Sebastián Piñera will be Chile's next president. He has won a clear victory over Eduardo Frei, who was unable to build on the performance of his predecessor Michelle Bachelet and her government, whose popularity hovers around 80%.
Don't expect big changes in the country's policy, however. Chile has become dreadfully serious over the last two decades, which means that its domestic and international policies hover around centrist policies, just as they do in most developed democracies. This makes for boring politics, with marginally meaningful party alternance the only game in town. But boring politics is the privilege of the wealthy. Think of Canada...
In the region as a whole, there is more in the offing. Next month, Costa Rica will have elections that no one will talk about, because they will largely be inconsequential. If Uribe does not run in the May elections in Colombia (and time is running out to change the constitution and enable him to do it), a less conservative politician take could well take over the country's presidency, with not much of a change in public policy, even on security. While nothing is settled yet, Brazil will probably also elect a more liberal president than Lula next October, once again with few substantive policy changes in sight. In all those countries, the economy is stable, inflation is low, poverty is declining, as are homicides and kidnappings.
Compare this with the recent referendums and elections in Honduras, Nicaragua (municipal) or Venezuela (on the Constitution) where politics is indeed most interesting, where inflation is high, growth prospects are bad, crime is rising and poverty increasing. Compare this also to Argentina, which is teetering on the brink of a constitutional crisis and where a lot of nasty things could happen between now and 2011, when the term of Cristina Fernandes de Kirchner ends.
The big division of the continent is not between Right and Left, but between boring but serious regimes, and lively but irresponsible ones, where wild things can happen at any time.
My hunch is, most Latin Americans would take the bore...
[I just found out that Michael Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue, in DC, has a similar take on the meaning of that election and those that are coming up.
Photo Jonathan Blair
Monday, January 18, 2010
Friday, January 8, 2010
A Honduras-type crisis in Argentina?
A Constitutional crisis appears to be in the making in Argentina. President Cristina Kirchner is meeting resistance from Congress, where her Peronista party has lost its majority, from the Central Bank, whose President has refused Kirchner's request to use reserves to pay external debt, and from the Judiciary, with a judge putting the Bank's President back in charge after he was demoted by Kirchner for refusing to abide by her request.
We thus have an interesting situation, very similar to the beginnings of the crisis in Honduras: The Kirchner --Cristina and her husband, former president Nestor- want to stay in power, but there is growing resistance in the political class and in the electorate. In fact, Julio Cobos, the country's vice-president who broke with the Kirchner and has been voting regularly against the government in Congress, is the most popular politician in Argentina right now. By using the country's reserves, the Kirchner appear to be trying to free resources for domestic spending, the only way for them to secure a victory in the coming election. For obvious reasons, however, their plan is opposed by Congress, the Central Bank, and now the Judiciary. To push the parallel even further, Martin Redrado, the President of the Central Bank, just like Cobos, are former supporters of the Kirchner
What is next? Well, either the couple retreats and regroup for a counter-attack a few years down the road, OR they try to get through the street what they cannot get through normal --some say legal-- means.
This is very precisely what Zelaya did...
We thus have an interesting situation, very similar to the beginnings of the crisis in Honduras: The Kirchner --Cristina and her husband, former president Nestor- want to stay in power, but there is growing resistance in the political class and in the electorate. In fact, Julio Cobos, the country's vice-president who broke with the Kirchner and has been voting regularly against the government in Congress, is the most popular politician in Argentina right now. By using the country's reserves, the Kirchner appear to be trying to free resources for domestic spending, the only way for them to secure a victory in the coming election. For obvious reasons, however, their plan is opposed by Congress, the Central Bank, and now the Judiciary. To push the parallel even further, Martin Redrado, the President of the Central Bank, just like Cobos, are former supporters of the Kirchner
What is next? Well, either the couple retreats and regroup for a counter-attack a few years down the road, OR they try to get through the street what they cannot get through normal --some say legal-- means.
This is very precisely what Zelaya did...
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
Venezuela on the war path?
This, from a friend of mine currently unable to publish on this blog: "I'm starting to wonder how long it will be until the Venezuelans have another 'accident' like the one that bombed a dredging unit in Guyanesse waters. The diversionary theory of war is looking more and more applicable."
Well, at the very least, Hugo Chavez seems to be looking for a way to divert Venezuelans' attention from inflation, corruption, shortages of basic goods, power outages and especially violent crime. His main theme is obviously Colombia, whom he accuses now of using unmanned drones to attack Venezuela. This accusation, moreover, is only a tiny bit of his big campaign against the military agreement between Colombia and the US that will enable American aircraft to use Colombian airbases as part of their support for that country's war against the FARC and narco-traffickers.
Now, the way in which the US has managed this file is worse than incompetent, like much of their policy towards the region under Obama -Honduras is the other prominent example. However, the idea that Colombia, which is just now --for the first time in its history-- getting close to controlling its own territory, would be looking for a war with Venezuela, is preposterous. What has to be on Uribe's mind, however, is the support that the FARC --which now has allied with the ELN, the other Colombian guerrilla movement-- is getting from its neighbours, Ecuador and Venezuela. That thesis was recently bolstered by a report from an unlikely source: the Commission named by Ecuador President Rafael Correa, to investigate the circumstances surrounding Colombia's attack on a FARC base on Ecuadorian soil. The report shows clearly that Ecuadorian officials and organizations linked to Venezuela were indeed collaborating with the FARC and meeting its representatives in Ecuador. No mention is made of weapons' provision or direct financial support, but there is enough in that report for Colombia to claim that its neighbours are supporting the guerrilla. Nobody in the region and few countries in the world would accept that as a legitimate excuse for Colombia's to engage in hit-and-run operations in either country, but this may not be enough for the Colombian government who, with massive public support, now appear to be moving for the kill. Such operations, however, could clearly be enough for Venezuela to take the confrontation to a higher level. This would be a high risk gamble, however, and one unlikely to get much support from Brazil and friends in the region (but that's another story).
Chavez, however, is not stopping there. He has also accused the Netherlands (yes!) of planning an aggression against his country. In his own words (though in my translation): "I am accusing the Netherlands, along with the Yankee Empire, of planning an attack against Venezuela." He has in mind the presence of 250 US naval personal in Dutch autonomous islands Aruba and Curação, from where they work on drug interdiction in the Caribbean. Both islands, by the way, are in Venezuela's territorial water.
The problem, in sum, is that if Chavez is looking for trouble, he won't have a hard time finding it: Colombia is indeed aggressively present in border areas, so is the US -both in Colombia and the Caribbean. Moreover, and in spite of the formal archiving of the country's claim over more than half of Guyana's territory, that old claim would be easy enough to resuscitate, for the greatest pleasure of Venezuela's ultra-nationalist circles.
The truly sad thing is that Venezuelans already have enough problems on their plate. It is not surprising in fact that most, according to recent polls [Globe and Mail, Dec. 22: A-13], are utterly uninterested in a war with Colombia, which is the most likely diversionary scenario. Still, would that stop a Chavez who is getting deeper in a hole of his own doing from "jumping"? It's not clear to me. Let's just hope my friend is wrong...
Well, at the very least, Hugo Chavez seems to be looking for a way to divert Venezuelans' attention from inflation, corruption, shortages of basic goods, power outages and especially violent crime. His main theme is obviously Colombia, whom he accuses now of using unmanned drones to attack Venezuela. This accusation, moreover, is only a tiny bit of his big campaign against the military agreement between Colombia and the US that will enable American aircraft to use Colombian airbases as part of their support for that country's war against the FARC and narco-traffickers.
Now, the way in which the US has managed this file is worse than incompetent, like much of their policy towards the region under Obama -Honduras is the other prominent example. However, the idea that Colombia, which is just now --for the first time in its history-- getting close to controlling its own territory, would be looking for a war with Venezuela, is preposterous. What has to be on Uribe's mind, however, is the support that the FARC --which now has allied with the ELN, the other Colombian guerrilla movement-- is getting from its neighbours, Ecuador and Venezuela. That thesis was recently bolstered by a report from an unlikely source: the Commission named by Ecuador President Rafael Correa, to investigate the circumstances surrounding Colombia's attack on a FARC base on Ecuadorian soil. The report shows clearly that Ecuadorian officials and organizations linked to Venezuela were indeed collaborating with the FARC and meeting its representatives in Ecuador. No mention is made of weapons' provision or direct financial support, but there is enough in that report for Colombia to claim that its neighbours are supporting the guerrilla. Nobody in the region and few countries in the world would accept that as a legitimate excuse for Colombia's to engage in hit-and-run operations in either country, but this may not be enough for the Colombian government who, with massive public support, now appear to be moving for the kill. Such operations, however, could clearly be enough for Venezuela to take the confrontation to a higher level. This would be a high risk gamble, however, and one unlikely to get much support from Brazil and friends in the region (but that's another story).
Chavez, however, is not stopping there. He has also accused the Netherlands (yes!) of planning an aggression against his country. In his own words (though in my translation): "I am accusing the Netherlands, along with the Yankee Empire, of planning an attack against Venezuela." He has in mind the presence of 250 US naval personal in Dutch autonomous islands Aruba and Curação, from where they work on drug interdiction in the Caribbean. Both islands, by the way, are in Venezuela's territorial water.
The problem, in sum, is that if Chavez is looking for trouble, he won't have a hard time finding it: Colombia is indeed aggressively present in border areas, so is the US -both in Colombia and the Caribbean. Moreover, and in spite of the formal archiving of the country's claim over more than half of Guyana's territory, that old claim would be easy enough to resuscitate, for the greatest pleasure of Venezuela's ultra-nationalist circles.
The truly sad thing is that Venezuelans already have enough problems on their plate. It is not surprising in fact that most, according to recent polls [Globe and Mail, Dec. 22: A-13], are utterly uninterested in a war with Colombia, which is the most likely diversionary scenario. Still, would that stop a Chavez who is getting deeper in a hole of his own doing from "jumping"? It's not clear to me. Let's just hope my friend is wrong...
Monday, December 21, 2009
Venezuela in Mercosur: Insights from Copenhagen (out of all place)
Brazil's Senate has finally approved the entry of Venezuela in the Mercosur bloc. The only hurdle remaining now is a vote from the Paraguayan Congress.
Brazilian advocates of the move, like Celso Amorim, the country's foreign minister, point out that this will make the bloc significantly larger and more powerful. For Brazil and Argentina, it could also pay handsomely if Venezuela complies with Mercosur rules and fully eliminates tariffs on imports from bloc countries: both already have huge trade surpluses with Venezuela and the latter exports basically nothing but oil.
There will be a price to pay, however. Mercosur acts as a bloc in trade negociation, i.e. no member country can sign an agreement with anybody without the other bloc members agreeing to it. For the foreseeable future, this will mean making deals that Hugo Chavez approves of. And the problem is, Venezuela has very little at stake in trade negotiations, because markets are fully open to the only thing it exports, namely its thick oil. In other words, it is free to be as rigid as it likes. Clearly, moreover, Venezuela under Chavez appears keen on doing just that.
For a recent example, take Copenhagen. Everybody agrees that the agreement is at best a rough starting point. At least, arguably, everybody appears willing to start something. But wait a bit: not everybody. Out of 193 countries, five refused to sign the agreement: Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan and Venezuela. But for Sudan--which also enjoys a perverse kind of "freedom" thanks to its oil--, this little club is Chavez' club.
Dear Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay: unless the Paraguayan Congress holds out indefinitely, expect more of the same on everything that Mercosur gets involved with. One more nail on the bloc's coffin?
Brazilian advocates of the move, like Celso Amorim, the country's foreign minister, point out that this will make the bloc significantly larger and more powerful. For Brazil and Argentina, it could also pay handsomely if Venezuela complies with Mercosur rules and fully eliminates tariffs on imports from bloc countries: both already have huge trade surpluses with Venezuela and the latter exports basically nothing but oil.
There will be a price to pay, however. Mercosur acts as a bloc in trade negociation, i.e. no member country can sign an agreement with anybody without the other bloc members agreeing to it. For the foreseeable future, this will mean making deals that Hugo Chavez approves of. And the problem is, Venezuela has very little at stake in trade negotiations, because markets are fully open to the only thing it exports, namely its thick oil. In other words, it is free to be as rigid as it likes. Clearly, moreover, Venezuela under Chavez appears keen on doing just that.
For a recent example, take Copenhagen. Everybody agrees that the agreement is at best a rough starting point. At least, arguably, everybody appears willing to start something. But wait a bit: not everybody. Out of 193 countries, five refused to sign the agreement: Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan and Venezuela. But for Sudan--which also enjoys a perverse kind of "freedom" thanks to its oil--, this little club is Chavez' club.
Dear Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay: unless the Paraguayan Congress holds out indefinitely, expect more of the same on everything that Mercosur gets involved with. One more nail on the bloc's coffin?
Friday, December 4, 2009
Lula and Ahmadinejad
Moisés Naím has published in El País a marvelous little piece about Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's recent visit to Brazil . It is called "Lula's secret documents," and is purely fictional.
For those not in the know, Moisés Naím is the editor of Foreign Policy Magazine. He was one of the technocrats that Venezuela's then-President Carlos Andrés Pérez (CAP) had brought to him to un-paralyze the country's economy and government in the 1990s. As you may remember, that attempt collapsed in death, fire, and humiliation in 1992 when CAP's economic shock therapy met with massive public protests in Caracas --the Caracazo-- whose repression led to the death of more than 100 people. Shortly thereafter, CAP, his ideas, and his policies were further discredited when he was demoted by the Country's Supreme Court and condemned for corruption. Naím could be described as a modern social-democrat, in the mold of Felipe Gonzalez and perhaps Tony Blair. Perhaps more relevant, he is also a standing member of that transnational elite -almost an aristocracy- of Latin-American technocrats, academics and intellectuals, highly-cultivated, usually well-off, superbly educated (generally in the United States, Paris, or both), and as much at ease in the salons, offices and universities of Washington, Paris, New York or Madrid, as they are in the region's capitals themselves (think of Mario Vargas Llosa, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Jorge Castañeda, Ricardo Hausman, Andrés Rozental, and so on. But that's another story. The key thing is: able and well-connected, Naím was quickly back on his feet and he has led the transformation of Foreign Policy, a staid and somewhat boring quarterly, into the hypest, most lively and best-looking international affairs web-journal in existence today. For what I know, he is based in New York, but he also writes in El País.
His column tells of a briefing note written by Lula's advisers, selling him the idea of welcoming Ahmadinejad. At once, it argues, Lula could poke a finger in the eye of the US, thus affirming Brazil's independence, and remind the world that Brasilia, as the capital of a world power, must be involved in big multilateral endeavors like containing Iran's nuclear program, which is not the case at the moment. Naím has obviously never seen such a note, but given the track record of Lula advisers Marco Aurelio Garcia and Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, it is very easy to imagine just such things being wispered in the President's ear.
Naím follows with a ficticious letter from a friend of Lula, a companion in the fight against the military regime, in the 1970s and 1980s, who has qualms about his getting too too close to people like Ahmadinejad. The trick is old, and could easily be cheap, but it is not. In fact, it borders on the poignant. The friend is understanding: yes, politics, domestic or foreign, calls for compromise, but there is a limit and, he feels, Lula has crossed it. Here is an excerpt, which I have translated from the Spanish original:
"I felt a great sadness when I saw you embrace the president of Iran. Did it cross you mind, old friend, that if you and I had been doing in Iran today what we did in Brazil when we were young -protest against the dictatorship- this president would have condemned us both to death? Iran's official TV announced death sentence for eight people. Their crime? To have protested against the government and against what they felt was the fraudulent election of the president that you received with all the honors. In other words, Lula, they will die in the hands of your guest for being what you were when you had their age and, just like them, could not stand in silence in the face of dictatorship. Moreover, in Iran, hundreds of students and political leaders are in prison and for sure many were being tortured while you were offering a banquet to the man responsible for it. I don't object to your inviting this tyran: I understand that these are "State" calculations. I hope that, in private, you told him that Brazilians don't like governments that kill their opponents. But I am saddened to see you holding his hand. There is blood on them, not on yours."
Case closed, no?
One more thing: this translation just cannot convey the palpable sadness of the original, so if you read Spanish, get the article itself, it almost feels like Jorge Luis Borges, still alive, delving in foreign policy commentary...
For those not in the know, Moisés Naím is the editor of Foreign Policy Magazine. He was one of the technocrats that Venezuela's then-President Carlos Andrés Pérez (CAP) had brought to him to un-paralyze the country's economy and government in the 1990s. As you may remember, that attempt collapsed in death, fire, and humiliation in 1992 when CAP's economic shock therapy met with massive public protests in Caracas --the Caracazo-- whose repression led to the death of more than 100 people. Shortly thereafter, CAP, his ideas, and his policies were further discredited when he was demoted by the Country's Supreme Court and condemned for corruption. Naím could be described as a modern social-democrat, in the mold of Felipe Gonzalez and perhaps Tony Blair. Perhaps more relevant, he is also a standing member of that transnational elite -almost an aristocracy- of Latin-American technocrats, academics and intellectuals, highly-cultivated, usually well-off, superbly educated (generally in the United States, Paris, or both), and as much at ease in the salons, offices and universities of Washington, Paris, New York or Madrid, as they are in the region's capitals themselves (think of Mario Vargas Llosa, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Jorge Castañeda, Ricardo Hausman, Andrés Rozental, and so on. But that's another story. The key thing is: able and well-connected, Naím was quickly back on his feet and he has led the transformation of Foreign Policy, a staid and somewhat boring quarterly, into the hypest, most lively and best-looking international affairs web-journal in existence today. For what I know, he is based in New York, but he also writes in El País.
His column tells of a briefing note written by Lula's advisers, selling him the idea of welcoming Ahmadinejad. At once, it argues, Lula could poke a finger in the eye of the US, thus affirming Brazil's independence, and remind the world that Brasilia, as the capital of a world power, must be involved in big multilateral endeavors like containing Iran's nuclear program, which is not the case at the moment. Naím has obviously never seen such a note, but given the track record of Lula advisers Marco Aurelio Garcia and Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, it is very easy to imagine just such things being wispered in the President's ear.
Naím follows with a ficticious letter from a friend of Lula, a companion in the fight against the military regime, in the 1970s and 1980s, who has qualms about his getting too too close to people like Ahmadinejad. The trick is old, and could easily be cheap, but it is not. In fact, it borders on the poignant. The friend is understanding: yes, politics, domestic or foreign, calls for compromise, but there is a limit and, he feels, Lula has crossed it. Here is an excerpt, which I have translated from the Spanish original:
"I felt a great sadness when I saw you embrace the president of Iran. Did it cross you mind, old friend, that if you and I had been doing in Iran today what we did in Brazil when we were young -protest against the dictatorship- this president would have condemned us both to death? Iran's official TV announced death sentence for eight people. Their crime? To have protested against the government and against what they felt was the fraudulent election of the president that you received with all the honors. In other words, Lula, they will die in the hands of your guest for being what you were when you had their age and, just like them, could not stand in silence in the face of dictatorship. Moreover, in Iran, hundreds of students and political leaders are in prison and for sure many were being tortured while you were offering a banquet to the man responsible for it. I don't object to your inviting this tyran: I understand that these are "State" calculations. I hope that, in private, you told him that Brazilians don't like governments that kill their opponents. But I am saddened to see you holding his hand. There is blood on them, not on yours."
Case closed, no?
One more thing: this translation just cannot convey the palpable sadness of the original, so if you read Spanish, get the article itself, it almost feels like Jorge Luis Borges, still alive, delving in foreign policy commentary...
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Let's be serious: Mercosur is over
Mercosur has become a bad joke. Continuous little crises belie the assurances of confidence and progress that are periodically uttered by the foreign ministries of Brazil, Argentina and their partners in grime. The latest source of tension, which has been termed "The Toy War," is one more example of the pathetic state of a process of regional economic integration in which much effort and resources has been invested, with little to show for it. So little in fact that closing the file would probably be of little real consequence for the countries involved: they would still have their little fights, their good days together, and regular meetings to discuss common problems. They would be freer to negotiate commercial agreements but, above all, they would stop having to patch up a cover for a process that, honestly, has never gone far institutionally, and that has made very little difference to dynamics of cooperation, integration and conflict that would have developed anyway.
Mercosur stands for Mercado Comun del Sur: the Common Market of the South. Made up of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, it is a common tariff zone, i.e. its member countries not only trade freely with one another, but also share external tariff barriers. As such it is more ambitious than a simple free trade zone like NAFTA, but less so than a full-fledged economic community, like the EU. It has been touted as the region's answer to ultra-liberal NAFTA, as a way for its members to build-up their export capacities behind some protection, and as a political springboard for its member countries, to gain influence in the world by acting collectively, particularly but not exclusively in trade negotiations, where the bloc stands as one.
Mercosur has a little secretariat, a Presidency that roves from one country to the next every six months, and even a Parliament, but every decision of import are taken by the Presidents of the countries. The president has no autonomy, the secretariat no capacity, and nobody cares about the Parliament or knows anything about who its members are or what they do. If you don't believe me, go check the website of any of the major journals of any of the four countries, seach for "Parlamento" and "Mercosur" --or "Mercosul" for Brazilian papers. If you find something, PLEASE do send it to me because my files are empty...
The history of commercial conflicts between Mercosur countries, particularly Argentina and Brazil, is long, lively, and pathetic. Fortunately for the student of trade issues in the region, the press in the region has long decided to treat those conflicts lightly. Among others, we have thus had the Cellulose War (between Argentina and Uruguay, still raging, by the way), the Chicken War, the Fridge War, the Shoe War, the Stove War and now, in step with the holiday season, the Toy War, all of them between Argentina and Brazil. The Toy War story is typical: the government of Argentina, to protect its toy industries, announced last week that it was imposing import license for Brazilian toys and would limit the quantities brought into the country. This week, Brazil announced that they would do the same to Argentinian toys. This is happening a few days after a meeting between President Lula and Argentina's President Cristina Kirchner, a meeting meant precisely to tackle the fast-growing list of little commercial skirmishes that is poisoning the relationship between the two countries.
The problem is much deeper than toys, or shoes, or fridges or even all this together. As The Economist was noting a few weeks back, Brazil is taking off, and Argentina remains stuck. The asymmetry between the two countries has been growing consistently since the mid-90s, with Brazil's relative weight in Mercosur, for trade, investment, GDP per capita, military power or almost any other metric, growing steadily. Argentina appears to be living on borrowed time, with a new economic crisis in the offing. Perhaps most damaging, Brazil's dependence on the bloc is also steadily diminishing. It is as if Germany were getting ever more powerful relative to all the other members of Europe, while becoming increasingly tied up politically, strategically and economically with China and the US. The exact opposite, by the way, is happening, with the European bonds getting stronger and the relative weight of its big players --Germany and France-- diminishing progressively, as new countries join in and as growth in smaller and more backward economies is typically stronger than in the larger ones.
To make things worse for Mercosur, a vote in the Brazilian senate is the last obstacle to Venezuela's joining the bloc as a full member. This would mean that the commercial policy of all of its members would suddenly become hostage to the whims of Hugo Chavez. A vote in time for Chrismas would make for great titles though: Santa Chavez gets involved in the Toy War.
No, really: Time to bury this one.
Mercosur stands for Mercado Comun del Sur: the Common Market of the South. Made up of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, it is a common tariff zone, i.e. its member countries not only trade freely with one another, but also share external tariff barriers. As such it is more ambitious than a simple free trade zone like NAFTA, but less so than a full-fledged economic community, like the EU. It has been touted as the region's answer to ultra-liberal NAFTA, as a way for its members to build-up their export capacities behind some protection, and as a political springboard for its member countries, to gain influence in the world by acting collectively, particularly but not exclusively in trade negotiations, where the bloc stands as one.
Mercosur has a little secretariat, a Presidency that roves from one country to the next every six months, and even a Parliament, but every decision of import are taken by the Presidents of the countries. The president has no autonomy, the secretariat no capacity, and nobody cares about the Parliament or knows anything about who its members are or what they do. If you don't believe me, go check the website of any of the major journals of any of the four countries, seach for "Parlamento" and "Mercosur" --or "Mercosul" for Brazilian papers. If you find something, PLEASE do send it to me because my files are empty...
The history of commercial conflicts between Mercosur countries, particularly Argentina and Brazil, is long, lively, and pathetic. Fortunately for the student of trade issues in the region, the press in the region has long decided to treat those conflicts lightly. Among others, we have thus had the Cellulose War (between Argentina and Uruguay, still raging, by the way), the Chicken War, the Fridge War, the Shoe War, the Stove War and now, in step with the holiday season, the Toy War, all of them between Argentina and Brazil. The Toy War story is typical: the government of Argentina, to protect its toy industries, announced last week that it was imposing import license for Brazilian toys and would limit the quantities brought into the country. This week, Brazil announced that they would do the same to Argentinian toys. This is happening a few days after a meeting between President Lula and Argentina's President Cristina Kirchner, a meeting meant precisely to tackle the fast-growing list of little commercial skirmishes that is poisoning the relationship between the two countries.
The problem is much deeper than toys, or shoes, or fridges or even all this together. As The Economist was noting a few weeks back, Brazil is taking off, and Argentina remains stuck. The asymmetry between the two countries has been growing consistently since the mid-90s, with Brazil's relative weight in Mercosur, for trade, investment, GDP per capita, military power or almost any other metric, growing steadily. Argentina appears to be living on borrowed time, with a new economic crisis in the offing. Perhaps most damaging, Brazil's dependence on the bloc is also steadily diminishing. It is as if Germany were getting ever more powerful relative to all the other members of Europe, while becoming increasingly tied up politically, strategically and economically with China and the US. The exact opposite, by the way, is happening, with the European bonds getting stronger and the relative weight of its big players --Germany and France-- diminishing progressively, as new countries join in and as growth in smaller and more backward economies is typically stronger than in the larger ones.
To make things worse for Mercosur, a vote in the Brazilian senate is the last obstacle to Venezuela's joining the bloc as a full member. This would mean that the commercial policy of all of its members would suddenly become hostage to the whims of Hugo Chavez. A vote in time for Chrismas would make for great titles though: Santa Chavez gets involved in the Toy War.
No, really: Time to bury this one.
Tuesday, November 3, 2009
Why Brazil is displacing Canada on the world stage
As you probably know, not much is expected of developing countries at the forthcoming Copenhagen conference on global warming. For that matter, not much is expected from developed countries either, and especially not from Canada. The rich have to pay is the South's standard line, and they certainly have a point as the West and Japan are responsible for much of the CO2 hanging in the sky. Why should they pay for our sins when they still have hundreds of millions of poor people who aspire to little more than the life expectancy and standard of living of Canadians in 1960? To which the wealthy reply: big Southern economies are now major producer of greenhouse gas, the consequences are bad for everybody, and especially the poor, so pick up your share of the burden, or suffer, because our societies are not ready to make alone the kind of sacrifice that is required.
Nice background for reaching an agreement, no?
Well, Brazil is about to break that mould. According to Nature the Brazilian government is about to announce a plan to "drastically" reduce emissions. In other words, they will do what both the rich and the poor want the other to do.
Brazil's energy situation is unique: essentially self-sufficient in oil and gaz -and about to become a significant exporter-, it currently relies mostly on hydro-electricity and bio-fuels for its transportation and industrial sector's needs (Ricardo Sennes and Thais Narciso have a great chapter on this in a recent book by the Brookings Institution). This does not make their task easier, however, because it means that they already produce less emissions per unit of GDP than most large industrial economies. Still, they apparently have found ways to cut significantly what is left.
Meanwhile, in Canada, we silently hope that oil sands royalties will get our public finances back in the black...
Nice background for reaching an agreement, no?
Well, Brazil is about to break that mould. According to Nature the Brazilian government is about to announce a plan to "drastically" reduce emissions. In other words, they will do what both the rich and the poor want the other to do.
Brazil's energy situation is unique: essentially self-sufficient in oil and gaz -and about to become a significant exporter-, it currently relies mostly on hydro-electricity and bio-fuels for its transportation and industrial sector's needs (Ricardo Sennes and Thais Narciso have a great chapter on this in a recent book by the Brookings Institution). This does not make their task easier, however, because it means that they already produce less emissions per unit of GDP than most large industrial economies. Still, they apparently have found ways to cut significantly what is left.
Meanwhile, in Canada, we silently hope that oil sands royalties will get our public finances back in the black...
Wednesday, October 7, 2009
Conservative revolutionaries
It is striking how utterly NOT progressive Latin American leftist leaders can be on gender and drug issues, from Castro to Ortega and Chavez.
Castro's well-documented repression of homosexuals is probably the most extreme case, but there are others. A surprising one is the Sandinistas' opposition to abortion. There is a famous anecdote to that effect. In the mid-eighties, a global feminist gathering took place in Managua to express solidarity with the threatened revolution in the face of US support for the contras. Daniel Ortega was the guest of honour at a big gala held during the conference. He was accompanied by his wife, poet Rosario Murillo, then pregnant, and five of their children, including a few from previous marriages. During question period, one of the visitors asked when the government would legalize abortion, to which Daniel, after making a reference to the need to sustain the war effort, said "La mujer nicaraguense va a cumplir con su deber reproductivo," i.e. "Nicaraguan women will comply with their reproductive duty." The answer obviously met with dead silence from the feminist audience, but no doubt in the name of revolutionary solidarity, they kept quiet and the whole thing would subsequently be censored from newspaper accounts of the meeting. All but one account, that is, though a very cryptic for anyone not in the know. At the time, a group of young Sandinista artists and intellectuals were publishing a small weekly called La Semana Comica, very funny, liberal and iconoclastic. The edition that followed the meeting featured a huge centerfold black-and-white photo of a long line of naked pregnant women, seen in profile. Below it, was the slogan of the Sandinista's women mass organization, AMNLAE: "We are AMLAE". I don't know if that hastened the fall of La Semana Comica, which stopped publication a bit later. Given how popular it was with the intellectual rank and files of the Front, my hunch is the economic crisis killed it, not the government, but who knows. Very clearly, however, this one must have irked Daniel and his cronies.
The latest bout of leftist moralism is almost as pathetic: the satiric "Family Guy" program has been banned from Venezuelan TV. Chavez's Justice Minister Tareck El Aissami said he was shocked by an episode's section called "A bag of weed" which is an hilarious plea for pot legalization that has gone viral on the web. The problem for Mr. El Aissami, obviously, is that most people watching the program can find it in cyberspace and probably do it already anyway. Good for them.
Castro's well-documented repression of homosexuals is probably the most extreme case, but there are others. A surprising one is the Sandinistas' opposition to abortion. There is a famous anecdote to that effect. In the mid-eighties, a global feminist gathering took place in Managua to express solidarity with the threatened revolution in the face of US support for the contras. Daniel Ortega was the guest of honour at a big gala held during the conference. He was accompanied by his wife, poet Rosario Murillo, then pregnant, and five of their children, including a few from previous marriages. During question period, one of the visitors asked when the government would legalize abortion, to which Daniel, after making a reference to the need to sustain the war effort, said "La mujer nicaraguense va a cumplir con su deber reproductivo," i.e. "Nicaraguan women will comply with their reproductive duty." The answer obviously met with dead silence from the feminist audience, but no doubt in the name of revolutionary solidarity, they kept quiet and the whole thing would subsequently be censored from newspaper accounts of the meeting. All but one account, that is, though a very cryptic for anyone not in the know. At the time, a group of young Sandinista artists and intellectuals were publishing a small weekly called La Semana Comica, very funny, liberal and iconoclastic. The edition that followed the meeting featured a huge centerfold black-and-white photo of a long line of naked pregnant women, seen in profile. Below it, was the slogan of the Sandinista's women mass organization, AMNLAE: "We are AMLAE". I don't know if that hastened the fall of La Semana Comica, which stopped publication a bit later. Given how popular it was with the intellectual rank and files of the Front, my hunch is the economic crisis killed it, not the government, but who knows. Very clearly, however, this one must have irked Daniel and his cronies.
The latest bout of leftist moralism is almost as pathetic: the satiric "Family Guy" program has been banned from Venezuelan TV. Chavez's Justice Minister Tareck El Aissami said he was shocked by an episode's section called "A bag of weed" which is an hilarious plea for pot legalization that has gone viral on the web. The problem for Mr. El Aissami, obviously, is that most people watching the program can find it in cyberspace and probably do it already anyway. Good for them.
Monday, September 28, 2009
Afghanistan: Giving Too Much, Asking Too Much
With the huge amount of ink and conference time devoted by specialists to Afghanistan in this country, it is striking that the discussion is so weakly influenced by social sciences per se. What we have instead are -sometimes- well-informed guessing, well-meaning and deeply-felt moral arguments, and free-floating advice based on the "lessons" of history or the previous experience of the writer.
Yet, believe it or not, political scientists, economists, and sociologists have done theoretical and empirical work that is extremely relevant to what is happening in Afghanistan, and that has been quite systematically tested and confronted to evidence. Not that this means they speak the truth or that their conclusions should be given some kind of privileged status in the debate. But what they tell us should at least be part of the discussion: good science says little about what "ought" to be, but it tells us something about what "is," and this should matter.
I have three big contributions in mind: the first has to do with the side effects of aid dependence (Djankov et al., 2007; Easterly, 2007); the second with the side effects of democracy in unstable environments (Bates et al., 2008a; Bates, 2008b); and the third with the limits of state-building in poor states with "difficult geographies" (Herbst, 2000; Rubin, 2002). Their implications for the case of Afghanistan are clear: 1) far too much aid is being given to Afghanistan, twisting the incentives of government officials and local leaders; 2) elections like the one Afghans just went through make their current or potential rulers focus on short term gains, which is bad for long-term peace and economic development; and 3) no centralized rule is possible in Afghanistan, which means that stability cannot come from an hypothetical "victory" of the central government over regional challengers, but from deals with them.
If these insights are valid, and I think they are, much is wrong about the West's current efforts in that country. See below for the references.
Yet, believe it or not, political scientists, economists, and sociologists have done theoretical and empirical work that is extremely relevant to what is happening in Afghanistan, and that has been quite systematically tested and confronted to evidence. Not that this means they speak the truth or that their conclusions should be given some kind of privileged status in the debate. But what they tell us should at least be part of the discussion: good science says little about what "ought" to be, but it tells us something about what "is," and this should matter.
I have three big contributions in mind: the first has to do with the side effects of aid dependence (Djankov et al., 2007; Easterly, 2007); the second with the side effects of democracy in unstable environments (Bates et al., 2008a; Bates, 2008b); and the third with the limits of state-building in poor states with "difficult geographies" (Herbst, 2000; Rubin, 2002). Their implications for the case of Afghanistan are clear: 1) far too much aid is being given to Afghanistan, twisting the incentives of government officials and local leaders; 2) elections like the one Afghans just went through make their current or potential rulers focus on short term gains, which is bad for long-term peace and economic development; and 3) no centralized rule is possible in Afghanistan, which means that stability cannot come from an hypothetical "victory" of the central government over regional challengers, but from deals with them.
If these insights are valid, and I think they are, much is wrong about the West's current efforts in that country. See below for the references.
Bates, Robert H. (2008a), When Things Fell Apart. State Failure in Late-Century Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Bates, Robert H.(2008b) "The Logic of State Failure: Learning from Late-Century Africa," Conflict Management and Peace Science,25:4: 297-314.
Djankov, Simeon, José García Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol (2007), “The Curse of Aid,” Working Paper 45254 (Washington DC: The World Bank). http://ssrn.com/abstract=893558
Easterly, William (2007), “Was Development Assistance a Mistake?” American Economic Review, 97(2): 328-332.
Rubin, Barnett (2002), The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and the Collapse of the International System (New Haven, London: Yale University Press).
Friday, September 25, 2009
Should Canada worry about Brazil?
Readers of Western media will have noticed a strange buzz about Brazil recently. President Lula still benefits from a huge capital of sympathy, from all sides, and most Western analysts see Brazil as a benevolent new global player, far less threatening than Iran, devoid of the dark sides of Russia and China, less messy than South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, or Pakistan, and much more accessible and easy to understand than far-away and complicated India and Indonesia. There is growing discomfort, however, with the perceived unreliability of Brazil as an ally of Western capitalist democracies. This has nothing to do with Lula's leftist background, which he has shown to be largely irrelevant to his domestic and international policies. In fact, the problem with Brazil, assuming there is one, does not appear to be ideology, but the fact that it pushes pragmatism and realism a tad too far.
Such discomfort was epitomized recently by The Economist magazine, which asked, in a cover story, editorial and special section, "[o]n which side is Brazil?" suggesting that the West should demand that Brazil show more principled stances on issues like democracy, human rights, and nuclear proliferation, that it adopt a less nationalistic tone in its dealings with the US, a more critical attitude towards Iran and Venezuela, and a tad less openness towards China. The self-appointed voice of the global establishment thus wants Brazil to demonstrate a clearer alignment with the positions of Western powers, in exchange, presumably, for better Brazilian access to the core clubs of global governance, the UN Security Council above all.
That position is preposterous on many counts, beginning with the idea that it is the West that holds the key to Security Council reform, when in fact, nobody can deliver a permanent seat to anyone today. As to the other clubs, Brazil is at the centre of WTO trade negotiations, and a weighty player in global warming and nuclear proliferation discussions; it was already a regular attendee to extended G8 meetings, and with the G20 all but taking over the coordination role traditionally held by the G8, Brazil's place at the centre of global economic governance is assured. The reason for that presence has nothing to do with Brazil's alignment with other capitalist democracies and does not result from Western generosity: Brazilians are invited because few if any global agreements can be reached without their being involved in the discussion and fully supportive. Arguably in fact, few clubs of which Brazil is not a member can claim much clout today. In other words, there is very little that can be offered by the West in exchange for Brazil's alignment: the West needs Brazil more than Brazil needs the West. This is what appears to rattle some analysts: little leverage on a state that does not always appear to behave as one wishes.
These concerns are not justified: there are no good reasons to worry about Brazil for the simple reason that the way in which the country deploys its growing power are consistent with Western democracies' interests. More importantly, the convergence between Brazil and the West is robust precisely because it is based on a pragmatic and realist reading by Brazilian elites, both in and out of government, of the country's hard-core interests, not on some fluffy ideological commitment.
Brazil is playing by the liberal cookbook both domestically and internationally, and winning. In addition to drastically lowering tariffs beginning in 1989, its economic discipline since the mid-1990s have made it an anchor of economic stability in Latin America. In fact, the country has suffered the least of any major capitalist country from the financial crisis. The Brazilian economy's resilience over the last eighteen months has convinced Moody's, on September 22, to join Fitch and Standard and Poor and give the country an investment grade credit rating. Growth prospects for 2010 --at 4.5-5%-- are excellent, inflation is under control, and the unemployment rate is lower than in Canada or the United States. Already an ethanol superpower, significant oil and gas discoveries have made the country essentially self-sufficient in energy and a soon-to-be significant oil exporter –and maybe OPEP member too. Brazilian politics has had its share of scandals in recent months, but the foundation of its democracy is extremely sound and the next presidential elections, in 2010, will likely be as clean as any in the Western world. Finally, public security, long a bane for tourists, investors, and above all Brazilians rich and poor, has bettered radically in the country's largest metropolitan areas.
The worriers challenge none of this. What bothers them are Brazil's international stands and the willingness of President Lula to talk and hold photo-ops with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; to refuse to openly confront Hugo Chavez on his weapons' buying spree, on his increasingly authoritarian rule, and on his ambitions to build within Latin America some kind of anti-liberal and anti-US coalition; to periodically, if indirecly, question the legitimacy of the global non-proliferation regime; to be assertive and vocal in questioning US military presence in Latin America; and to demand with increasing insistence reforms in global governance institutions that would give more power to India, China, and Brazil itself.
If we consider that the interests of capitalist democracies can only be served by regional stability in the Americas and by a functional set of global governance institutions, most of Brazil's current stands, far from worrying, should be seen as significant contributions to the defense and promotion of those interests. A confrontational stance towards Chavez and his band of small, poor, and mostly unstable allies, would contribute nothing to the management of current tensions in the region. Often in the face of US indifference or bungling, as in the case of American access to some of Colombia's military bases, Lula and his diplomats have been most adept at disarming the various international crises linked to what are hopefully the last stages of that country's continuing civil war. Brazil's own weapons acquisition program prevents the balance of military power in South America from tilting towards Venezuela.
One can draw a similar picture on the global scene: the recent financial crisis has clearly shown the inadequacies of current mechanisms of global financial governance, from the IMF to the G-7; the UN Security Council, without Japan, Germany, India, or any African or Latin American country among its permanent member, clearly suffers from a tremendous deficit of legitimacy and political clout; nuclear powers, comfortable in their oligopoly, have until now proven unwilling to move decisively towards effective disarmament, which was supposed to be the counterpart to non-nuclear states' acquiescence to complete vulnerability. The issue of Iran --whose President will be visiting Brazil next month-- may look more ambiguous. Yet, there is nothing to suggest that Brazil would support the nuclear program of what is after all a competitor among emerging powers. Moreover, Brazil's maneuvers could very well be meant to gain a seat at one of the few global tables on which it does not sit: indeed, the P5+1, the world's "team" charged with negotiating with Iran (made up of the Security Council's permanent members and of Germany) excludes all emerging powers from the South, something once again that diminishes its legitimacy and clout. In the end, Brazil's building a bridge with Iran, as it has done with Venezuela, could be either helpful or at worse irrelevant to global efforts to contain Iranian ambitions.
What is most interesting and advantageous from the West's standpoint, however, is that Brazil is acting very much for its own sake. Instability and the military build up in South America threaten its interests much more than the US' or any other power's, and better balanced and more legitimate global governance institutions imply more space and more power for Brazil itself. This basically means that those options are stable and hat the country's policy is largely predictable. Brazil is on its own side, but that side is also, from most standpoints, the West's side.
What about Canada?
This is a mixed bag for Canada. On one hand, and this is most important, an increasingly prosperous, reliable and stable Brazil that works to limit tensions and instability in the Americas clearly serves Canadian interests, however one defines them. Similarly, effective global governance is a true public good and to the extent that Brazil's growing involvement in global affairs enhances the world's ability to confront its problems, its growing influence also serves Canadian interests. The flip side of it all, however, is that what space Brazil occupies is largely lost to others, and Canada is one of those losers. As became clear at the Pittsburgh Summit, there are new players around and Canada's privileged access to the core clubs of global governance is threatened if not already significantly curtailed. There is something unjust about this: the country's sacrifice in the defense of Western democracies' interests and values, from WWII to the Balkans and Afghanistan, and its contribution to world governance over the last 50 years have been by any measure significantly greater than Brazil's. Yet this is not about justice but about power and effeciveness: most "minimum governing coalitions" today need Brazil, not Canada.
Beyond hurt feelings, there is also a real price to be paid: to lose access to core governance clubs implies a diminished ability to shape global politics in a way that is consistent with one's own interests. Canada will need to fight harder and is very likely to lose more battles in coming years, on all fronts, from trade to environmental regimes.
The ultimate balance is not clear: I would venture that Canadians gain more from the contribution of a more assertive and influential Brazil to regional and global governance than it loses through diminished influence. Yet, I would not bet the farm on this.
Such discomfort was epitomized recently by The Economist magazine, which asked, in a cover story, editorial and special section, "[o]n which side is Brazil?" suggesting that the West should demand that Brazil show more principled stances on issues like democracy, human rights, and nuclear proliferation, that it adopt a less nationalistic tone in its dealings with the US, a more critical attitude towards Iran and Venezuela, and a tad less openness towards China. The self-appointed voice of the global establishment thus wants Brazil to demonstrate a clearer alignment with the positions of Western powers, in exchange, presumably, for better Brazilian access to the core clubs of global governance, the UN Security Council above all.
That position is preposterous on many counts, beginning with the idea that it is the West that holds the key to Security Council reform, when in fact, nobody can deliver a permanent seat to anyone today. As to the other clubs, Brazil is at the centre of WTO trade negotiations, and a weighty player in global warming and nuclear proliferation discussions; it was already a regular attendee to extended G8 meetings, and with the G20 all but taking over the coordination role traditionally held by the G8, Brazil's place at the centre of global economic governance is assured. The reason for that presence has nothing to do with Brazil's alignment with other capitalist democracies and does not result from Western generosity: Brazilians are invited because few if any global agreements can be reached without their being involved in the discussion and fully supportive. Arguably in fact, few clubs of which Brazil is not a member can claim much clout today. In other words, there is very little that can be offered by the West in exchange for Brazil's alignment: the West needs Brazil more than Brazil needs the West. This is what appears to rattle some analysts: little leverage on a state that does not always appear to behave as one wishes.
These concerns are not justified: there are no good reasons to worry about Brazil for the simple reason that the way in which the country deploys its growing power are consistent with Western democracies' interests. More importantly, the convergence between Brazil and the West is robust precisely because it is based on a pragmatic and realist reading by Brazilian elites, both in and out of government, of the country's hard-core interests, not on some fluffy ideological commitment.
Brazil is playing by the liberal cookbook both domestically and internationally, and winning. In addition to drastically lowering tariffs beginning in 1989, its economic discipline since the mid-1990s have made it an anchor of economic stability in Latin America. In fact, the country has suffered the least of any major capitalist country from the financial crisis. The Brazilian economy's resilience over the last eighteen months has convinced Moody's, on September 22, to join Fitch and Standard and Poor and give the country an investment grade credit rating. Growth prospects for 2010 --at 4.5-5%-- are excellent, inflation is under control, and the unemployment rate is lower than in Canada or the United States. Already an ethanol superpower, significant oil and gas discoveries have made the country essentially self-sufficient in energy and a soon-to-be significant oil exporter –and maybe OPEP member too. Brazilian politics has had its share of scandals in recent months, but the foundation of its democracy is extremely sound and the next presidential elections, in 2010, will likely be as clean as any in the Western world. Finally, public security, long a bane for tourists, investors, and above all Brazilians rich and poor, has bettered radically in the country's largest metropolitan areas.
The worriers challenge none of this. What bothers them are Brazil's international stands and the willingness of President Lula to talk and hold photo-ops with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; to refuse to openly confront Hugo Chavez on his weapons' buying spree, on his increasingly authoritarian rule, and on his ambitions to build within Latin America some kind of anti-liberal and anti-US coalition; to periodically, if indirecly, question the legitimacy of the global non-proliferation regime; to be assertive and vocal in questioning US military presence in Latin America; and to demand with increasing insistence reforms in global governance institutions that would give more power to India, China, and Brazil itself.
If we consider that the interests of capitalist democracies can only be served by regional stability in the Americas and by a functional set of global governance institutions, most of Brazil's current stands, far from worrying, should be seen as significant contributions to the defense and promotion of those interests. A confrontational stance towards Chavez and his band of small, poor, and mostly unstable allies, would contribute nothing to the management of current tensions in the region. Often in the face of US indifference or bungling, as in the case of American access to some of Colombia's military bases, Lula and his diplomats have been most adept at disarming the various international crises linked to what are hopefully the last stages of that country's continuing civil war. Brazil's own weapons acquisition program prevents the balance of military power in South America from tilting towards Venezuela.
One can draw a similar picture on the global scene: the recent financial crisis has clearly shown the inadequacies of current mechanisms of global financial governance, from the IMF to the G-7; the UN Security Council, without Japan, Germany, India, or any African or Latin American country among its permanent member, clearly suffers from a tremendous deficit of legitimacy and political clout; nuclear powers, comfortable in their oligopoly, have until now proven unwilling to move decisively towards effective disarmament, which was supposed to be the counterpart to non-nuclear states' acquiescence to complete vulnerability. The issue of Iran --whose President will be visiting Brazil next month-- may look more ambiguous. Yet, there is nothing to suggest that Brazil would support the nuclear program of what is after all a competitor among emerging powers. Moreover, Brazil's maneuvers could very well be meant to gain a seat at one of the few global tables on which it does not sit: indeed, the P5+1, the world's "team" charged with negotiating with Iran (made up of the Security Council's permanent members and of Germany) excludes all emerging powers from the South, something once again that diminishes its legitimacy and clout. In the end, Brazil's building a bridge with Iran, as it has done with Venezuela, could be either helpful or at worse irrelevant to global efforts to contain Iranian ambitions.
What is most interesting and advantageous from the West's standpoint, however, is that Brazil is acting very much for its own sake. Instability and the military build up in South America threaten its interests much more than the US' or any other power's, and better balanced and more legitimate global governance institutions imply more space and more power for Brazil itself. This basically means that those options are stable and hat the country's policy is largely predictable. Brazil is on its own side, but that side is also, from most standpoints, the West's side.
What about Canada?
This is a mixed bag for Canada. On one hand, and this is most important, an increasingly prosperous, reliable and stable Brazil that works to limit tensions and instability in the Americas clearly serves Canadian interests, however one defines them. Similarly, effective global governance is a true public good and to the extent that Brazil's growing involvement in global affairs enhances the world's ability to confront its problems, its growing influence also serves Canadian interests. The flip side of it all, however, is that what space Brazil occupies is largely lost to others, and Canada is one of those losers. As became clear at the Pittsburgh Summit, there are new players around and Canada's privileged access to the core clubs of global governance is threatened if not already significantly curtailed. There is something unjust about this: the country's sacrifice in the defense of Western democracies' interests and values, from WWII to the Balkans and Afghanistan, and its contribution to world governance over the last 50 years have been by any measure significantly greater than Brazil's. Yet this is not about justice but about power and effeciveness: most "minimum governing coalitions" today need Brazil, not Canada.
Beyond hurt feelings, there is also a real price to be paid: to lose access to core governance clubs implies a diminished ability to shape global politics in a way that is consistent with one's own interests. Canada will need to fight harder and is very likely to lose more battles in coming years, on all fronts, from trade to environmental regimes.
The ultimate balance is not clear: I would venture that Canadians gain more from the contribution of a more assertive and influential Brazil to regional and global governance than it loses through diminished influence. Yet, I would not bet the farm on this.
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