tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-51467182570713348992024-03-14T02:46:29.487-04:00Jacaré mirimJacaré mirim means "little crocodile" in Guarani and, through it, in Brazilian Portuguese. Curious, big eyes, long nose. Not cute. Floats around much of the day. It is not really mean and anyway too small to be dangerous, but it can bite.
You get the idea.Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comBlogger115125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-11979145771855497632023-08-08T20:44:00.002-04:002023-08-08T20:50:27.852-04:00The Brazilian gun lobby's er... dysfunctions<p><a href="https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/herald/2023/07/21/para-compensar-corte-na-posse-de-arma-bancada-da-bala-negocia-decreto-sobre-aumento-peniano/">A funny one from my favourite Brazilian magazine</a>, although, unfortunately, gun proliferation in Brazil is a sad, very serious and, literally, <a href="https://forumseguranca.org.br/publicacoes_posts/armas-de-fogo-e-homicidios-no-brasil/">deadly problem</a>.<br /><br />Let me explain this one, because although a bit simplistic, dead on about the whole gun lobby, whether in the US, in Canada, or in Brazil.<br /><br />The Lula government has recently introduced a decree revising the extremely liberal regime of access to weapons that Bolsonaro had adopted, and which had led to a huge increase in the number of guns in circulation in Brazil. In many ways, it is very little, very late, and it is not even clear that it will survive congressional resistance. Given the government's weakness in congress, what little there is probably as much as can be done. The Congressional Gun Lobby ("a Bancada da Bala") has 267 members, out of 513 deputies in total, and is predictably going to war over this. The government may still win, but they will literally have to buy votes to do so--freeing money for the pet projects of enough deputies. <br /><br />The key is, most people affected already have guns, piles of them, and in may cases, they have bought a huge number of additional ones under Bolsonaro: the number of registered weapons went from 83,000 to 280,000 between 2018, when he was elected, to 2021, one full year before he was finally thrown out of power.<br /><br />That's the context.<br /><br />Now the text itself (revised Google translation):<br /><br />"To compensate for restrictions in gun ownership, the Gun Lobby is negotiating a decree on penis enlargement<br /><br />TOMA LÁ GÁ CÁ [A Brazilian expression meaning patronage]– The system of checks and balances of democracy continues to function normally. Dissatisfied with the presidential decree that radically reduced the CACs' right to own and carry weapons [CAC stands for Caçadores, Atiradores e Colecionadores/Hunters, Sharpshooters and Collectors], the Gun Lobby obtained compensation from the federal government. In the next few days, Lula should sign a new decree to provide penis enlargement via SUS [Brazil's public health system], in addition to discounts on Ferraris, Porsches, pickups and SUVs for all CACs.<br /><br />The solution was celebrated by federal deputy Alberto Fraga, from the PL [Bolsonaro's Liberal Party], who presides over the Bala Bancada. “I had already been complaining that the restriction on the sale of 9mm pistols would cause a crisis in trade and a feeling of deep insecurity in the masculinity of the Brazilian shooter”, explained Fraga. “That consolation will be welcome.”<br /><br />Taurus [a large Brazilian gun manufacturer] has already announced that it intends to change the production of rifles for that of penis enlargers, projecting a record profit for the next quarter."<br /><br />https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/herald/2023/07/21/para-compensar-corte-na-posse-de-arma-bancada-da-bala-negocia-decreto-sobre-aumento-peniano/<br />[About the picture: Sildenafil is the generic version of Viagra, and C.A.C. stands for Hunters, Sharpshooters and Collectors].</p>Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-11764299117105642352023-06-29T10:36:00.003-04:002023-06-30T16:06:37.587-04:00Canada's review of its Cannabis legalization policy<p><i> [This short comment marks the return of the Little Crocodile, exceptionally, with Canadian content, but only because it is about drugs and drug policy. I am letting go of administrative responsibilities and will be posting more regularly from now on]</i><br /></p><p>Cannabis legalization was to be reviewed after three years, that is, in 2021. The process was launched a year later and is still underway. <br /><br />Like many things this government does, it is shrouded in secrecy. What would we do without nosy journalists (in this case from <a href="https://mjbizdaily.com/internal-documents-raise-questions-about-canadas-cannabis-act-review/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=MJD_20230629_NEWS_Daily">the Marijuana Business Daily</a>)? <br /><br />The report will be prepared under the direction of Morris Rosenberg, former head of the Trudeau Foundation and author of the recently published report on foreign threats to the 2021 elections, which, to say the least, was thin. </p><p>Here is Andrew Coyne's take on it: "The report on foreign interference in the 2021 election by former Trudeau Foundation CEO Morris Rosenberg was even worse. O'Toole says Rosenberg did not interview any senior Conservative official for his report. Yet the report leaves the strong impression he did... The report says “[t]here was an opportunity to meet with representatives of major political parties” without saying who, refers to “interviews with party representatives” without saying which, even states “party representatives were pleased with the thoroughness of briefings..."<br /><br />Is there really no one else available for these things in Ottawa?</p>Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-52634425055985160212021-04-30T11:45:00.002-04:002021-04-30T11:48:58.391-04:00Bolsonaro and the Brazilian military<span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span data-offset-key="e52g5-0-0"><span data-text="true">Reacting on Facebook to <a href="https://opencanada.org/lulas-back/?fbclid=IwAR1W-Jll244fnPTPYQw2z-d5erYSPF0Pjiv7RBnsBG4njAKE-uzHCHlK3Wo">my recent piece on Lula in Open Canada</a>, Fraser Taylor pointed out that, aside from the Covid situation, the key variable was the role of the military: "</span></span><span><span class="d2edcug0"><span style="line-height: 107%;">the
role of the military. I think that a coup is unlikely but who will the military
support and what deals will be made."</span></span></span></span></span></span><div data-contents="true"><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="e52g5-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="e52g5-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span class="d2edcug0"><span style="line-height: 107%;"> </span></span></span></span></span></span></div><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="e52g5-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span class="d2edcug0"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I answered that </span></span></span></span><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
<o:AllowPNG/>
</o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:WordDocument>
<w:View>Normal</w:View>
<w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom>
<w:TrackMoves/>
<w:TrackFormatting/>
<w:PunctuationKerning/>
<w:ValidateAgainstSchemas/>
<w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>false</w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>
<w:IgnoreMixedContent>false</w:IgnoreMixedContent>
<w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>false</w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>
<w:DoNotPromoteQF/>
<w:LidThemeOther>EN-CA</w:LidThemeOther>
<w:LidThemeAsian>X-NONE</w:LidThemeAsian>
<w:LidThemeComplexScript>X-NONE</w:LidThemeComplexScript>
<w:Compatibility>
<w:BreakWrappedTables/>
<w:SnapToGridInCell/>
<w:WrapTextWithPunct/>
<w:UseAsianBreakRules/>
<w:DontGrowAutofit/>
<w:SplitPgBreakAndParaMark/>
<w:EnableOpenTypeKerning/>
<w:DontFlipMirrorIndents/>
<w:OverrideTableStyleHps/>
</w:Compatibility>
<m:mathPr>
<m:mathFont m:val="Cambria Math"/>
<m:brkBin m:val="before"/>
<m:brkBinSub m:val="--"/>
<m:smallFrac m:val="off"/>
<m:dispDef/>
<m:lMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:rMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:defJc m:val="centerGroup"/>
<m:wrapIndent m:val="1440"/>
<m:intLim m:val="subSup"/>
<m:naryLim m:val="undOvr"/>
</m:mathPr></w:WordDocument>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:LatentStyles DefLockedState="false" DefUnhideWhenUsed="false"
DefSemiHidden="false" DefQFormat="false" DefPriority="99"
LatentStyleCount="376">
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="0" QFormat="true" Name="Normal"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Normal Indent"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="footnote text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="annotation text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="header"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="footer"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="35" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="caption"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="table of figures"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="envelope address"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="envelope return"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="footnote reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="annotation reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="line number"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="page number"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="endnote reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="endnote text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="table of authorities"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="macro"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="toa heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="10" QFormat="true" Name="Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Closing"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Signature"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="Default Paragraph Font"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text Indent"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Message Header"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="11" QFormat="true" Name="Subtitle"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Salutation"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Date"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text First Indent"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text First Indent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Note Heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text Indent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text Indent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Block Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Hyperlink"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="FollowedHyperlink"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="22" QFormat="true" Name="Strong"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="20" QFormat="true" Name="Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Document Map"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Plain Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="E-mail Signature"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Top of Form"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Bottom of Form"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Normal (Web)"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Acronym"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Address"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Cite"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Code"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Definition"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Keyboard"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Preformatted"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Sample"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Typewriter"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Variable"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Normal Table"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="annotation subject"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="No List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Outline List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Outline List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Outline List 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Simple 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Simple 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Simple 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Colorful 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Colorful 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Colorful 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table 3D effects 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table 3D effects 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table 3D effects 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Contemporary"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Elegant"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Professional"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Subtle 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Subtle 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Web 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Web 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Web 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Balloon Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="Table Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Theme"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" Name="Placeholder Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" QFormat="true" Name="No Spacing"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" Name="Revision"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="34" QFormat="true"
Name="List Paragraph"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="29" QFormat="true" Name="Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="30" QFormat="true"
Name="Intense Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="19" QFormat="true"
Name="Subtle Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="21" QFormat="true"
Name="Intense Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="31" QFormat="true"
Name="Subtle Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="32" QFormat="true"
Name="Intense Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="33" QFormat="true" Name="Book Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="37" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="Bibliography"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="TOC Heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="41" Name="Plain Table 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="42" Name="Plain Table 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="43" Name="Plain Table 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="44" Name="Plain Table 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="45" Name="Plain Table 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="40" Name="Grid Table Light"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46" Name="Grid Table 1 Light"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51" Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52" Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46" Name="List Table 1 Light"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51" Name="List Table 6 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52" Name="List Table 7 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Mention"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Smart Hyperlink"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Hashtag"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Unresolved Mention"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Smart Link"/>
</w:LatentStyles>
</xml><![endif]--><span><span><span class="d2edcug0"><span>"the
military issue is complicated. Bolsonaro's has strong support among the rank
and file, as he does among the states-based "military police," which
has its own command in each state, and 50% more members than the federal military.
Officers are another story: Bolsonaro has talked the talk and brought several
generals in his cabinet--and they have brought other officers in their own
cabinets. When he talks about "his" military and disrespect standard
rules of promotion, however, the establishment is reminded that he was expelled
for violating military discipline as a captain, and they don't like that at
all. Lastly: Brazil will be a mess for at least another decade and they may
want to leave the management of the mess to civilians..."</span></span>
</span></span></span></span></div><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="e52g5-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="e52g5-0-0"><span data-text="true"> </span></span></span></span></span></span></div><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="e52g5-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="e52g5-0-0"><span data-text="true">Here is more meat around that bone: As the Thais Oyama suggests, the top brass are doing their best to protect the military from the increasingly broad backlash against Bolsonaro's criminal mismanagement of the COVID crisis.</span></span></span></span></span></span></div><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="e52g5-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="e52g5-0-0"><span data-text="true"> <br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="fc7j4-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="fc7j4-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="fc7j4-0-0"><span data-text="true">Here is the Google translation of <a href="https://noticias.uol.com.br/colunas/thais-oyama/2021/04/29/convocacao-de-pazuello-a-cpi-irrita-exercito-e-faz-clube-militar-estrilar.htm">a column</a> on <a href="https://www.defesanet.com.br/tfbr/noticia/40476/TFBR---Clube-Militar--O-Poder-das-Trevas-no-Brasil/">a recent letter by the head of the Military Club</a> and the link to the letter itself: </span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="a001p-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="a001p-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="a001p-0-0"><br data-text="true" /></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="cfen3-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="cfen3-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="cfen3-0-0"><span data-text="true">Thaís Oyama</span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="atp7t-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="atp7t-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="atp7t-0-0"><br data-text="true" /></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="1p92n-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="1p92n-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="1p92n-0-0"><span data-text="true">Pazuello's summons to COVID Parliamentary Commission Inquiry [CPI] irritates the Army and makes the Military Club go wild</span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="9fh9c-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="9fh9c-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="9fh9c-0-0"><br data-text="true" /></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="f9e66-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="f9e66-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="f9e66-0-0"><span data-text="true">04/29/2021 11h52</span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="dtcml-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="dtcml-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="dtcml-0-0"><br data-text="true" /></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="edmmh-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="edmmh-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="edmmh-0-0"><span data-text="true">The president of the Military Club, Reserve Division General Eduardo José Barbosa, published yesterday a text in which he defends the application, by the Executive Power, of the infamous article 142 of the Constitution - the one that talks about the use of the Armed Forces to guarantee "the law and the order "and which is brandished by President Jair Bolsonaro every time he feels run over by the Supreme Court.</span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="bom5d-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="bom5d-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="bom5d-0-0"><br data-text="true" /></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="cttbq-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="cttbq-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="cttbq-0-0"><span data-text="true">In the text, General Barbosa points to the Supreme Federal Court, the National Congress, the press, Minister Gilmar Mendes [a Supreme Court Judge], ex-President Lula and Senators Omar Aziz (PSD) and Renan Calheiros (MDB) - President and CPI rapporteur for Covid. None of the characters was named in the article, entitled "The power of darkness in Brazil". In it, Eduardo José Barbosa also says that the criticized institutions "chickened out" and now want to blame President Jair Bolsonaro "for what they did not let him do".</span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="4o2km-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="4o2km-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="4o2km-0-0"><br data-text="true" /></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="38kvk-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="38kvk-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="38kvk-0-0"><span data-text="true">The general's text needs to be read in perspective.</span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="e6qhh-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="e6qhh-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="e6qhh-0-0"><br data-text="true" /></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="8q6ve-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="8q6ve-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="8q6ve-0-0"><span data-text="true">The Military Club, a bunker for Army reserve officers, is the Force's most strident political voice. There, the generals, free from the restraints of active duty, shout at will against whom and what they want. General Hamilton Mourão presided over the Club when he accepted to be candidate for vice on Bolsonaro's slate, when he called Colonel Brilhante Ustra, a former DOI-CODI [military investigation units during the dictatorship, infamous for their use of torture] chief and the first military man to be recognized by the courts as a torturer, as a hero.</span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="dsms8-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="dsms8-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="dsms8-0-0"><br data-text="true" /></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="5rt31-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="5rt31-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="5rt31-0-0"><span data-text="true">But if General Barbosa's text is one or two shades higher than what even some of his most prominent reserve colleagues would adopt, it is certain that, at some points, it reflects precisely what even active duty officials think.</span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="5hjiu-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="5hjiu-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="5hjiu-0-0"><br data-text="true" /></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="8in2n-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="8in2n-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="8in2n-0-0"><span data-text="true">As one of them says: "It is intolerable to hear someone like Renan [the President of the CPI, a conservative anti-Bolsonaro who happens to be one of the most corrupt members of Congress] wanting to teach a moral lesson and summoning a uniformed general to testify".</span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="37dgt-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="37dgt-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="37dgt-0-0"><br data-text="true" /></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="5j99r-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="5j99r-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="5j99r-0-0"><span data-text="true">Covid's CPI scheduled for next Wednesday the testimony of the former Minister of Health, General Eduardo Pazuello, who is still active and is now in the General Secretariat of the Army, in Brasilia.</span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="9v02v-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="9v02v-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="9v02v-0-0"><br data-text="true" /></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="bnv9i-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="bnv9i-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="bnv9i-0-0"><span data-text="true">Not that Pazuello is very prestigious in the ranks of the Force. The maskless parade he performed in a shopping mall in Manaus last Sunday even angered the Army High Command (those who attended the inauguration ceremony of the new commander, General Paulo Sérgio Nogueira de Oliveira, could see how the members of the institution take the recommendations of the anti-covid manual to the letter: with the exception of Minister Braga Netto [the new Minister of Defense], who took off his mask for a moment when speaking, no one was without it for a second).</span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="7biqe-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="7biqe-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="7biqe-0-0"><span data-text="true">Pazuello's display of nonchalance in the mall, therefore, was seen as deserving even of a public reprimand by the Force command, which did not happen.</span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="bqj2g-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="bqj2g-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="bqj2g-0-0"><br data-text="true" /></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="70o03-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="70o03-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="70o03-0-0"><span data-text="true">But it is one thing for a general to suffer internal criticism from his peers and quite another to be "publicly embarrassed by people like Renan", as an active official in the government says.</span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="70o2o-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="70o2o-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="70o2o-0-0"><br data-text="true" /></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="6nt8q-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="6nt8q-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span data-offset-key="6nt8q-0-0"><span data-text="true">General Barbosa's text may call attention to the stridency, but it contains a message shared by generals, from active duty and in pajamas: it will be noisy if Covid's CPI, when targeting Pazuello, hits the Army.</span></span></span></span></span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="djo82" data-offset-key="ekc6t-0-0"><div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="ekc6t-0-0"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span data-offset-key="ekc6t-0-0"><br data-text="true" /><br /></span></span></span></span></div></div></div>Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-45728685974893490622021-04-30T11:35:00.002-04:002021-04-30T11:48:23.542-04:00Lula is Back<span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">Brazil is
going through the worst crisis of its modern history. As of this writing, the
pandemic has killed more than 400,000 Brazilians, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/mar/30/neighbors-shun-brazil-covid-response-bolsonaro">with 60,000 COVID-related deathsin March alone</a>, and reaching 20,000 per week in April. Mortality is on an
explosive growth path as hospitals are running out of oxygen and now of the
painkillers needed to intubate patients. Thousands are waiting for admission
into intensive care units while people are treated and die on hospital floors.
Bodies are piling up in morgues and cemeteries, and funeral homes are running
out of caskets. Infection levels are such that the country threatens to turn
into the world’s foremost incubator of COVID variants. </span>
</span></span></span></span></span></span><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">Meanwhile,
the president who bears much responsibility for the scale of the crisis and the
awful government response to it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/05/bolsonaro-brazil-covid-coronavirus-death-toll">tells Brazilians to stop “whining,”</a> complains
Brazil looks like <a href="https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/11/10/bolsonaro-diz-que-brasil-tem-de-deixar-de-ser-pais-de-maricas-e-enfrentar-pandemia-de-peito-aberto.ghtml">"a country of fags”</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g4K_WlfUhuI">publicly mocks people gasping forair</a>. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span>
</span></span></span></span></span></span><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">Incredibly,
Jair Bolsonaro’s political prospects were, until recently, not that bad. The
opportunism of the centre-right coalition that dominates Congress, the deep
divisions that plague the opposition, the relatively good growth expectations
for next year (<a href="https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WP/2021/English/wpiea2021066-print-pdf.ashx">+3.6%</a>), along with incumbency and a still sizable core group of
fanatical supporters gave him solid chances to win a second mandate in the fall
2022 presidential elections.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span>
</span></span></span></span></span></span><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">On March
8, however, a Supreme Court judge nullified the criminal conviction of former
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ruling that the tribunal that condemned
him did not have the jurisdiction to do so. His decision was endorsed in April
by the full Court, which also ruled the judge who presided his trial, <a href="https://theintercept.com/2021/03/15/brazil-lula-sergio-moro-supreme-court/">SergioMoro, had been partial</a> and decisions he made during the proceedings were
tainted. A new trial will take years to complete. In the meantime, the 76-year-old
da Silva is free to face off against Bolsonaro next year. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span>
</span></span></span></span></span></span><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">Lula, as
he is universally known, is by far Brazil’s most popular politician of the last
50 years. He ended his second mandate in 2011 <a href="http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2010/12/popularidade-de-lula-bate-recorde-e-chega-87-diz-ibope.html">with an 80 per cent rate ofapproval</a>, though corruption allegations have tarnished his reputation since. He
was president when billions of dollars of public monies were diverted to
political parties and intermediaries <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/01/brazil-operation-car-wash-is-this-the-biggest-corruption-scandal-in-history">in exchange for their support for hispolicies</a>. Evidence that he benefitted financially is evaporating by the day, but
the scale of the scandals and the involvement of several of his closest
advisors make his claims to be the victim of a full-fledged conspiracy difficult
to swallow. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span>
</span></span></span></span></span></span><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">However, out
of resignation or cynicism, Brazilian voters tend to see corruption as an
<a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2021/03/datafolha-expectativa-de-mais-corrupcao-sobe-a-67-e-bate-recorde-sob-bolsonaro.shtml">inherent part of their national politics</a>, especially if it is tempered with
meaningful action or change. And on this front, Lula is untouchable. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span>
</span></span></span></span></span></span><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">Helped by the
explosive increase in China’s demand for natural resources in the early 2000,
he presided over the fastest period of growth since the mid-1960s and,
crucially, the largest and broadest reduction of poverty in the history of the
country. While his progressive outlook doesn’t make him the first choice of the
business sector, he has proven to be remarkably pragmatic and credible rumours
already signal his interest in recruiting a centrist business person as candidate
for vice-president. Brazil’s economic elites would not fear a radical turn to
the left in the country’s economic policies were Lula to return to the
presidency. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span>
</span></span></span></span></span></span><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">For all these
reasons, he is Bolsonaro’s worst nightmare. Polls show Lula and Bolsonaro neck-and-neck
when it comes to Brazilians’ voting intentions — and this is without any
campaigning by Lula, or even a formally declared candidacy. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span>
</span></span></span></span></span></span><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 2in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">* * *</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span>
</span></span></span></span></span></span><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">Interesting,
you might say, but why should the prospect of an electoral victory by Lula more
than 18 months from now matter to Brazil, the Americas and Canada?</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span>
</span></span></span></span></span></span><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">Lula’s
return matters in Brazil because it changes the calculations of all political
forces in the country. On the Left, presidential hopefuls must now know that
they have to wait until at least 2026 to even think of winning, because their current
supporters will most likely vote for Lula in a polarized 2022 contest,. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span>
</span></span></span></span></span></span><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">Things are
more complicated on the right. The Brazilian Congress is fragmented, with 24
parties dividing up 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and 81 in the Senate.
The government’s core coalition is made up of only 150 deputies and 12
senators, while the opposition has 170 deputies and 18 senators. The balance of
power is held by the so called “Fat Centre.” Members of this group have no well-defined
ideology and are almost purely opportunistic. For them, their families, friends
and financial backers, bargaining every one of their votes, and getting
re-elected to keep doing it, is all that counts. With Lula in the picture, the
price of their support for Bolsonaro’s policies will increase and he will need
to demonstrate that supporting him in 2022, instead of Lula, will increase
their chances of winning. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span>
</span></span></span></span></span></span><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">All this
has shaken up President Bolsonaro’s life and weakened his electoral prospects. He’s
panicking, and it shows on several fronts. One year into the COVID-19 pandemic,
he’s finally announced the creation of <a href="https://www.gov.br/secretariageral/pt-br/noticias/2021/marco/presidente-bolsonaro-cria-comite-com-representantes-dos-tres-poderes-para-enfrentamento-da-covid-19-no-pais">a committee to fight it</a>. He’s replaced
several of his ministers. He’s tried — and failed — to increase his own
executive power while reducing that of Congress. He’s also tried to get the explicit
support of the military hierarchy for his opposition to the restrictive
COVID-19 measures imposed by some governors and mayors and in his fights with
the Supreme Court. These efforts backfired, however, when the commanders of
the army, navy and air force resigned following the dismissal of the Minister
of Defense, himself a four-star general, who was resisting Bolsonaro’s pressure
to involve the military in the politics of pandemic management. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">The long-term
domestic effect of Lula’s return would obviously depend on how he does in the presidential
elections. Were he to win, it is easy to see a period of Joe Biden-like
calmness and moderately progressive policies that would help stabilize the
country. Lula’s Worker’s Party doesn’t have a great reputation for competent
economic management. Party member Dilma Rousseff, who succeeded Lula as
president in 2011, squandered much that Lula had achieved. Still, it is
difficult to imagine anything worse for the country than the utterly anachronic
hyper-liberalism of Paulo Guedes, Bolsonaro’s current finance minister, whose narrow
obsession with privatization comes straight out of the 1980s. </span>
</span></span></span></span></span></span><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">Lula’s
return clearly matters for South America. In the short term, Brazil’s numerous neighbours
are bound to benefit from a more rational pandemic policy born out of Bolsonaro’s
growing fear that someone will capitalize on his mismanagement of the COVID
crisis<span style="background: yellow none repeat scroll 0% 0%; mso-highlight: yellow;">. </span>In the mid-
and long-term, the prospects of Lula’s regaining power would be encouraging in
a region where Venezuela remains the epicenter of the worst refugee crisis in
the America<span style="background: yellow none repeat scroll 0% 0%; mso-highlight: yellow;">’s</span>
history, where democratic crises are multiplying and where an experienced
diplomatic bridge-builder is sorely needed. Over his eight years in power, he was
the linchpin of a golden age of pragmatic regional problem-solving through
presidential diplomacy, and the face of a Left as committed to democracy as it
is to social justice. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span>
</span></span></span></span></span></span><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><span><span><span><span><span style="line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman \(Body CS\)";">Canada
should also root for Lula. Ottawa’s attempts to pressure Venezuelan President Nicolás
Maduro to hold open elections and stop violating human rights, along with
similar efforts directed at President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, are hampered
by the presence on its side of a Brazil led by<span style="background: yellow none repeat scroll 0% 0%; mso-highlight: yellow;">]</span> Bolsonaro, an authoritarian and overt apologist
of military rule. While Lula’s diplomacy never quite aligned with Canada’s core
strategic interests, its pragmatism, its support for multilateral diplomacy and
its commitment to a humane world order certainly accorded well with Canadians’
values and international outlook. Conversely, the re-election of Bolsonaro or,
worse, a coup in the face of probable defeat, would definitely plunge South
America as a whole into a period of instability and democratic decay, an
outcome clearly at odds with both Canadian interests and values.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">[<span><a href="https://opencanada.org/lulas-back/?fbclid=IwAR1W-Jll244fnPTPYQw2z-d5erYSPF0Pjiv7RBnsBG4njAKE-uzHCHlK3Wo">This piece was first published in Open Canada</a>]</span><br /></span></span>Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-13001924514097455762019-09-17T14:04:00.001-04:002019-09-17T14:04:49.170-04:00Thinking clearly about Amazon protectionThe world has suddenly rediscovered the Amazon. After a summer of record heat waves in Europe and North America, thousands of fires and a climate-sceptic, obnoxious, sexist, racist and proudly authoritarian Brazilian president have put the Amazon and its protection on the global to-do list and, more pointedly, on this past week’s G7 Summit agenda.<br />
<br />
This is great. The Amazon is the world’s largest rainforest and its largest reserve of biodiversity. It plays an important role in the planet’s carbon cycle and its destruction would have a massively negative impact on climate change. And yet, a fast-growing part of it is being destroyed on President Jair Bolsonaro’s watch.<br />
<br />
Over the last two weeks, as demonstrations were taking place the world over, a huge wave of aid offers, threats and advice have flooded the media, and the usual clique of universal experts and global spotlight grabbers — from Stephen Walt and Leonardo DiCaprio to our very own Lloyd Axworthy — have jumped in the fray. Most of the suggestions, however, seem to assume that the development of the region can still be largely stopped while others have been frankly counter-productive — for instance, sending "<a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-amazon-fires-brazils-president-is-committing-ecocide-we-must-stop/" target="_blank">multilateral green helmets</a> [...] across the Brazilian border."<br />
<br />
For the current energy not to evaporate as the rainy season starts in the Amazon and as temperatures drop in the Global North, it may be useful to drop those views and consider a few basic things that any serious endeavour to save as much of the forest as possible should take into account.<br />
<br />
First, and most importantly, the Amazon is huge: larger than Western Europe and, at 5.5 million square kilometres, as large as Canada’s 10 provinces together. Depending on how one defines it, between 20 and 30 million people live in the 60 percent of the Amazon that lies in Brazil, and millions more in the Colombian, Peruvian and Bolivian Amazon. Most of those people are poor and, with very few exceptions, their current livelihood and long-term life prospects are not consistent with the transformation of the Amazon into a huge forest reserve.<br />
<br />
The protection of forest thus calls for the creation of options for those people. This will be costly, and it will take time. Consider for instance that the US$20 million G7 aid offer represents less than a dollar per capita for Amazonians — or less than the carbon tax on 20 litres of gasoline that many Canadians are loath to pay. It also probably means that, even in the best of cases, a substantial portion of the forest will be destroyed in the meantime.<br />
<br />
Being serious about the Amazon means being ready to invest massive amounts of money into the long-term and necessarily slow and muddled re-engineering of its economic development. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, who managed Brazil’s Amazon policy from 2007 to 2009, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/opinion/amazon-rainforest-fire.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share" target="_blank">speaks for instance of a knowledge-based economy for the region</a>, an appealing prospect, but one that is also not realistic in the short or medium term.<br />
<br />
Third, the G7 countries’ track record on climate change commitment is patchy at best: Germany’s main source of electricity is still coal; Canada is building pipelines to export thick and dirty oil; the gilets jaunes movement in France was driven in part by opposition to a carbon tax; the Trump administration is doing its very best to keep the country’s energy matrix as dirty as possible; and so on.<br />
<br />
In other words, a serious attempt at tackling the problem calls for a long-term outlook, a willingness to invest large sums of money, a sizable degree of humility and the recognition that the main players will be Amazonian countries themselves. Now, with a man like Bolsonaro in charge of the largest chunk of the forest, some prodding will obviously be needed too, but the latter must be cleverly applied.<br />
<br />
This means leveraging the will and interests of local players. Brazilians are proud and protective of the Amazon and, as Robbert Muggah recently noted, most are shocked and ashamed at the current government’s policies and actions. The governors of Amazonian states and significant sectors of the Brazilian Congress are pushing the central government to fight the fire and enforce existing regulations, and they want to prevent Bolsonaro from weakening the latter. Powerful counter-forces must obviously be tackled — the large and powerful congressional “cattle caucus” for instance — and for this, sensitive pressure points must be exploited.<br />
<br />
The most obvious of them is Brazil’s sizable dependence on foreign agricultural markets. Brazil is the world’s top exporter of sugar, coffee, soy, orange juice and chicken, and it ranks third for beef and eighth for cotton. Credible threats of boycotts could thus in theory work wonders. The agro-business lobby in Brazil understands this and is already pushing the government to enhance the monitoring of illegal logging and enforce existing regulations.<br />
<br />
To have any hope of success, however, such pressure needs to be completely de-linked from any challenge to Brazil’s sovereignty, and tied to a credible and substantive offer of cooperation.<br />
<br />
A very promising avenue is being opened by Colombia and Peru’s call for a summit of Amazon countries on September 6. The G7 summit may be now over, but if leaders of those countries are serious about action on the Amazon, they should engage with this effort, commit to supporting effective action with significant resources, and make it clear that, while the effort must be led by Amazon countries themselves, inaction or worse could have real economic consequences.<br />
<br />
[This post was <a href="https://www.opencanada.org/features/how-think-clearly-about-amazon-protection/" target="_blank">first published on the Open Canada website</a>]Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-30881954981897807152019-08-24T08:55:00.002-04:002019-08-24T09:01:29.938-04:00Lava Jato: beware throwing the baby with the bathwater<div class="" data-block="true" data-editor="f2de8" data-offset-key="57n9m-0-0" style="background-color: white;">
<div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="57n9m-0-0" style="direction: ltr; position: relative;">
<div class="" data-block="true" data-editor="f2de8" data-offset-key="a814b-0-0" style="color: #1c1e21; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap;">
<div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="a814b-0-0" style="direction: ltr; font-family: inherit; position: relative;">
<span data-offset-key="a814b-0-0" style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="https://theintercept.com/brasil/" target="_blank">The trove of documents that The Intercept is posting online</a> shows increasingly clearly that Lava Jato Judge Moro and key prosecutors were targeting Lula to make sure that he would not run in 2016, thus opening the way for a victory of the Right.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Those who denounced the impeachment of Dilma and the arrest of Lula as a coup--among whom I was not--look increasingly right. The whole affair, well beyond clownish, violent and vulgar Bolsonaro, points to deep flaws in the country's institutional make-up and to strict limits to its supposedly democratic status. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">It would be tempting, therefore, to dismiss Lava Jato as a scheme, as the pure artefact of an attempt by the Right to get back to power, which would be a mistake.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Let's indeed not through the baby with the bathwater: though the proof against him personally look increasingly fraught, corruption was rife under the governments of Lula and his chosen successor, Dilma Rousseff (against whom nothing has been found) government.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">As the latest issue of David Fleischer's Brazil Focus (August 17-23) reminds us, the scale of those scandals is just mind boggling. </span><a href="https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/pf-deflagra-fase-63-da-lava-jato-e-investiga-suposta-propina-a-ex-ministros-da-fazenda-do-pt/" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">In one of the latest instalments of the investigation</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">, two of the PT's finance ministers are targeted: Antonio Palocci, who is already in prison and collaborating with the police, and Guido Mantega, "the longest-serving finance Minister in the history of Brazil," still free.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The latter is accused by Palocci of having received $R50 million Reais (about US$15 million) from Odebrecht, the big engineering firm that was at the core of the scandal. As Palocci is clearly trying to save his skin, this may or not be true, but in the meantime, judges and the Swiss authorities, on the request of Brazil, have frozen the bank accounts of Mantega: $R 50 million in Brazil, and $US 50 million in Switzerland, for a total of about US $65 million dollars.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Mantega should obviously be considered innocent until proven guilty, but this guy is the foreign-born son of Italian immigrants, he has a BA in Economics and a PhD in Sociology from the University of São Paulo. He has been close to Lula since the 1990s, he has taught in universities, worked for think tanks, and he was, for a while, an advisor in the PT administration of the City of São Paulo. His only real claim to fame is this long stint as Finance Minister for Lula and Dilma. And now, no doubt among many other assets, he has US$50 million in a Swiss bank account?</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">As the evidence piles up, of Moro's scheming and of engineering firms, banks and PT operators' getting immensely rich, Lula--and possibly Dilma too--looks increasingly like a pathetic tool cleverly used by a cynical mafia of conservative political entrepreneurs and long-time "friends" and "collaborators."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">It is to cry.</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-17178115550371504152019-02-28T14:06:00.000-05:002019-02-28T14:06:05.845-05:00A military intervention in Venezuela?February 23 marked the failure of two gambles against the regime of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.<br />
<br />
First, the opposition bet that Venezuela’s military would abandon Maduro and let a peaceful caravan of food and medicine cross the country’s borders from neighbouring countries; instead, it ended in tear gas, fire and death. Second, the Lima Group and most European countries bet that the recognition of Juan Guaido as interim president would lead to a peaceful collapse of the regime; instead, it ended in the embarrassed denunciation of violence that was always highly probable.<br />
<br />
Dreams of a tropical Berlin Wall bash were replaced by opposition demands for military action.<br />
<br />
The Lima Group is desperately looking for another path and is having a hard time finding one. At its meeting in Bogota on Monday, the alliance took a firm stand against military action, denounced Maduro’s use of violence to prevent the entry of humanitarian aid and reaffirmed its support for Guaido. It repeated its call for the military, and now the judiciary, to recognizeGuaido as interim president. The group also announced a series of diplomatic initiatives already under way at the International Criminal Court, the UN Human Rights Council and Human Rights Commission, and the OAS Permanent Council – in particular the recognition of Guaido’s envoys as legitimate representatives of Venezuela.<br />
<br />
Broad smiles and hugging aside, this is unlikely to satisfy Guaido. On Sunday, he echoed an earlier statement of U.S. President Donald Trump. He called on the international community to "consider every option to free this homeland.” Guaido is almost certainly worried that the current mobilization, already more than a month long, could lose its momentum – as has happened repeatedly in the past. Worse still, cracks have appeared in his ranks, and the familiar spectre of disarray again threatens the opposition.<br />
<br />
In this new phase, the United States takes centre stage, because from the beginning, Mr. Trump was adamant not to exclude the use of military force. The legality of foreign military interference in Venezuela would be on shaky grounds, but an “invitation” by Guaido – recognized broadly as the legitimate interim president of the country – could probably give the intervention some legal cover.<br />
<br />
Ultimately, the success or failure of such a move will rest on the nature and scale of the endeavour. In <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/02/25/with-us-military-action-venezuela-could-become-libya-caribbean/?utm_term=.f0c43c980827" target="_blank">a recent op-ed in the Washington Post</a>, Francisco Toro examines the challenges of such an intervention, noting the collateral dangers of a large operation and the difficulty of dealing with the criminal organizations – including Colombian National Liberation Army guerrillas – that control much of the country’s territory. He argues that Venezuela’s generals would quickly fold in the face of a credible threat and that its army should be spared to give the new regime a tool to reassert control over the country. Doing otherwise would turn it into a “Libya of the Caribbean.” His analysis looks sound, though the “credible threat” he favours looks a bit like another gamble. At a minimum, limited commando operations or targeted missile attacks may be needed to do the trick, while avoiding large-scale loss of life and the complete dismantling of the army. History reminds us, however, that such “surgical” operations can quickly get out of hand.<br />
<br />
Unsurprisingly, Europe, Canada and the Lima Group will have none of this. Even Brazil, whose President is openly nostalgic of the old days of his country’s military regime, has made it clear that it would not join a military operation against Venezuela or even let U.S. troops on its territory. Given the opposition’s growing desperation, however, this unfolding scenario risks leaving Canada and its allies on the sideline.<br />
<br />
Their bet on hardball diplomacy is coming back to haunt them: recognizing governments that enjoy no territorial or administrative control, and letting their leaders blatantly politicize humanitarian aid leads one down a slippery slope. Here, it could end up opening the way to an aggressive U.S. foreign policy that cares little for democracy but, if successful, will nonetheless reap much of the credit for toppling a heartless dictatorship. Were a Libya scenario to develop, Canada and its allies would find themselves forced to choose between owning something they didn’t break, or washing their hands and watching the disaster unfold from the outside. Whatever the outcome, I am not sure it shores up Canada’s claim to represent a bulwark of the global liberal order or a shield for the international rule of law.<br />
<br />
[Originally published on February 26 in The Globe and Mail, under the title "<a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-why-us-military-intervention-in-venezuela-would-be-a-risky-gamble/?fbclid=IwAR0VScALs5-o2mabgemWjzmOhCVHBUAZ8up2shZfFD1B-UQN-f5zNzXUcDg" target="_blank">Why U.S. military intervention in Venezuela would be a risky gamble</a>"]Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-88944890139648141672019-02-27T12:42:00.003-05:002019-02-27T12:42:52.984-05:00Who has skin in the Venezuela game?[<a href="https://www.opencanada.org/features/venezuela-foreign-players-most-stake/" target="_blank">Originally published by Open Canada</a> on February 11]<br />
<br />
The crisis in Venezuela obviously matters most for Venezuelans. On top of years of economic crisis, political repression, decaying infrastructure, withering education and social services, hollowed-out administrative capabilities, revolting corruption and stratospheric levels of criminality, they now confront the possibility of chaos and violence in an uncertain and likely drawn-out process of regime transition. At the same time, this very uncertainty holds the promise of a new economic beginning, with the prospect, dim but genuine, of a broadly legitimate political regime and of a rational economic policy.<br />
<br />
Venezuela’s current troubles also have significant ripple effects. Canada’s media and commentators have mostly focused on the wisdom and implications of Ottawa’s recognition of Juan Guaidó, the president of Venezuela’s National Assembly, as interim president of the country, and of its call, along with Lima Group allies, for the Venezuelan military to switch allegiance and abandon the current head of state, Nicolás Maduro.<br />
<br />
The reality, however, is that Canada has very little at stake in this crisis. It could enjoy a moment of glory at the vanguard of global democracy promotion, if Maduro resigns. But whether he does or not, Canada’s long-standing reputation as a diplomatic honest broker will suffer from its quick siding with Guaidó. The Trudeau government will also have to face an inevitable reckoning when it becomes clear that consistently applying this new “Freeland Doctrine” of forceful democracy promotion, in a world where dubious electoral processes and broad-based challenges of the governments they produce are common, is simply not possible (think of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, just last December). For Canada’s diplomacy and the credibility of its foreign policy, this is far from irrelevant, but a number of other countries have much more at stake than mere reputation or self-image.<br />
<br />
Colombia<br />
Colombia has suffered the brunt of the crisis, absorbing most of the three million or so refugees that have fled Venezuela’s economic and political collapse. The massive inflow of refugees has hit Colombia as it confronts a tricky stage of its peace process, with millions of internally displaced people to resettle, tens of thousands of coca farmers to bring back into the legal economy and thousands of former guerrillas to reintegrate into civilian life. While public opinion and the government have proven to be admirably open and generous towards Venezuelans, uncertainty and discontent are growing as the country continues to face severe public security challenges and still partial and unequal social service provisions.<br />
<br />
The flip side is that regime change in Caracas could both stem the flow of refugees and restart an economy that has long been a natural partner of Colombia’s. In the short-term, the fall of Maduro would put an end to the use of Venezuela’s territory by the National Liberation Army, significantly weakening the last guerrilla group that still refuses to demobilize and that has claimed the recent bombing that killed 20 people in Bogotá. For Colombia’s president, Ivan Duque, Maduro’s fall would be a great help.<br />
<br />
Cuba<br />
Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s former president, saw himself as an heir to Cuba’s Fidel Castro, and relations between the two countries have remained extremely close since Chávez’s death in 2013. Cuban advisors surround Maduro, as they did Chávez, Cuban doctors staff many of the regime’s “missions” among Venezuela’s poor, and Cuban military personnel support Venezuela’s security and intelligence apparatus.<br />
<br />
In exchange, Venezuela took over from Russia the transfer to Cuba of large amounts of heavily subsidized oil, which helped Havana keep its economy afloat.<br />
<br />
Crucially, in the face of the Trump administration’s aggressive stance towards the remaining “Leftist” governments of the Americas (Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela), and of the right turn of several previously sympathetic countries (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador), Venezuela gave “strategic depth” to Cuba’s diplomatic and military defence arrangement. Losing both the oil — which admittedly had been diminishing quickly — and a key buffer would represent a major strategic setback for Havana. For Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel and the still-influential Raul Castro, Maduro’s fall would be a costly loss.<br />
<br />
China<br />
Until now, China has refused to recognize Guaidó and made it clear that it would block any US attempt to use the United Nations Security Council to pressure Venezuela, for instance by suspending its membership in the multilateral body. Beyond that, however, the Chinese government has remained largely quiet, its media defending a peaceful political settlement and giving pride of place to negotiation efforts by the UN Secretary-General. That moderation could well be related to the Venezuelan government’s debt to China, estimated at $13 billion. The idea has been floated that China — and Russia — could decide to jump in to defend Maduro and take control of what many refer to as the largest oil reserves in the world. Notwithstanding the fact that much of that oil is probably not recoverable, the global oil glut, the sorry state of Venezuela’s production infrastructure and the poor quality of its heavy, sour crude oil, such a bet would make little economic and even strategic sense. China has a lot of money currently sunk in what looks like a bottomless pit and internationally-supported guarantees of repayment by Guaidó could perhaps make Beijing reconsider its current position. Keeping a hard line, by contrast, could put its sizable investment in jeopardy.<br />
<br />
Russia<br />
Vladimir Putin’s Russia has also lent money to Venezuela, and Russia’s Rosneft oil company has a collateral claim to half of Venezuela’s US-based refinery, Citgo (the US government is now preventing Citgo from remitting its revenues to Maduro’s government). The amounts involved — $2 billion to $3 billion — are relatively small, but Russia does not have the financial leeway of China. Venezuela has also bought sizable amounts of weapons from Russia, though the extent to which they have already been paid for is unclear. Altogether, Moscow’s economic stakes nonetheless appear to be relatively limited. Venezuela probably matters more to Putin as a piece of the chicken game he is playing with at least part of the Trump administration. Maduro’s fall would be a loss, but Venezuela is not equal to Syria or Ukraine on Moscow’s strategic board, and the shock would have little strategic impact on Russia’s position.<br />
<br />
The United States<br />
The Trump administration was the first to recognize Guaidó. It has also undercut attempts by the Lima Group — and now Europe — to frame the international pressure as a peaceful initiative by insisting that military intervention remain an option. The fall of Maduro’s fragile regime would be a boon to an administration that boasts of machismo but has in fact been retreating globally in the face of Russia’s and China’s increasingly assertive policies beyond the Americas. Another easy win could be in the offing in Nicaragua — another member, along with Cuba, of what John Bolton has called Latin America’s “Troika of Tyranny” — where President Daniel Ortega also confronts massive popular opposition. The first domino, however, absolutely has to fall, and Washington really can’t afford to lose such an easy play.<br />
<br />
Many other countries have dipped into the Venezuela stew: Brazil, most members of the EU, Mexico, Norway and Bolivia, among others. Like Canada, however, they have little at stake: they are to a large extent “disinterested.” This gives them freedom but also makes them less likely to remain engaged or to throw in significant political or economic capital. Hopefully, it should also make them wary of pushing for “solutions” whose consequences are immaterial for them but all too concrete for Venezuelans.Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-26406725154549921662019-02-22T10:18:00.001-05:002019-02-22T10:18:17.753-05:00Venezuela: The opposition's dangerous "humanitarian" gambleAn aid caravan organized by the opposition and supported mainly by the United States and Colombia will try to cross the border against the will of the Maduro government. Military and largely criminalized militia units have been massed at the border to prevent them from doing so.<br />
<br />
In the words of Francisco Toro, one of the keenest observer of Venezuela and a critic of Maduro: "<a href="http://www.irinnews.org/opinion/2019/02/20/why-venezuelan-opposition-s-high-stakes-aid-gamble-must-pay?utm_source=IRIN+-+the+inside+story+on+emergencies&utm_campaign=3e45d85830-RSS_EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_ENGLISH_AID_AND_POLICY&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d842d98289-3e45d85830-75465653" target="_blank">It’s clear that the opposition leaders lined up behind Juan Guaidó are using humanitarian aid chiefly as a political tool – one aimed squarely at Venezuela’s military establishment for the purpose of getting them to turn on President Nicolás Maduro’s government</a>."<br />
<br />
In an <a href="https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/venezuelas-guaido-humanitarian-crisis-potential-political-transition" target="_blank">interview with PBS</a>, Guaidó himself sees the humanitarian caravan as a political endeavour and the possibility of violence as a risk worth taking:<br />
<br />
"Nadja Drost: If the military doesn't allow the aid to cross over the border, there is a possibility of a violent confrontation. Is that cost worth it in order to be able to bring some temporary relief to a small number of Venezuelans in proportion to how many Venezuelans need long-term humanitarian aid? Are you willing to take that risk in order to bring humanitarian aid across the border?<br />
<br />
Juan Guaido: It is worth it. It's good for millions of children who are in need. Besides, we need to muster the strength for this situation to stop. This has been years in the making, years of mobilizations of political persecution of more than 1,000 political prisoners. Persecutions and asylees and the exiled, ask them if their sacrifice has been worth it. It has been worth it."<br />
<br />
Clearly, he sees the caravans less as a way to address short-term humanitarian needs and as a tactic meant to further corner the regime.<br />
<br />
So, what is likely to happen tomorrow?<br />
<br />
Assuming there is no support for the caravan from Brazilian, Colombian or American military personnel (I will go back to this later) I see three main possible scenarios:<br />
<br />
1) The caravan's participants chicken out in the face of the government's military units and retreat in clouds of tear gas but without victims. We are back to square one from their standpoint and both the opposition and its international ally have to look for a new plan while the economic and humanitarian situation of the country continues to deteriorate.<br />
<br />
2) The military chickens out and let the caravan in. Fraternization scenes take place, relayed all over the world, other demonstrations follow in Caracas and Maracaibo, and Maduro and his clique rush to the airport with as much gold and cash as they can carry. This is what the opposition hopes and what the regime fears the most. Indeed, this is probably why Maduro did NOT send military units to prevent the public demonstration of January 23rd, where Juan Guaido took oath as interim president: he feared fraternization. This is also probably why he is likely to do his best to prevent it from happening, in particular, bringing in his most radical militia followers, as well as the foreign fighters (Colombian ELN guerrillas who have everything at stake here, along with Cuban and possibly Nicaraguan "volunteers"). <br />
<br />
3) The military (or whoever "mans" the border for Maduro) fires on the caravan and people are killed possibly a large number. This meets with international condemnation and opens the door to the explicit threat of a Colombia-US intervention. The corrupt and disorganized Venezuelan military partly liquefies in the face of such a challenge, with top officers running away. Militias and foreign fighters resist but the some hold firm, and while they leave major cities, they take refuge in South and West of the country and live out of drug trafficking and smuggling for a long while. This is the bloodiest scenario.<br />
<br />
The possibility of military support to the caravan by Brazil and Colombia was mentioned by Jorge Castaneda, Mexico’s former foreign minister, in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/06/opinion/venezuelan-maduro-guaido.html" target="_blank">a recent op-ed in the New York Times</a>. While the Brazilian government said clearly that it would make the aid available at the frontier, <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2019/02/eua-pressionam-brasil-a-usar-forca-militar-em-operacao-na-venezuela.shtml" target="_blank">its military leaders oppose the use of force to deliver it</a>, leaving Colombia and the US as the only two possible countries to support that option. Such support will embolden the opposition and make scenario 1 unlikely.<br />
<br />
At this point, I think that scenarios 2 and 3 are most probable, with scenario 2 obviously the most preferable.<br />
<br />
For the international community, though, even such a "success" would come at a heavy cost, as the episode would represent a most blatant case of aid politicization. <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/opinion/2019/02/20/why-venezuelan-opposition-s-high-stakes-aid-gamble-must-pay?utm_source=IRIN+-+the+inside+story+on+emergencies&utm_campaign=3e45d85830-RSS_EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_ENGLISH_AID_AND_POLICY&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d842d98289-3e45d85830-75465653" target="_blank">Francisco Toro puts it best</a>: "[T]he humanitarian community can never be seen to violate its principle of political neutrality: even if the opposition tactic does prove effective (which is a long way from a given), for the aid sector to back it would set a precedent that stores up any amount of trouble for the future." This is highly problematic for a country like Canada, particularly given the Trudeau-Freeland loud proclamations in favour of the international rule of law.<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-82248335684546325122019-02-05T17:25:00.002-05:002019-02-05T18:14:18.505-05:00Check what Guatemala is doing at home while denouncing Venezuela in Ottawa...Well, apparently, not all eyes are on Guatemala these days...<br />
<br />
From The Americas Quarterly and worth reading in full.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/all-eyes-guatemala-crisis-brews-ahead-elections" target="_blank">All Eyes on Guatemala as Crisis Brews Ahead of Elections</a><br />
<br />
BY MICHAEL J. CAMILLERI AND TAMAR ZIFF | FEBRUARY 4, 2019<br />
President Jimmy Morales' maneuvering against Guatemala's institutions could give the U.S. a chance to recalibrate its policy.<br />
<br />
It’s not every day that a purportedly friendly foreign nation tries to intimidate the United States by dispatching a fleet of military vehicles to the U.S. Embassy. It is rarer still for the vehicles in question to have been donated by the United States itself and diverted from their intended mission of combatting crime and narcotics trafficking. And it is perhaps unprecedented that such a turn of events would elicit only a tepid response from the U.S. government, followed a short while later by the transfer of additional military jeeps to the foreign government in question.<br />
<br />
Camilleri is director of the Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program at the Inter-American Dialogue. Ziff is a program assistant with the Peter D. Bell Program.Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-88128729185047202022019-02-05T17:21:00.000-05:002019-02-05T17:21:20.729-05:00Venezuela: Norway looks a lot like the honest broker that Canada could have beenWhile Canada is calling for the Venezuelan military to change side and support Juan Guaido, Norway takes an "intriguing" position: at some point, it may be useful to have someone between the two sides and their respective allies.<br />
<br />
Below, the Google translation of <a href="https://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/i/ddKbwJ/norge-anerkjenner-ikke-juan-guaido-som-midlertidig-president-i-venezuela" target="_blank">an article published yesterday</a> in <i>Verdens Gang</i> (VG):<br />
<br />
<br />
Norway does not recognize Juan Guaidó as temporary president of Venezuela<br />
<br />
Unlike the United States and several European countries, the Norwegian government does not recognize opposition leader Juan Guaidó as temporary president of Venezuela.<br />
<br />
- Norway has the tradition of recognizing states, not governments. We have always expressed our support for Juan Guaidó as the elected and legitimate president of the National Assembly, says Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide (H).<br />
<br />
Guaidó, head of the Venezuelan National Assembly, proclaimed himself president two weeks ago, but still has little real power and seemingly little support from the country's armed forces.<br />
<br />
Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide (H) says that Norway maintains the requirement for respect for democratic rights and new elections. She also reiterates previous statements that Norway encourages the parties to dialogue that may lead to new elections. - We maintain the demand for respect for democratic rights and new elections. The situation in Venezuela is acute and we urge the parties to establish an inclusive political process that can lead to new elections. Norway has a dialogue with both parties and has offered them assistance to such a process if and when they wish, ”she says.<br />
<br />
Professor Benedicte Bull, a researcher at Latin America at the University of Oslo, follows developments in Venezuela. Photo: The University of OsloLes all of Norway can try to become facilitator - I look at this as stepping slightly gently. One does not necessarily disagree, but that it is okay to have players with a slightly different position for the government to withdraw. If they are pushed up in a corner, it can be difficult to accomplish something, says political scientist Benedicte Bull, who researches Latin America at the University of Oslo, to VG. She thinks there are two things one is now trying to achieve in Venezuela. One is a government change in new elections. The second is a good process that allows a government change to create a long-term peaceful solution. In this process, Norway may try to be a facilitator.<br />
<br />
- There is no doubt that the government is giving clear support to Guaidó, but there is some cautious play, which may not be so stupid in this situation.<br />
<br />
- Is there a solution in Venezuela? - I think things happen every day now. I think we're going to see a change in the situation. However, she says that a solution is far ahead.<br />
<br />
- A solution had to be a transitional government, peace and a solution to the economic problems.<br />
<br />
After President Nicolás Maduro on Monday refused to follow up the demand from seven EU countries to light new elections by Sunday, France, Spain, the UK and Sweden went Monday to announce the public announcement that they recognize Guaidó as Venezuela's acting president. Shortly after, Denmark, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Germany and Austria joined.<br />
<br />
The countries urge Guaidó to light new elections as quickly as possible.<br />
<br />
"We are working to bring democracy back to Venezuela, with human rights, elections and no more political prisoners," said Spain's Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez in a television talk, according to the AP. Maduro, who has a background as union leader, bus driver and foreign minister, blames the United States for conducting economic warfare against Venezuela and raising coups hoping to gain control over the country's oil resources, Reuters writes.<br />
<br />Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-38721836194937864522019-01-25T10:14:00.000-05:002019-01-25T16:22:32.312-05:00Canada's gamble on VenezuelaLooking bold towards Venezuela is not without risk. Listening to the brief reference to Venezuela by the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Artg72tWWh0&t=0s&index=2&list=PLvntPLkd9IMdQ15d846WkdNgHHuUISVDe" target="_blank">"At Issue Panel" yesterday on CBC</a> was interesting. Svend Robinson and Niki Ashton's denunciations of Canada's recognition of Juan Guaido's as the legitimate President by interim of Venezuela are obviously of a piece with their support for Latin dictators... of the Left. But that was predictable. What was more surprising, given the usual clear-sightedness of Coyne and Hebert, was their straightforward acceptance of the rationales for Guaido's claim and for Canada's decision to support it. This came, it must be pointed out, after a long discussion of the idiotic public declarations of John McCallum regarding Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou, and about their implications for Canada's claim to be acting strictly within the boundaries of "the rule of law."<br />
<br />
There is no doubt that Maduro is an authoritarian ruler who has manipulated his country's electoral process to get a second mandate. There is no doubt either that his regime is inept and corrupt and that Venezuelan's are paying the price for it. As such, however, he is part of a pretty large club, most of whose members have a cosy relationship with Canada. Among them, it must be pointed out, one finds those economically incompetent dictators that would have prevented any "National Assembly" to keep functioning or a potential challenger to the President to roam around freely and hold a meeting which tens of thousands could join without the military or the police preventing them (hello Niki Ashton's Cuba).<br />
<br />
It is obviously easy to take strong stands on issues that have no bearing on us. But in this case, it may not even be true. ICG's Robert Malley's comment should apply to Canada --notwithstanding the apparent consensus of the mainstream commentariat about Canada's courageous stand.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/world/americas/donald-trump-venezuela.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage" target="_blank">“The administration’s posture toward Venezuela is a foreign policy gamble that in hindsight could look prescient” if Mr. Maduro is forced out “or reckless if that doesn’t happen,” said Rob Malley, the president of the International Crisis Group and a former aide to Presidents Barack Obama and Bill Clinton. “At that point, the ball will be squarely in the U.S. court, with the risk that it does little and displays impotence or, worse, intervenes militarily and demonstrates rashness.”</a><br />
<br />
What exactly are we doing, or more precisely what exactly can we do, with allies or without, to make the Venezuelan military change their mind: Offer them guarantees that they won't be prosecuted before the International Criminal Court? Promise that they can keep the millions of dollars they squirreled into offshore safe havens? Why not offer them refugee status if they are under threat by the new regime or its supports, which is very likely to happen, given their track record and the bitterness that pervades Venezuela's political arena. After all, isn't this what France did for Haiti's Duvalier when he was thrown out--if this can help the transition? And what do we do if, say, only half the military change their mind and an all-out armed confrontation explodes in the streets of Caracas?<br />
<br />
I think Mexico and Uruguay found the right tone, along with the UN, when they proposed, in the face of Guaido's declaration, a new process of negotiation, "inclusive and credible." <a href="https://twitter.com/JesusRCuevas/status/1088165403031941120" target="_blank">Mexico in particular--through President Lopez Obrado's spokesperson--, cleverly gave itself some space for manoeuver by stating that their position had not changed "for now" ("hasta el momento"</a>). No such room for those who jumped the gun and basically ruled themselves out as "honest brokers." <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-germany/germany-venezuela-needs-fair-free-elections-or-guaido-should-be-interim-leader-idUSKCN1PJ11E" target="_blank">Germany</a> and Spain also tried to use their power a bit more wisely, announcing that <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/01/25/actualidad/1548401314_676721.html?autoplay=1" target="_blank">they would recognize Guaido unless new elections are announced, and it is trying to get the EU to adopt the same position</a>.<br />
<br />
But Canada decided to jump. Now, will we recognize Martin Fayulu if he declares himself President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, given the consensus of the international community about the illegitimacy of the December 30th election results? And which side will we pick when either of the likely winners of the Ukraine elections, Poroshenko or Timoshenko, is accused by her/his adversary, with plenty of evidence, of electoral fraud and corruption?<br />
<br />
O'Malley is right: this is a gamble. I hope Freeland's will work, but I am not sure that I like the idea of gambling gaining ground as a diplomatic tactic.Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-69057220003259868952018-11-06T10:51:00.002-05:002018-11-06T10:51:57.316-05:00With a longtime leftist out of the picture, Brazil lurches to the rightBrash, hard-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro is cleaning up in Brazil. How bad could that be for Brazilians and for the world?<br />
<br />
The second round of Brazil’s presidential elections will take place on October 28 but the die has been cast: barring a miracle — or a cataclysmic disaster, depending on what side of the political spectrum one falls — Jair Messias Bolsonaro will almost certainly become president of the world’s eighth largest economy and fifth largest country by population.<br />
<br />
The man, a former army captain with an unremarkable 27-year political career, sounds like an awkward Donald Trump with an even more explicitly sexist and racist bent. He promises an all-out war against crime in a country where the police already kill thousands every year, denounces human rights as a scheme to protect criminals, and openly longs for the quiet and stability that torture and repression ensured under Brazil’s 21-year military dictatorship. His economic program is ill-defined, but he has spoken about privatization, deregulation and tax reform, and his main economic adviser is reminiscient of the chicago-trained economists known for bringing neoliberal policies to the region in the 80s. <br />
<br />
Bolsonaro campaigned in the first round with little funding and a minuscule allotment of government-funded TV time because his party, the Social Liberal Party (PSL), had negligible representation in Congress and he could find precious few allies among other parties. He was forcefully denounced by all his opponents, the mainstream media and the country’s academics and intellectuals, and was unable to campaign after being stabbed during a rally.<br />
<br />
Still, in the first round of voting on October 7, he finished first, and in a crowded field received 46 percent of all valid votes — 17 percent more than Workers’ Party (PT) candidate Fernando Haddad, against whom he will run in this weekend’s second round. The latest polls give Bolsonaro close to 60 percent of the votes in the latter. Most centrist and right-wing parties are now supporting him or refusing to take a strong stand in favour of his adversary, and he enjoys majority support in most regions of the country and in all major demographics, except in the poor Northeast, where the left still appears to maintain significant support.<br />
<br />
Well-meaning people the world over have noticed and many are panicking. The New York Times deplored “Brazil’s Sad Choice.” Le Monde published a manifesto of intellectuals asking Brazilians to oppose Bolsonaro’s election. In the run-up to the first round, the Economist devoted its cover, main editorial and lead story to the “menace” he represents for Brazil and Latin America, and Robert Muggah, co-founder of the Igarapé Institute in Rio de Janeiro and an OpenCanada contributor, wondered in The New York Times if Brazil’s democracy could be saved.<br />
<br />
Should the world, Latin America and especially Brazil really be scared by this latest incarnation of right-wing populism? To answer this question, one needs to understand why Brazilians are voting for Bolsonaro, and how much power he will have.<br />
<br />
It is obviously very early for a post-mortem, but one should probably read much of the support for Bolsonaro as a protest vote. Many Brazilians have plenty of excellent reasons to be mad, and precious few to support a candidate — Haddad — clearly identified with the party that has governed the country for most of the last 16 years. Very little is left of a euphoric decade of growth underlied by China’s massive demand for the resources that Brazil exports. This extraordinary moment coincided with a unique demographic sweet spot in Brazil’s history, during which the ratio of working age population to dependents (children and retirees) was at its apex. It was an exceptional juncture, a golden opportunity. And the opportunity was missed. One could point to sectoral reforms, in health and education for instance, that could have long-lasting impacts, but much of the massive rent available for long-term structural investments was wasted in poorly-designed subsidies to the private sector, a massive expansion of public sector employment and pharaonic projects — most spectacularly, both the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics, held just two years apart.<br />
<br />
Today, barely recuperating from three years of recession and stagnation, the country finds itself with poor growth prospects, high unemployment, a massive fiscal deficit, and a social security system that threatens to go bankrupt before much of the population can benefit from it. Add to the mix recurrent public health crises (remember Zika?), a chronic public security disaster (more than 60,000 homicides last year) that did not even let off at the height of the economic boom, and a constant flow of corruption scandals engulfing almost all political parties and reaching all the way up to two of the country’s last presidents, Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva and Michel Temer.<br />
<br />
Amid crises, enter Bolsonaro<br />
<br />
Weird, vulgar and boasting extreme views, Bolsonaro was a marginal figure in the Brazilian Congress. Like many of his fellow politicians, he has been under criminal investigation, but for racism and incitation for rape, not for corruption. In a most perverse way, he was thus not even in on the corruption schemes that involved many of his colleagues, and he has cleverly used that fact to present himself, with some justice, as an outsider. Haddad, a former mayor of São Paulo, could have made the same claim, but from the start, and very publicly during the first round, he fully identified with former president Lula, who is in prison for corruption. Through that lens, the choice was stark, between the outsider, Bolsonaro, and Haddad, hand-picked by the person who for many embodies the scandal.<br />
<br />
The strong rejection of incumbents to the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in the first round also points to a protest vote and to a deep discontent with the political establishment: 85 percent of the senators elected and 52 percent of deputies will be new. Above all, however, the election was a settling of accounts between Brazilian elites and Lula, a man they long despised and were happy to see confined to prison and denied a chance to defend himself. Without Lula as its candidate, the PT proved to be doomed. Had Lula run, many, especially among the poor, would have forgiven the corruption that is largely taken for granted in Brazilian politics. Lula would certainly have made it to the second round and his chances would be much better than those of Haddad, who can’t capitalize on Lula’s personalist appeal, but has to shoulder the revulsion he inspires on the right and in much of the centre.<br />
<br />
So President Bolsonaro it will likely be, but, if so, what will that mean, exactly?<br />
<br />
Political scientists are notoriously bad at predicting the future, but a number of factors suggest that Brazil is unlikely to take a radical turn, even with Bolsonaro at its helm. More likely, the country will keep muddling through, down a mediocre path of slow and skewed modernization, with modest and inequitable growth, continuing social violence and environmental destruction, limited economic liberalization, deepening fiscal paralysis and continuous political bickering.<br />
<br />
Brazil’s 1988 Constitution already made the country’s presidents largely hostage to a highly framented Congress, a weakness amplified by subsequent constitutional amendments. The power presidents have must be wrestled through the constant construction and reconstruction of coalitions with the plethora of parties that populate the two chambers of its Congress.<br />
<br />
Bolsonaro’s party, the PSL, has four of the 81 seats in the Senate. It may end up with the largest deputation in the Chamber, but once deputies from parties with too few votes move to larger ones, it will still have at most 75 seats out of 513, and need to weave together coalitions of seven or more parties to pass any measure. Bolsonaro will find broad support for blunt anti-crime measures, regressive environmental policies, conservative social policies and perhaps some privatization. But he hasn’t demonstrated much ability or fondness for coalition-building and will quickly find out that, far from controlling them, he will be the instrument of these lobbies at least as much as they will be his.<br />
<br />
The Brazilian judiciary has lost prestige in the eyes many Brazilians, but none of its independence and institutional power. The Lava Jato scandal may have hurt the PT the most, but as the party in power while hundreds of millions were being diverted, this should be expected. Politicians from all parties, and some of the country’s most prominent business people, however, are also in prison. And while they are currently despised by much of the left, a majority of current members of the Supreme Court were named by PT presidents and are unlikely to look kindly at attempts to limit their power or to challenge what remains a democratic and progressive constitution.<br />
<br />
Weathering a military leader<br />
<br />
Much has been made of Bolsonaro’s military past, of his glorification of the military regime and of its methods, of his commitment to bring generals into the cabinet and of his promise to use violence to put an end to the violence that plagues the country. Some retired military officers have expressed support and one of them stands as his running mate, but Bolsonaro is more at ease with the violent SWAT-type police units of Rio and São Paulo than with most of the well-educated and polished members of Brazil’s higher military ranks. The Brazilian military as an institution is certainly not welcoming the attention. It has been steadily constitutionalist since going back to the barracks, largely on its own it must be added, devoid of a political project — unlike during the dictatorship decades ago. It is also underfunded and worried about getting trapped in urban policing quagmires. Public security, moreover, is a jealously guarded state prerogative, which the federal government rarely challenges, except by invitation, and the federal coffers are in the red, mostly tied up with pensions, including military ones.<br />
<br />
Bolsonaro will govern from the hard right, in sum, but he won’t have a free hand. He will have to bargain with a fractious Congress and deal with a strong judiciary, 27 state governments and quite a feisty media. Things could certainly go awry: major national crises, like the truckers’ strike that paralyzed the country last spring, or a new global financial crisis that some see looming, could open the door to bluntly repressive interventions, but it is difficult to fathom a Venezuela-like collapse. Brazil’s institutions, however unable to realize the country’s potential, look robust enough after three decades of consolidation to weather these shocks.<br />
<br />
As to ripple effects in the region, or beyond, they are unlikely. Brazil remains the most insulated economy of the continent, its convulsions have little bearing on its neighbours and it is largely oblivious of them. Supportive winks could well come from Washington and Moscow, but the elites with whom Bolsonaro will be forced to come to terms with would not countenance a radical shift in the country’s reserved international posture.<br />
<br />
Brazilians themselves, in other words, will alone pay the price of their choice. Sadly, the poor among them will pay more, beginning, most likely, with the young black men who die by the tens of thousands in the countries’ metropolis and who will now be hunted down by the police — as they already are — with the blessing of the president. Women seeking abortions, Indigenous peoples, LGBTQ, human rights and environmental activists can also expect a rough patch. But the dictatorship feared by the global commentariat looks unlikely to materialize.<br />
<br />
[<a href="https://www.opencanada.org/features/longtime-leftist-out-picture-brazil-lurches-right/" target="_blank">This post was first published on Open Canada, right before Bolsonaro's election</a>.] <br />
<div>
<br /></div>
Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-85229797681508226972016-12-31T12:58:00.000-05:002016-12-31T13:06:06.398-05:00Overdoses are a problem for dealers too[The little crocodile is not abandoning Latin America, but while home in Canada, it keeps an eye on local drug markets. Comments are most welcome.]<br />
<br />
The overdose epidemic risks killing--literally--the customer base of drug dealers, and they have to know it.<br />
<br />
Drug sellers have a vested interest in keeping their customers heavily dependent but also alive. Irresponsible legal prescriptions of opioids have enormously broadened their client base: when doctors end up refusing prescriptions as it becomes clear that their client's requests are driven by addiction, dependent users move to the black market. Hence the quick increase of recent years, which may get even quicker as legal prescriptions are likely to get reigned in given media attention and the public outcry that develops as a result of it.<br />
<br />
Cheap, powerful and hard to detect synthetic opioids imported illegally from China make it easy for dealers to satisfy demand. With a high much stronger than heroin or good old oxycontin, synthetic fentanyl and carfentanyl quickly hooks people, for whom heroin becomes , All this is obviously good for business. Concentration, however, is also a problem as it becomes extremely difficult to get a grip on the strength of particular doses, especially once opioids are mixed with other substances. There lies the root of the current crisis, which will have killed about 800 people in British Columbia alone in 2016.<br />
<br />
At that speed, unless doctors keep feeding the addiction pipeline--which at last, they may stop doing, in the face of the disaster that they have wrought--many dealers will run out of clients in a few short years.<br />
<br />
So, from their standpoint, what is to be done?<br />
<br />
One solution would be to find a way to get a grip on the doses that they hand out. "Safe" products would quickly give their dealers a competitive edge. The technical requirements of doing so in an illegal environment, and the power of the products currently entering the market, however, make this unfeasible.<br />
<br />
Another solution is to bet that the public health effort will be ramped up substantially, keeping users alive. Better still would be to piggy back on it, basically exploiting the availability of emergency services to ensure that the essentially unavoidable overdoses become less lethal, ideally not lethal at all. The world-famous Insite supervised injection site delivers just that, with no overdose death since it opened its doors in 2003. It can't keep up anymore with increased use, however, and emergency injection sites have been set up in tents right by the alleys where people procure and inject the drug. With more resources--and they should be coming soon--public policy would basically solve the dealers' problem...<br />
<br />
In the meantime they appear to bet on the compromise solution that results from underfunded and desperate efforts of volunteers and overworked emergency workers, setting up shop right by both their customers and the people who can keep them alive: "<a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/on-cheque-day-a-toxic-mix-of-money-and-drugs-in-vancouvers-downtowneastside/article33462579/" target="_blank">Outside the tent, street-level dealers sell various drugs to dozens of people injecting in the alley. More than 200 people will access the tent before the last group is hustled out at 10 p.m.</a>"<br />
<br />
Moral hazard, in sum, meets health hazard...<br />
<br />
Now, normalizing overdoses cannot be an acceptable solution from a public health perspective. At the same time, framing Insite and the current desperate effort to keep thousands of dependent users alive as simply abetting--if not encouraging--heavy use and trafficking takes one down a narrow, cruel and ultimately ineffective policy path.<br />
<br />
In other words the main implication of the argument just developed is that dealers have a vested interest in getting a grip on the epidemic and, consequently that they can be part of the solution.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-35670782491050999872016-02-04T11:41:00.002-05:002016-12-30T14:29:53.655-05:00Development experts' heads are stuck in the manufacturing sandTry to forget industrialization: it's essentially over and it won't happen again. The challenge is to grow rich and not too unequal with service economies.<br />
<br />
When you have time (it is 46 minutes-long), check <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/research/podcasts/2016/01/made-in-africa?hs_u=jean.daudelin@carleton.ca&utm_campaign=Global+Economy+and+Development&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=25738105&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--MG_Sqxo6OUeA9uq9hreAkLpD63sMNymNbBuZ9BkhYLgpGLBkQHxORZGiuJeehMeZAkWikBjcc-o0tN-38zO1gWhs-lg&_hsmi=25738105#" target="_blank">this podcast</a> from Brookings, which features one of their fellows, John Page, a former Chief Economist for Africa at the World Bank. Its hook is that about 85 million of China's "bottom-end" manufacturing jobs will have migrated away by 2030 and that Africa's challenge is to capture as many of those jobs as possible. The point is to plug a book by Brookings, UNU-WIDER and the African Development Bank called "Learning to Compete in Industry."<br />
<br />
Now, in 2030, there will be 1.6 bn people in Africa, about half of whom will be older than 15 years old. Among the latter, assuming participation rates similar to todays (70-80%), the region's labour force will be about 600 million strong. This means that while 85 million jobs look like a lot, if Africa were to capture ALL OF THOSE JOBS--an extremely unlikely outcome--that would still represent only 13% of the region's labour force. Adding those jobs to the current paltry levels of industrial employment, in other words, would just not make African countries "successful industrializers." Most likely, in fact, these economies will morph—some already have—from mining and agricultural primary goods producers to service economies, without the historically "standard" industrial episode in the middle.<br />
<br />
This study, in other words, like much of current development scholarship, is stuck with the assumption that development and industrialization are synonymous and that the first simply will not happen without the second.<br />
<br />
Obviously, that assumption may be right, but if it is, Africa is doomed. because the very evidence mentioned by promoters of industrialization makes it clear that industrialization on any significant scale will not happen in the region. At the very least, however, we should check, which we are not doing, in spite of all our ritual evocations of "evidence-based" research.<br />
<br />
What we may find once we start looking may not be that depressing, by the way. Indeed, there is no theoretical reason why service economies can't become more productive. The most compelling explanation of growth today--endogenous growth--sees ideas as its core driver. Why should ideas only impact productivity in the manufacturing sector? Or, from a research perspective, why should we keep thinking of development as if it could only happen as it did in the past, both old, in the West and Japan, and recent, in China?<br />
<br />
Oh, and by the way, the industrialization mirage is not just misleading for Africa, it is even more of an illusion for countries—hello Canada—that have long ago become service economies.<br />
<br />
To repeat, the challenge is not to find a time machine to reach back to the 1950s (and call it a "revolution") when the path to industrialization crossed indeed manufacturing land, but to see how service economies can deliver reasonably equitable growth in developing countries.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-36791486953821781392016-02-03T15:06:00.000-05:002016-02-03T15:06:21.468-05:00Can Brazil's Olympics survive the Zika emergency? Nearly overnight, the Zika virus has caught the world’s attention. Will Brazil be able to ease concerns before August?<br />
<br />
Jean Daudelin<br />
<br />
Three recent developments are changing the Zika crisis: global media awareness, new possible vectors, and doubts — at the epicentre of the crisis — about Brazil's capacity and honesty. Together, they threaten the upcoming Rio Olympics.<br />
<br />
At the end of November 2015, I peddled <a href="https://www.opencanada.org/features/mosquito-transmitted-virus-has-brazilian-officials-shaking/" target="_blank">a piece</a> about the Zika/microcephaly crisis that was already severe in Recife, the large Northeastern Brazilian city where I am currently working. No one but this site, OpenCanada.org, would have it: not the Globe, not the Huffington Post, not Foreign Policy, no one else. Worse still, it took a few more weeks for the global media to catch up: the New York Times, measure of "all things fit to print," published its first piece on Dec. 29.<br />
<br />
Today, Zika is front-page news every day the world over. This is mostly good as it keeps prodding governments and the increasingly nimble global infectious disease community. As usual, the danger is that, were the epidemic to be less serious than currently speculated, the overblown coverage could lead to public cynicism and, subsequently, less urgency from politicians, less money for research, and public nonchalance when a truly severe one hits: call this the <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1284133/The-pandemic-Drug-firms-encouraged-world-health-body-exaggerate-swine-flu-threat.html" target="_blank">"swine flu"</a> scenario. Fortunately, public health organizations and experts have become very adept at balancing warnings with caveats. In the face of global infectious diseases, panic is not the default mode any more.<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><br />
The second development is only bad, as researchers — still tentatively — point to new vectors for the disease. Until now, the Aedes family of mosquitos (aegypti and albopictus) were considered the only culprits, which is already scary given the <a href="http://elifesciences.org/content/4/e08347" target="_blank">global distribution</a> of those bugs. Now, however, there is a growing worry that their <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/28/the-zika-virus-isnt-just-an-epidemic-its-here-to-stay-world-health-organization/" target="_blank">Culex cousins</a>, who reach farther North and South <a href="http://www3.folhape.com.br/cms/opencms/folhape/pt/cotidiano/noticias/arqs/2016/01/0439.html" target="_blank">could also be infected</a> and in turn infect the people they bite. Culex is the family of your "friendly" spring and summer mosquito, but also of the West Nile Virus vector. In addition to expanding the potential range of the infection, this would imply a significant increase in vulnerability as, unlike Aedes aegypti, which is still the main apparent culprit for Zika, many Culex mosquitoes are active in the evening and at night. Perhaps most worrying, there is growing evidence that Zika could be <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/how-zika-virus-can-spread" target="_blank">sexually transmitted</a>, thus turning your sexual partners, just back from a trip in the South, into <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/health/zika-sex-transmission-texas.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1" target="_blank">a potential vector</a> even in the middle of Winter, and we don't know yet for how long.<br />
<br />
There is no real flip side to the third development either, with growing doubts about Brazil's capacity to deal with the crisis and, most worryingly, to honestly tell the world how bad things are. In the last week or so, both Brazil's Health Minister and President Dilma Rousseff have said that the battle against the mosquito was being lost. Rousseff's declaration was framed as a call to arms, but without a single good news on the eradication front, and with Brazilian microcephaly statistics showing growth rates of five to seven percent per week in suspected cases, one is compelled to take her statement literally.<br />
<br />
Worse still, the states of São Paulo and Rio, which are crucial to the national effort, appear to be less than candid about the local scale of the problem. <a href="http://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2016/01/25/politica/1453755744_022637.html" target="_blank">El País</a> revealed recently that the government of São Paulo had lied about the number of microcephaly cases on its territory, not reporting 200 cases and thus conveying the impression that the epidemic was largely confined to the poor Northeast of the country. The fact that Rio is currently <a href="http://refusing%20to%20test%20olympic%20waterways/" target="_blank">refusing to test Olympic waterways</a> for viral infection, while not directly Zika-related, nonetheless conveys a worrying lack of transparency about health risks.<br />
<br />
Behind Rio's reluctance, obviously, lies the nightmarish scenarios of an Olympic Games participation disaster or of an unprecedented cancellation of the event. Brazil is clearly lobbying hard to save the Games, but its very efforts reinforce global skepticism: as reported by the New York Times, when the WHO declared Zika a global health emergency earlier this week on Feb. 1 but refused to follow the US Centre for Disease Control and recommend that pregnant women avoid countries where Zika is endemic, "<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/02/health/zika-virus-world-health-organization.html" target="_blank">some global health experts contended the W.H.O.’s decision was more about politics than medicine</a>."<br />
<br />
In the end, full transparency or deceptive manoeuvring of that sort may not matter much: given the massive press coverage Zika currently receives, the tremendous platform the Olympics would provide for the diffusion of the virus, and the increasingly clear inability of Brazilian authorities to get a grip on the epidemic, many countries may follow <a href="http://m.nzherald.co.nz/sport/news/article.cfm?c_id=4&objectid=11582268" target="_blank">New Zealand's lead</a> and, at the very least, support those athletes who decide to stay home. Now, this only makes things worse: a public relations disaster for Brazil, it will increasingly suck up government attention and efforts. All-out cancellation would probably be better: with Olympic distraction out of the picture, all energies could focus on the mundane jobs of eradication, vaccine development, and care for the poor kids who end up crippled by the disease.<br />
<br />
[This post was first published by https://www.opencanada.org/features/can-brazils-olympics-survive-zika-emergency/]<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-41188474958671354802015-12-03T10:42:00.001-05:002015-12-03T10:42:42.255-05:00Zika virus: trying to make sense of what we have<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica;">A friend writes the following: "the
public health info released by the Brazilian government on zika and
microcephaly is actually pretty good. [Still t]here is a fundamental methodological
problem with all of this… zika may not be the source of the issue. The rise in
microcephaly is correlated with a spike in zika, but it may not be the factor
causing the condition [or it may be a] catalyst of some underlying aetiology."</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Helvetica;">He is certainly right on the mechanism:
nobody knows yet. Maybe something else is causing the surge in microcephalia
cases, which is the only really big news here: from 147 to 1248, for Brazil,
and from 12 to 646, for Pernambuco, as of November 28 and 30). [References <a href="http://portalsaude.saude.gov.br/index.php/o-ministerio/principal/secretarias/svs/noticias-svs/21020-ministerio-da-saude-divulga-novos-dados-de-microcefalia" target="_blank">here</a> and <a href="http://portalsaude.saude.gov.br/images/pdf/2015/novembro/30/coes-microcefalias---informe-epidemiol--gico---se-47.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>].<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica;">For the rest, what we have is less
compelling: <a href="http://veja.abril.com.br/multimidia/video/zika-vivemos-momento-semelhante-a-epidemia-de-aids-diz-infectologista-artur-timerman" target="_blank">in an interview</a>, the head of the Dengue and Arbovirus society spoke
of experimental results showing Zika to damage the brain of mice, but I have
not seen—and I have looked for it—the </span><span style="font-family: Helvetica;"> </span><span style="font-family: Helvetica;">research he was referring to. </span><span style="font-family: Helvetica;">For its part, the government’s
acknowledgement of a link is based on the presence of the Zica virus in the
blood and tissue of a single new born baby who died in Ceará</span><span style="font-family: Helvetica;">.</span><span style="font-family: Helvetica;"> The
virus was also found in the </span><a href="http://jconline.ne10.uol.com.br/canal/cidades/saude/noticia/2015/11/29/zikamicrocefalia-e-um-novo-capitulo-na-historia-da-medicina-210170.php" style="font-family: Helvetica;" target="_blank">amniotic liquid of pregnant women in Paraiba</a><span style="font-family: Helvetica;"> (Pernambuco's northern neighbour state).</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica;">The broader nervousness is based on a
significant number of interviews of mothers of newborns with microcephalia, a
large proportion of whom reported suffering from Zika-like symptoms (which
could have been dengue) during the first months of pregnancy, and on a time
correlation: the surge in mosquito infections, </span><a href="http://portalsaude.saude.gov.br/images/pdf/2015/novembro/26/2015-dengue-SE45.pdf" style="font-family: Helvetica;" target="_blank">as proxied by diagnosed dengue cases</a><span style="font-family: Helvetica;">, began 10 months ago and went on for 20 weeks (week 5 to 25 of 2015, see
the graph below), which corresponds to the beginning of the surge in affected
newborns’ beginning on week 40-41 (beginning of October) and quickly increasing
after that, which is more or less what appears to be happening. Nobody knows
precisely if, for how long, and where Zika had been transmitted to people by
aedes aegypti, but if the hypothesis is right, the next 15 weeks will tell. Moreover,
many of the zika cases identified over the last year may have been misdiagnosed
as dengue. Carlos Brito, a member of the Health Ministry's Arbovirus technical
committee considers for instance that "of the dengue cases identified in
the State (of Pernambuco), </span><a href="http://jconline.ne10.uol.com.br/canal/cidades/saude/noticia/2015/11/29/zikamicrocefalia-e-um-novo-capitulo-na-historia-da-medicina-210170.php" style="font-family: Helvetica;" target="_blank">80% were, in fact, zika cases</a><span style="font-family: Helvetica;">."</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Helvetica;">Now, 80% may look like a lot, so let's do
the math. As of November 16, according to the Health Ministry, there had been 83,601
"probable cases of dengue" in Pernambuco.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Helvetica;">Most of the cases of dengue being
asymptomatic (in a proportion of <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3315825/" target="_blank">between 1.8:1 </a></span><span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Helvetica; mso-bidi-font-family: Helvetica;"><a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3315825/" target="_blank">13:1</a>), this must
be considered an absolute floor. But to play "safe," let's stay with
the cases identified. Zika cases misdiagnosed as dengue would thus number
around 67,000 for the state or about 0.8% of the its population. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Assuming that Pernambuco's share of birth is
proportional to its share of Brazil's population (4%), it would have had about
120,000 births in 2014 (Brazil's total was about 3 million, or 1.5% of its
population). Using this as a proxy for the number of pregnancies, and factoring
the fact that the peak infection period is about four months-long, this would
imply a floor of about 350 pregnant mothers infected by the Zika virus in Pernambuco
over the course of 2015. As noted above, there are already more than 600 cases
of microcephalia this year in the state…<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Helvetica; mso-bidi-font-family: Helvetica;">In other words: if there is indeed a causal link between zika and
microcephalia, the number of zika infections that should be used as a basis of
impact assessment has to be much larger than even 80% of the suspected number of
dengue cases. In addition, the calculations made above and leading to the projected 350
cases assumes that 100% of pregnant mothers transmit the virus, and that 100%
of the foetuses are affected by it. Anything lower than that would
massively increase the hypothetical number of infections.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Helvetica; mso-bidi-font-family: Helvetica;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Helvetica; mso-bidi-font-family: Helvetica;"><br /></span></div>
Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-66170313903593193562015-12-03T08:16:00.001-05:002015-12-03T08:16:34.266-05:00Zika virus: the surreal epidemic that has Brazilian doctors tell women not to get pregnant A little-known virus called Zika has led, on November 29, to the declaration of a state of emergency in Pernambuco, Brazil's fourth most populous state. An unusually large number of suspected cases of microcephalia among newborns has been detected here over the last few months. The babies affected have an abnormally small cranium, a condition that is often associated with intellectual and developmental disabilities. This week-end, Brazil's health ministry has formally established a link between the presence of the virus and that condition, which however may also have a variety of other causes, from syphillis to malnutrition. Still, the number of suspected cases of microcephalia identified up to now this year (more than 1,000 in the country as a whole as of November 30, and around 500 in Pernambuco alone) significantly exceed the normal incidence of cases in Brazil, which have ranged <a href="http://portalsaude.saude.gov.br/index.php/o-ministerio/principal/secretarias/svs/noticias-svs/20929-ministerio-divulga-boletim-epidemiologico-sobre-microcefalia" target="_blank">between 139 and 175 per year since 2010</a>. In addition, a small number of infected people have died in recent days, including a few adults, though it is unclear if the virus itself was the cause of death, if it interacted with another disease, or if the person died of an unrelated condition.<br />
<br />
The virus is transmitted by a mosquito, aedes aegypti which is also a vector for two increasingly common diseases in Brazil: Chikungunya and especially dengue fever, which has reached epidemic proportion in the country.<br />
<br />
Symptoms of Zika are similar to those of dengue fever: high temperature, headaches, joint and muscular pains as well as spots on the skin. They disappear after a few days. A significant proportion of people infected by dengue fever, however, <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3315825/" target="_blank">are asymptomatic</a>, and the same could be true of Zika. Finally, many dengue fever diagnoses have been based on clinical assessments instead of blood tests and an unknown proportion of presumed dengue patients or asymptomatic dengue carrier may thus have been in fact infected by the Zika virus.<br />
<br />
Specialists and government officials currently think that foetal infection leading to microcephaly occurs when mothers are inoculated with the viruses in the first three months of pregnancy, in a period crucial for the development of the foetal brain and before the placental barrier is fully formed.<br />
<br />
The possibility that Zika is already widespread or that it could quickly expand to the whole country is based on the large number number of diagnosed cases of dengue, which increased between 2014 and 2015 <a href="http://portalsaude.saude.gov.br/images/pdf/2015/novembro/26/2015-dengue-SE45.pdf" target="_blank">from 555,000 to 1.5 million</a> (as of November 16). Such a sharp increase clearly indicates that efforts to get rid of the mosquito are unsuccessful. The prospect that, by infecting pregnant women, aedes aegypti could now produce a large number of cases of microcephaly magnifies the severity of the health challenge that dengue and Chikungunya fevers already represents. <br />
<br />
The state of emergency has been declared in Pernambuco, which enables the state government to draw from special federal funds may be extended to other states in the coming days. The federal government has set up <a href="http://portalsaude.saude.gov.br/index.php/o-ministerio/principal/secretarias/svs/noticias-svs/20929-ministerio-divulga-boletim-epidemiologico-sobre-microcefalia" target="_blank">an inter-ministerial working group</a> to tackle the crisis and is mobilizing research capacities and seeking international support to better understand what remains an extremely poorly known virus (CDC and WHO missions will come to Brazil later this week to discuss the crisis). The effort at this point focuses on the elimination of the mosquito. In addition, the government encourages pregnant women to wear long sleeves and pants, to close windows and doors and to use insect repellent. <br />
<br />
The spectre of large-scale microcephaly occurence is obviously the dominant preoccupation of the government and health specialists. This has led a specialist to make a most extraordinary health recommendation: <a href="http://veja.abril.com.br/multimidia/video/zika-vivemos-momento-semelhante-a-epidemia-de-aids-diz-infectologista-artur-timerman" target="_blank">in an interview posted last week-end on the website of Veja</a>, Brazil's most widely read weekly, Artur Timerman, a virologist and President of the Brazilian Society for Dengue and Arbovirus (mosquito-transmitted), recommended that Brazilian women postpone pregnancies until the risks involved are assessed, which may take months. When asked by the female interviewer what women who were already pregnant should do, he fell back to dress codes and insect repellent recommendations, though noting that the efficacy of the latter was limited.<br />
<br />
The elephant in the room is the issue of abortion, which is illegal in Brazil except for cases of rape or danger to the life of the mother. The question is extremely delicate in a country that is much more conservative, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/01/abortion-in-brazil-a-matter-of-life-and-death" target="_blank">especially on that issue</a>, than its international image would suggest. Given that the surge in dengue fever typically takes place <a href="http://portalsaude.saude.gov.br/images/pdf/2015/novembro/26/2015-dengue-SE45.pdf" target="_blank">between the end of February and June</a> (week 7-23 of each year), most foetuses affected this year would be due between December and the end of March. This would imply impossible, extremely late or very risky pregnancy interruptions for this cycle, but a significant incidence of microcephaly in coming months would precipitate a huge debate in 2016. The tenor of that debate would be unprecedented, and not just for Brazil.<br />
<br />
As the world's governments are meeting in Paris to talk about climate change and what it could mean for the future, a very ugly side of that future may already be showing at the door. A situation is developing in the planet's fifth largest country that may force its society to consider "postponing" or interrupting pregnancies on a massive scale to avoid the birth of a possibly very large number of severely disabled newborns. The fact that the vector of that potential epidemic is an insect that has adapted perfectly to the messy and increasingly warm urban context in which much of the population of the world already lives, and the fact that this insect is already showing resistance to common insecticides just boggles the mind. With Aedes egypti already roaming a very broad strip of the world's surface, and with the Zika virus quickly spreading beyond Brazil, expect this little post not to be the last you read on this topic.<br />
<br />
[A slightly different version of this post was first published on www.opencanada.org.]<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-60687591439085767672015-12-03T07:56:00.000-05:002015-12-03T08:01:41.757-05:00The cat is out of the bag in Brazil as the PT itself throws Dilma under the bus<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: helvetica, arial, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">It looks like it is the PT itself that has decided to dump Dilma Rousseff from the presidency.</span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: helvetica, arial, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">The presidency had asked PT members on the Ethics Council of the Chamber of Deputies to support the Eduardo Cunha, the President of Chamber. The man is completely rotten and everybody knows it BUT he had the power to accept or refuse a formal request to launch the impeachment process. They voted against Cunha and, predictably, the latter immediately answered by launching the process.</span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: helvetica, arial, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">More discussions and negotiations are in the works, but Rousseff's position is much weaker as a result.</span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: helvetica, arial, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">What could explain the party's attitude? I see two things, that may overlap.</span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: helvetica, arial, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">1) The country is going through a massive multidimensional crisis. The economic situation is dire (growth for 2015: -3%; inflation >10%; unemployment bordering 10%, double of last year); a national health emergency could soon develop around the Zika virus; and the Petrobras corruption scandal is reaching ever deeper into the political establishment. Except for the latter--which is getting ever closer to Lula himself--leaving someone else to deal with the mess would increase the chances of a victory in the 2018 presidential crisis, where Lula, if he is still standing, would have the best chance of winning among all possible PT candidates.</span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: helvetica, arial, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">2) Many in the party's base--the so-called social movements--are up in arms against the current Finance Minister's austerity package, and deeply critical of Dilma Rousseff's giving cover to it.</span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: helvetica, arial, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">The first is most likely, but don’t underestimate the second, as Lula could himself be thrown under the bus by his various close friends who are currently negotiating plea bargaining deals with federal prosecutors. If he falls, it will be civil war inside the party, and looking good right now may pay off. </span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: helvetica, arial, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">For the details (worth translating), see this <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/12/1713951-pt-pensa-em-si-mesmo-expondo-dilma-ao-impeachment.shtml" target="_blank">Folha de São Paulo article </a>and, for background and a very careful presentation of the next steps, this, <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5cab78d2-668c-11e5-a57f-21b88f7d973f.html#axzz3tG11PjMr" target="_blank">from the Financial Times</a>.</span></span></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div class="text_exposed_show" style="background-color: white; color: #141823; display: inline; font-family: helvetica, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">
<div style="margin-bottom: 6px; margin-top: 6px;">
<br /></div>
</div>
Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-29516310445687244222015-11-24T13:58:00.001-05:002015-11-24T14:00:52.930-05:00Beyond tragedy and invidious chest-beating<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">Beyond tragedy and invidious chest-beating</span></span><br />
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">How great we Canadians are compared to those pathetic French, who now pay for their long history of "rejecting the other"...</span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">In the <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/muslims-in-france-a-cautionary-tale/article27376738/" target="_blank">Globe and Mail</a>, Erna Paris points to the disproportional presence of Muslims in French prisons and gloats that Canada doesn’t have the same problem.</span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">She should consider the possibility that poor social integration in some countries may not regard mainly immigrants. In 2013, according to <a href="http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/%E2%80%A6/comm/press/press20131126-eng.aspx" target="_blank">Canada’s correctional investigator</a>, "aboriginal people represented a staggering 23% of federal inmates yet comprise 4.3% of the total Canadian population. And one-in-three women under federal sentence are Aboriginal.” The latter roughly equals the scale of over-representation that she rightfully denounces in the case of France. Add provincial prisons to the picture and there is little reason to boast about our history.</span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">Writing from a country where "no Jewish refugees were too many" (to paraphrase the title of Irving Abela's and Harry Troper's history of Canada's policy towards Jewish refugees during World War II) Ms Paris should also perhaps thread more carefully when assessing the record of France during the Holocaust, which is more ambiguous than she suggests.</span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">Her basic argument is defensible: citizenship matters, equality matters, and denial of either could well feed violence. And France indeed offers cautionary tales... along with Canada, the United States, and so on. Why, in the midst of the tragedy that strikes France, she felt the need to mar that argument with invidious chest-beating is beyond me.</span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">Now, that argument may well be totally wrong too. </span></span><span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">Perhaps the very real social exclusion which is epitomized by prison statistics but associated with very distinct outcomes here and in France should make us consider the possibility that the heart of the problem, as the terrorist themselves keep saying, is islamic fundamentalism, not social exclusion.</span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">French historian and philosopher Marcel Gauchet, in a recent interview with Le Monde, makes just that point, and in a way that is completely devoid of islamophobia. His explanation, in fact, harks back to the argument he first laid out in The Disenchantment of the World, which focused on Christianity.</span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">Here is the opening summary of <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/11/21/marcel-gauchet-le-fondamentalisme-islamique-est-le-signe-paradoxal-de-la-sortie-du-religieux_4814947_3232.html" target="_blank">the full article</a>:</span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">Le fondamentalisme islamique est le signe paradoxal de la </span></span><span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">sortie du religieux </span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">Historien de la démocratie, Marcel Gauchet explique que l'origine de la violence des terroristes n'est pas -sociale ou </span></span><span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">économique, mais bien religieuse. </span><span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">Comment penser les attaques du 13 novembre et ce déferlement de haine ? </span><span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">Cette violence terroriste nous est impensable parce qu'elle n'entre pas dans nos grilles de lecture habituelles. Nous </span><span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">savons que c'est au nom de l'islamisme que les tueurs agissent, mais notre idée de la religion est tellement éloignée de </span><span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">pareille conduite que nous ne prenons pas cette motivation au sérieux. Nous allons tout de suite chercher des causes </span><span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">économiques et sociales. Or celles-ci jouent tout au plus un rôle de déclencheur. C'est bien à un phénomène religieux </span><span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">que nous avons affaire. Tant que nous ne regarderons pas ce fait en face, nous ne comprendrons pas ce qui nous arrive. </span><span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">Il nous demande de reconsidérer complètement ce que nous mettons sous le mot de religion et ce que représente le </span><span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">fondamentalisme religieux, en l'occurrence le fondamentalisme islamique. Car, si le fondamentalisme touche toutes les </span><span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">traditions religieuses, il y a une forte spécificité et une virulence particulière du fondamentalisme islamique. Si le </span><span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">phénomène nous échappe, à nous Européens d'aujourd'hui, c'est que nous sommes sortis de cette religiosité </span><span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;">fondamentale. Il nous faut en retrouver le sens.</span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 6px;">
<span style="color: #141823; font-family: "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 15.456px;"><br /></span></div>
Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-31762523282448736852015-11-20T21:30:00.001-05:002015-11-20T21:30:19.687-05:00Terrorism: the need for intelligent intelligence, not just more of it<div class="p1">
<span class="s1">To those who may think that even C-51 is not enough and that Canada should put even more resources into controlling its population, the lesson from France may well be that, a</span>t some point, expanding the reach of surveillance becomes counterproductive, and that point may already have been reached in France. </div>
<div class="p1">
<br /></div>
<div class="p1">
From The Economist:</div>
<div class="p2">
<span class="s1"></span><br /></div>
<div class="p1">
<span class="s1">"France has robust judicial and security laws that give investigators fairly sweeping powers to monitor, detain and interrogate suspects. In the past these have been envied by their counterparts working in countries with stricter constraints. Yet the French now seem to be overwhelmed by the sheer numbers involved. Manuel Valls, the prime minister, acknowledged this week that fully 10,500 people in France are on a file known as “Fiche S”, meaning that they are suspected of being radicalized.</span></div>
<div class="p2">
<span class="s1"></span><br /></div>
<div class="p1">
<span class="s1">Assessed on a scale, they range from those who have simply looked at jihadist websites or met radicals outside mosques, to those considered highly dangerous. Only a fraction can be monitored closely, because it requires 20 agents to follow one suspect round the clock. As François Heisbourg, of the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris, points out, it is in many ways good news that people like Amimour and Mostefai were known to the intelligence services. The trouble seems to lie with the analysis of the risk they posed, and the follow-up.”</span></div>
<div class="p2">
<span class="s1"></span><br /></div>
<br />
<div class="p3">
<span class="s2"><a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21678744-bloody-siege-shows-strengths-and-limits-french-security-work">http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21678744-bloody-siege-shows-strengths-and-limits-french-security-work</a></span></div>
Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-28737979896823188452015-11-20T20:45:00.001-05:002015-11-21T06:17:15.145-05:00Why must so much media coverage about drugs be over the top...Vox's German Lopez is my favourite reporter on drug issues. Clear, measured, always the right table or graph. Great. Well, most times.<br />
<br />
Indeed, I think he blew his last one, on Captagon, <a href="http://vox%27s%20german%20lopez%20is%20my%20favourite%20reporter%20on%20drug%20issues.%20clear%2C%20measured%2C%20always%20the%20right%20table%20or%20graph.%20great.%20%20now%2C%20i%20think%20he%20blew%20his%20last%20one%2C%20on%20captagon%27s/" target="_blank">ISIS' amphetamine</a>, which was clearly meant to tone done hyperbole and introduce a measure of sanity in the discussion. And indeed, the press coverage of that issue has been very much over the top.<br />
<br />
Unfortunately, Lopez swallows whole the latest piece of moral panic coming from the very prohibitionist UNODC and abetted by <a href="http://world.time.com/2013/10/28/syrias-breaking-bad-are-amphetamines-funding-the-war/" target="_blank">Time magazine</a>:<br />
<br />
"A pill that costs pennies to produce in Lebanon retails for up to $20 a pop in Saudi Arabia, where some 55 million Captagon tablets are seized a year — a number that even Saudi officials admit amounts to only 10% of the overall total that actually makes it into the kingdom, according to the UNODC World Drug Report and a not-yet-published E.U. assessment of drug trafficking in the Middle East."<br />
<br />
So, about 550 million tablets make it to the kingdom and 10% are seized, which leaves about 500 million pills on the market. At $20 a pop, we are talking of about $10bn worth of amphetamines...<br />
<br />
Now, Saudi Arabia is a country that, in 2013 imported <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/sau/all/show/2013/" target="_blank">$14bn worth of automobiles</a>. In other words, this article calling for skepticisms towards media reports is telling us that the market for amphetamines is two-third as large as the car market and that every one of the country's 28 million people (men, women, babies, kids and retirees) spends, on average and every year, $400.00 on that particular type of drugs. And remember, this is what "even Saudi officials admit," so the careful reader is to understand that these numbers are low estimates.<br />
<br />
Sorry guys, but who is high on what here?<br />
<br />
<br />Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-90233833641560070002015-08-11T19:21:00.004-04:002015-11-01T19:20:40.422-05:00Venezuela’s unlikely rescuers? The country is about to explode. An Obama-Castro team might be best placed to diffuse the crisis <div class="MsoNormal">
Given the
scale of its problems and the "quality" of its government, Venezuela
could have collapsed into a civil war years ago. It did not. The restraint
shown by the opposition and especially the fact that most weapons were on the Chavista<i> </i>side kept the lid on the pot.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">The crisis
is deeper than ever, with deadly department stores' looting now joining
crippling shortages of basic necessities, increasing unemployment, the world's
highest inflation rate, stratospheric levels of corruption, disintegrating
public services, crumbing infrastructure and terrifying levels of criminal
violence. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">At the same
time, the government's quasi-monopoly of violence is breaking down. President
Nicolás Maduro's control over the military and party militias has always been
partial with National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello, in particular,
keeping a much-purged and corrupt military for himself. There are rumbles,
however, both on the party militia side and within the military. Without
surprise, the regimes' much used but long unruly street gangs' loyalty is less
assured than ever. When it comes, in other words, the violence will start from
within Chavista ranks.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">Parliamentary
elections are approaching and the chances of a government victory in a clean
process are dismal. Maduro is a dull-witted bully. He has never been popular
and, for obvious reasons, he is now less than ever. While the opposition brings
back his asinine declarations about Chavez' reincarnation into a little talking
bird, Maduro's putting his wife at the head of the government party's list further
reveals the depth of his ineptitude. Arguably, he doesn't have much choice,
Chavez and then himself having made sure no one would emerge from the party's
ranks to challenge their authority, but Cilia Flores —The Mrs— has to be the
worst option. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">To make
things worse, the government can't use populist spending to secure the masses that
have traditionally supported it. The forced sale of electronics at government-set
prices, which the government has used before, was a one-shot wonder but it has
understandably discouraged retailers from importing any more. With oil
production declining, and international prices remaining low, the
"system" is now simply running out of fuel. Once the Chavista crust
has taken its share of what's left, almost nothing remains to buy votes. In
other words, the electoral fraud will need to be even more blunt than the last
time and nobody will be on site to defend the government: even the Carter
Center, which shamefully joined UNASUL and the OAS in 2015 to give a legitimacy
it did not deserve to the elections that kept Maduro in power, is packing and
leaving the country—officially because of the cost of operating at the surreal
official exchange rate. In spite of its help the last time, the government has
pre-emptively dismissed the OAS—although it is now led by a progressive
Uruguayan diplomat—as an agent of U.S. imperialism and no other regional
organization could offer at once a modicum of global legitimacy and guaranteed backing.
Given that the Chavista system depends entirely on the money it extracts from the
state-owned oil company PDVSA's coffers, it can't abandon its lifeline and,
unavoidably, "authorities" will do whatever it takes to ensure that
the opposition loses the election.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">Believe it
or not, however, the problem is much deeper than that.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span>The
shrinking pie and apparently limitless appetite of the Chavista leadership are
turning the sharks against one another. Maduro's abysmal incompetence and his
unpopularity make him an appealing target for a military coup that Cabello and
his friends could present as the beginning of a way out. Maduro's family
network and retinue, however, are unlikely to leave the scene quietly. Division
at the top would reverberate all though the party's shaky apparatus and its
already mutinous informal tentacles. And all those people have guns.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Who could
do something? Who could convene the parties, including the opposition, to some
kind of national dialogue that would defuse the current crisis or help find a
way out after violence explodes? Who could offer a comfy exile to Maduro and
Cabellos, taking them out of the game? Well, at this point and unfortunately, the
picture is bleak.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">As
mentioned, and even though it covered the regime's fraud in the last election,
the OAS has already been dismissed. UN intervention would be met by all South
American countries as an affront to national sovereignty and to the region's
much asserted ability to deal with its own problems on its own—pure grandstanding
in this case, but still enough to keep it out. The regime's allies in UNASUL—Bolivia,
Ecuador and, for now at least, Argentina—ensure in turn that the organization
won't be trusted by the opposition. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">The real
bulwark could have been the region's big players, Colombia, Argentina and
especially Brazil. Given the two countries' love-hate relationship, any Colombian
attempt to interfere would quickly be seized by the regime as an opportunity to
drum up nationalist sentiments, which would obviously serve no useful purpose
whatsoever. Decades of silliness have disqualified Argentina as a serious
international or regional actor. Brazil could have been the exception and while
in power, Lula had used his immense regional legitimacy to effectively control
Chavez and keep tensions down. Lula is gone, however, and with his successor
and party eye-deep in corruption scandals, the government has turned completely
inward. Brazil's refusal to push earlier for reform and reconciliation, as well
as the prominence within the foreign Ministry of a PT-pushed nationalist and
"sovereigntist" phalanx, moreover, have no doubt burned its
long-respected diplomats in the eyes of Venezuela's opposition. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">Who is
left? Oddly enough, what would perhaps work best would be some kind of joint U.S.-Cuba
initiative. Obama is now undoubtedly the global figure that enjoys the most
legitimacy and he is very popular in Latin America. The opposition would trust
him. The Castro brothers may be on their way out, but the strong presence of
their intelligence and military services in the Venezuelan state apparatus and
their deep links with all sides in the Chavista establishment gives them more
leverage on that unruly crew than anyone else. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
<o:AllowPNG/>
</o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
</xml><![endif]-->
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:WordDocument>
<w:View>Normal</w:View>
<w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom>
<w:TrackMoves/>
<w:TrackFormatting/>
<w:HyphenationZone>21</w:HyphenationZone>
<w:PunctuationKerning/>
<w:ValidateAgainstSchemas/>
<w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>false</w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>
<w:IgnoreMixedContent>false</w:IgnoreMixedContent>
<w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>false</w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>
<w:DoNotPromoteQF/>
<w:LidThemeOther>FR-CA</w:LidThemeOther>
<w:LidThemeAsian>JA</w:LidThemeAsian>
<w:LidThemeComplexScript>X-NONE</w:LidThemeComplexScript>
<w:Compatibility>
<w:BreakWrappedTables/>
<w:SnapToGridInCell/>
<w:WrapTextWithPunct/>
<w:UseAsianBreakRules/>
<w:DontGrowAutofit/>
<w:SplitPgBreakAndParaMark/>
<w:EnableOpenTypeKerning/>
<w:DontFlipMirrorIndents/>
<w:OverrideTableStyleHps/>
<w:UseFELayout/>
</w:Compatibility>
<m:mathPr>
<m:mathFont m:val="Cambria Math"/>
<m:brkBin m:val="before"/>
<m:brkBinSub m:val="--"/>
<m:smallFrac m:val="off"/>
<m:dispDef/>
<m:lMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:rMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:defJc m:val="centerGroup"/>
<m:wrapIndent m:val="1440"/>
<m:intLim m:val="subSup"/>
<m:naryLim m:val="undOvr"/>
</m:mathPr></w:WordDocument>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:LatentStyles DefLockedState="false" DefUnhideWhenUsed="false"
DefSemiHidden="false" DefQFormat="false" DefPriority="99"
LatentStyleCount="380">
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="0" QFormat="true" Name="Normal"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Normal Indent"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="footnote text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="annotation text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="header"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="footer"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="35" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="caption"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="table of figures"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="envelope address"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="envelope return"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="footnote reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="annotation reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="line number"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="page number"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="endnote reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="endnote text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="table of authorities"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="macro"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="toa heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="10" QFormat="true" Name="Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Closing"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Signature"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="Default Paragraph Font"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text Indent"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Message Header"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="11" QFormat="true" Name="Subtitle"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Salutation"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Date"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text First Indent"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text First Indent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Note Heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text Indent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text Indent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Block Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Hyperlink"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="FollowedHyperlink"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="22" QFormat="true" Name="Strong"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="20" QFormat="true" Name="Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Document Map"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Plain Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="E-mail Signature"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Top of Form"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Bottom of Form"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Normal (Web)"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Acronym"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Address"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Cite"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Code"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Definition"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Keyboard"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Preformatted"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Sample"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Typewriter"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Variable"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Normal Table"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="annotation subject"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="No List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Outline List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Outline List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Outline List 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Simple 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Simple 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Simple 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Colorful 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Colorful 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Colorful 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table 3D effects 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table 3D effects 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table 3D effects 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Contemporary"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Elegant"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Professional"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Subtle 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Subtle 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Web 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Web 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Web 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Balloon Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="Table Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Theme"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Note Level 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Note Level 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Note Level 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Note Level 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Note Level 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Note Level 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Note Level 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Note Level 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Note Level 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" Name="Placeholder Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" QFormat="true" Name="No Spacing"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" Name="Revision"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="34" QFormat="true"
Name="List Paragraph"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="29" QFormat="true" Name="Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="30" QFormat="true"
Name="Intense Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="19" QFormat="true"
Name="Subtle Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="21" QFormat="true"
Name="Intense Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="31" QFormat="true"
Name="Subtle Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="32" QFormat="true"
Name="Intense Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="33" QFormat="true" Name="Book Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="37" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="Bibliography"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="TOC Heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="41" Name="Plain Table 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="42" Name="Plain Table 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="43" Name="Plain Table 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="44" Name="Plain Table 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="45" Name="Plain Table 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="40" Name="Grid Table Light"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46" Name="Grid Table 1 Light"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51" Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52" Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46" Name="List Table 1 Light"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51" Name="List Table 6 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52" Name="List Table 7 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 6"/>
</w:LatentStyles>
</xml><![endif]-->
<!--[if gte mso 10]>
<style>
/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:"Tableau Normal";
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-parent:"";
mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0cm;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:Cambria;
mso-ascii-font-family:Cambria;
mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;
mso-hansi-font-family:Cambria;
mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;
mso-ansi-language:FR-CA;
mso-fareast-language:EN-US;}
</style>
<![endif]-->
<!--StartFragment-->
<!--EndFragment--><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">The idea
may look odd, but think about it: one more feather on Obama’s cap, and a decent
exit from the international scene for the Castros.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">[First published as http://opencanada.org/features/venezuelas-unlikely-rescuers-the-us-and-cuba/] </span></div>
Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-22413051043813785592015-08-07T09:25:00.000-04:002015-08-07T09:25:23.253-04:00Brazil: The Crash of the Chicken<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">Cynics
have long described Brazil's development path as "the flight of the
chicken:" brief spurts of growth, sometimes spectacular, followed by more
or less brutal declines. After a tad more than a decade of expansion, the
country is now going through one of those periodic crashes. And this one is
ugly, perhaps because this time the chicken was flying really high, seemingly dreaming
that, with all this talk of BRICS and emerging power, it was a chicken no more.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Calibri; mso-ansi-language: EN-CA; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">Analysts
are predicting between two and four years of recession while inflation has
reached its highest level in more than 10 years. Tax revenues are down (minus US$37bn
projected for 2015), June's "primary" deficit—excluding interest
payments—is larger than the worst predictions of analysts while the overall
deficit of the public sector borders 7 percent of the GDP. The Real is down 40
percent since June 2014 and the index of São Paulo's stock exchange—the largest
in Latin America—has dropped 20 percent in dollar terms since January 1.
Exports were down in 2014, especially for manufactured goods (minus 14 percent)
and the country saw its first trade deficit in years. The current account shortfall,
at US$93bn, reached 4.3 percent of GDP last year, the largest since 2001 and interest-rates
stand at a world's "best" 14 percent. The country has lost more than
300,000 jobs in the first three months of 2015, to the point where the absolute
size of the formal labour market has shrunk for the first time in years. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Calibri; mso-ansi-language: EN-CA; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">Help
won't be coming from the government, which is instead ushering in brutal budget
cuts that affect all programs, including health and education, while public
investment, already insufficient, has dropped 37 percent in the first five
months of 2015 (ECLAC). Understandably, given high interest rates and the
general uncertainty, the private sector is wary of jumping in and foreign
direct investment flows for the year are now lower than the current account
deficit. No wonder Brazil's credit rating could soon fall back to junk status.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Calibri; mso-ansi-language: EN-CA; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">To make things
worse, President Dilma Rousseff's popularity, at between 7 and 10 percent, is among
the lowest ever recorded by a chief executive since the end of the military regime.
Congress is as dysfunctional as ever, with the Presidents of both the Senate
and the Chamber of deputies under investigation for corruption. And yet, to get
the support that she needs to govern, Rousseff's team is about to
"give" the Congress' most influential members control over the hiring
of hundreds of employees in various state dependencies. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Calibri; mso-ansi-language: EN-CA; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">Petrobras,
the country's largest company—still de facto under government control—and Brazil's
world-class engineering firms are at the centre of a corruption scandal
involving the governing Workers Party (PT) and its allies, and reaching back to
the golden age of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's two presidential mandates. The sums
involved boggle the mind: Odebrecht, the country's dominant engineering firm
and one of the world's largest, is accused of having transferred R$1bn (US$350m)
to secret bank accounts in foreign countries, many of them held by government
and party officials. The Workers' Party former treasurer, João Vaccari Neto, is
accused of having received R$500m (US$150m) for the party. Renato Duque, an upper-middle
level Petrobras official named by the PT and responsible for getting the party
a share of over-billed contracts, had 20 million Euros in Switzerland and Monaco
bank accounts. In a country where barely half the population lives on more than
two minimum salaries (R$1600 per month or less than US$500 at the current
exchange rate), this level of corruption, for a government controlled by one of
the most admired "progressive" parties in recent history, is quickly
destroying the long held assumption that the PT was different from its largely
discredited competitors. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Calibri; mso-ansi-language: EN-CA; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">Any light
at the end of the tunnel? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Calibri; mso-ansi-language: EN-CA; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">Well,
maybe yes, but mostly no. The flip side of the corruption scandal is that
Brazil's justice system is strong and doing its job, which is cause for
optimism. The problem is, judges and police officers can't run finance
ministries, design infrastructure programs, reform education or implement
social policy. A sizable part of the massive resources generated over the last
decade of growth were captured by the state and invested in infrastructure,
education and security. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Calibri; mso-ansi-language: EN-CA; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">After the
World Cup's orgy of white elephants (a whole slew of high-tech stadiums with few
ripple effects and no hope of profitability), brutally over-budget energy
projects and through the ever-expanding corruption scandals, it is becoming
clear that such spending was highly inefficient and that the machinery designed
to implement state programs remains creaky and, above all, leaky. Now that
resources are drying up and the need for efficiency increases, the lack of a
serious re-engineering of the state represents a massive obstacle for any
attempt to relaunch the country on a sustainable growth path. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Calibri; mso-ansi-language: EN-CA; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">Given its
immense resources and capabilities, Brazil is not inescapably doomed to
"chicken-dom." In recent years, however, the country has been flying
high on strong prices for the primary goods that remain its bread and butter,
while leaving hard choices—on pensions, education, trade liberalization,
taxation, public sector reform—for another day. That day is still not on the
horizon. With a political class keener on pilfering public funds than on
tackling the county's structural challenges, Brazil should be stuck on the farmyard—or pretty close to it—for a while still. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Calibri; mso-ansi-language: EN-CA; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">I am currently a visiting
researcher at the </span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">Núcleo de Estudios de Política Comparada e Relações Internacionais
– NEPI, </span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Calibri; mso-ansi-language: EN-CA; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">Federal University of Pernambuco, Brazil.</span></i><span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Calibri; mso-ansi-language: EN-CA; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-CA" style="font-family: Calibri; mso-ansi-language: EN-CA; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">[Originally
published on <a href="http://opencanada.org/features/brazil-the-crash-of-the-chicken/">http://opencanada.org/features/brazil-the-crash-of-the-chicken/</a>
]</span><span style="font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Calibri; mso-ansi-language: EN-CA; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: Calibri;"> </span></div>
Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5146718257071334899.post-36822249874743234802015-04-13T14:01:00.001-04:002015-04-13T14:01:40.539-04:00Harper in Panama: wrapping upOverall, Steven Harper's Summit performance was eminently sensible. On Cuba, when talking about the need for a new approach that would engage Havana and avoid isolating Cuba, he mostly had the US in mind. Still, it could mean that Canada may not oppose the full reintegration of Cuba into inter-American institutions, in particular full OAS membership. That would be quite a change or hearth and it would imply that Ottawa would basically decide to ignore the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which makes it very clear that respect for human rights, periodic, free and fair elections as well as freedom of the press are necessary conditions for participation in regional institutions.<br />
<br />
Now, in the face of a clear regional consensus on "engagement," or more precisely on an unconditional re-integration of Cuba in the system, a consensus that the US now appears willing to join, it would have made no sense for Canada to take a rigid stance. Keeping a hard line, aside from having little or no impact on Cuba, would also entail a degree of diplomatic risk, as Toronto prepares to host the region for the Pan-American Games, this coming August. Given the tone of Venezuela's Maduro, Ecuador's Correa and even Raul Castro at the Summit, the possibility of a boycott could very well have been raised.<br />
<br />
On Cuba, moreover, Harper made it very clear that while Canada would be keen to build on what is already a significant relationship, especially around trade and tourism, strong concerns remained regarding human rights violations and the absence of a "democratic space" in the country. In other words, the PM will continue to call a cat a cat, unlike his fellow heads-of-state, who have decided to give Cuba, and obviously also Venezuela, a free pass on those issues.<br />
<br />
It is tempting to see primarily economic motivations behind Harper's move, but that would be a mistake. Cuba is a small ($68bn), dysfunctional, poorly governed and vulnerable economy (because of its dependence on imported oil and gas, now provided at a discount by shaky Venezuela). On one side, this obviously implies that growth prospects are excellent: as my Carleton colleague Dane Rowlands put it, you don't get Chinese stratospheric growth rates without a disastrous Great Leap Forward and decades of economic repression and mismanagement. A case in point would be the island's agricultural sector, whose stunning under-development explains why Cuba, with plenty of arable land, is nonetheless <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/mar/11/cuba-agricultural-revolution-farmers" target="_blank">a huge net food importer</a>. On the other hand, it is far from clear that the current leadership is ready to make the kind of concessions, on secure property rights for the private sector in particular, that were central to China's remarkable bout of growth. In other words, while there is money to be made here and there, Cuba's importance for Canada will remain marginal. Now, and to insist, with a share of about 1/10th of 1% of Canada's trade, the potential for progress is huge.<br />
<br />
Finally, as to Harper's announcements for the region as a whole, the government basically dug up everything it could, from its files including various programs worth about $40m that have been under way for a year, and another one that will be launched in 2016. Some of the initiatives are very interesting, e.g. on security, policing and justice for Central America and the Caribbean, but total commitments at about $200m over three, four or five years (depending on the program), while not negligible, are certainly no sign of a particularly strong new engagement when you consider that Canada's ODA envelope is worth more than $4.5bn...Jean Daudelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14637464854096815265noreply@blogger.com