes not. A number of large Canadian firms have become fixtures in the region’s mining and financial sectors but the complicated relations these firms often have with local governments rarely benefit when poorly-informed ministers breeze in for a short stay before returning to Ottawa.

At some point, insisting on progress in the face of paralysis becomes counter-productive. Consider the official press release from the meeting between Baird and Brazilian foreign Minister Antonio Patriota according to which the ministers “initiated work toward the inaugural meeting of the Canada-Brazil CEO Forum”, a forum that was established during Stephen Harper’s visit in… August 2011. One can’t help but conclude that the two countries’ “Strategic Partnership Dialogue” is weaker than it sounds, and that it may struggle when awkward questions pop up about real problems and deeply conflicting views.

Two such delicate themes immediately come to mind: visas and drug policy. The cost and difficulty of obtaining visas is developing into a major impediment to closer economic relations with the region. Indeed, the only article from one of the region’s major papers to mention Baird’s most recent visit, published in Colombia’s El Espectador, points out that trade between the two countries has declined substantially in the last year, and it fingers visas as an important reason for this. The regions’ increasingly liberal view of drug policy, feeding on years of bloody confrontation with traffickers, is also clearly incompatible with the rigid stance of the Harper government on the issue. Without anything to offer on these fronts, Canada’s hyperactive, hamster wheel diplomacy looks at best irrelevant, and at worst counterproductive.

The sustained efforts of the last fifteen years have probably established for good Canada’s credentials as a significant political and economic player in Latin America. Mexico, Chile, and now Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru have become real and reliable partners. Linkages with Brazil are increasingly deep and diversified, and, although the two countries often don’t see eye to eye, their mature relationship befits their status as serious global players. Canada’s trade, investment, and aid presence in the smaller countries of the region has become “normal,” which means usually welcome, but sometimes criticized. Now, until the government has something substantial to put on the regional table, it would be wise to adopt a lower profile and let the diplomats posted in the region quietly do their job. Repeatedly showing up empty-handed will make even our friends wish we hadn’t shown up at all.

[Originally published in http://opencanada.org/features/the-think-tank/comments/hamster-wheel-diplomacy/#.Ug5Wk-AmCxk.twitter]

Thursday, August 8, 2013

Brazil’s diplomats and the Canadian model

Canadian International Council head Jennifer Jeffs has an intriguing piece in the August 7 Globe. She argues that Canada should look to Brazil for lessons on how to engage the world effectively. I am not sure I agree, when I look at the very few hard results that Brazil got from all its efforts of the last decade. Clearly however, Foreign Minister John Baird, who is arriving in Rio for a two-day visit, will not be impressed with his hosts' "efficiency" when he hears the latest news about Brazil's diplomatic machinery.

Brazil’s Federal Account Tribunal, best thought of as an auditor general with judicial power, has just told Itamaraty, Brazil’s foreign ministry, that the top salary of its diplomats could not exceed $28,000 Reais per month (about C$14,000 or C$ 182,000 dollars a year as Brazilians are paid on a 13-months European schedule). This will come as a shock to Brazilian diplomats, some of whom currently make up to $60,000 Reais per month, or about C$ 390,000 a year...

Perhaps, reversing Jeff’s advice, Brazil's rank-and-file diplomats will be keen to “import” the tactics of their much, much poorer Canadian counterparts, who have been delaying the treatment of visa applications and refusing to take phone calls in foreign countries to get better salaries. For his part, and in keeping with his customary modesty, Baird may well try to sell his rigid stance in the face of those demands.


[Thanks to Fabricio Chagas Bastos for the tip on salaries]